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alike. It is as if there is a formula set in stone how one should write the 
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doctoral thesis is an arduous task and moves on to thanking the supervisor, other 
reviewers, commentators, and secretaries as well as one’s friends and family. 
Naturally, one cannot mention everyone, who has been part of the process, and 
thus an apology is in order to those who are left unnamed. As I discovered when I 
wrote the first draft of my acknowledgements, this formula is hard to break and 
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you for all your advice – academic and non-academic – for your patience, for 
challenging me, for knowing how to challenge me, and for caring, Don Corellone. 
Andrew Glencross, Thomas Teichler, and Xymena Kurowska began their doctoral 
research at the same time as I did, and they were all also supervised by Fritz. After 




an important part in solidifying the friendships. The first Dinner took place in my 
apartment, where I had invited Andrew, Thomas, and Xymena as well as Fritz. 
Fritz took over the cooking, and I’m pretty sure the word “deadbeat” was used, 
while he tried to teach us how to cook his specialty dishes. Although none of us 
supervisees had similar topics, we all learned much from each other. Thank you 
for all the good times and the support you have given me. 
 Moreover, Thomas and I used to spend a day every now and then trying to 
explain our own work to each other. Perhaps it was more about explaining it all to 
oneself, but in any case these intensive but relaxed “workshops” that he and I 
shared were an enormous help in seeing the research on a higher level or at least 
differently. We used to call these workshops “Camp Davids,” and I hope that there 
will be many more in the future. Thank you Thomas for your patience, for your 
time, and for your interest in my work. 
The term “Camp David” is actually owed to my brother Tuomas, who coined it 
with Aaron Mehrotra. For me, one of the perks for coming to Florence was to be in 
the same city with my brother. Because of my earlier studies, we had been in 
different countries for years. It was unfortunate for me that he got an offer he 
couldn’t refuse after the first Christmas, but the months that we shared made up 
for all the years of separation. In addition to being an excellent bigger brother, I 
should thank him for telling me to apply to the EUI. 
At the EUI and the SPS department, I would like to thank especially Maureen 
Lechleitner and Marie-Ange Catotti. Both of them always found time for me, 
supported me, and tolerated my silly questions about administrative matters. Of 
the other staff at the EUI, I would like to mention especially Antonella. Her 
cheerfulness was simply marvelous. Unfortunately there are too many other 
people to be named of the EUI staff who have contributed to the making of this 
thesis, and the same is true also of people in the city center. I hope, though, that 
they know how much I have appreciated them. I would, however, like to mention 
famiglia Murgia, Ilenia, Antonio, and Riccardo. They have made me feel at home 




Although the good friends I made during these years may not have directly 
contributed to this thesis, they have nevertheless had their impact indirectly. 
Thank you for your friendship and for all the good times Juho “Wingman” 
Härkönen, David “Gollum” Lebovitch, Tambiama “Tambi” Madiega, Tiago “Maniac” 
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The traditional debate concerning humanitarian intervention has changed since 
the publication of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report. This thesis addresses 
both the debate before the publication of the R2P report and the report itself by 
examining in-depth the international responsibility, which the international 
community shares in relation to such grave humanitarian crises as genocide. It is 
argued that the debate before the R2P report made implicit assumptions about 
international responsibility. Moreover, international collective responsibility is 
examined both at a conceptual level and at a practical level, thus contributing to 
the discussion after the publication of the R2P report. It is argued that especially 
the conceptualization of international responsibility is lacking in the report, and 
this thesis suggests a conceptualization of international collective responsibility, 
which is then modeled in the second half of this thesis. Furthermore, the 
responsibility model and its functioning are illustrated first with the help of a 
thought experiment and then by examining the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and 
some of the international responses to the tragedy. The responsibility model 
serves also as a tool for evaluating the international responses, and thus the 
justifications of non-intervention are assessed. 
On a higher level this thesis contributes to an understanding of the functioning of 
international politics. For example, the thesis argues for a particular 
understanding of the international community as well as state practice within the 
community. Moreover, the thesis addresses some of the roles that states have and 
some of the expectations that we have of states at the international level. Finally, 
the use of discretion in practicing international politics is an underlying theme of 
this thesis, thus addressing both what is the politics in international politics and 
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You need to believe in things that aren’t true; how else can they become?1 
 
When studying international politics we often study things that are the creation of 
our minds. What is the balance of power, the state, or sovereignty but products of 
our imagination? We cannot point to or touch anything that would correspond 
with “the state” or “sovereignty.” For example, although a national flag is a symbol 
of a state, it hardly is the state. Similarly, it would be a mistake to claim that 
counting tanks or missiles would equal to determining the balance of power. 
Naturally, tanks and missiles do contribute to determining the balance of power, 
but they would remain pieces of metal welded together, if we did not assign them 
as “tanks” and “missiles” and as something that ought to be counted in the balance 
of power. In a similar vein, such concepts as “justice” and “fairness” do not exist 
“out there.” We believe that justice should prevail, and we believe in fairness. Yet, 
it is our beliefs and our commitment to being just or fair that conjure these 
concepts, and it is our actions that make them real despite being intangible. 
For some reason, however, we limit the applicability of our own creations. Justice, 
for example, is considered to be a cornerstone of civilized society, yet only 
relatively recently has the notion of justice been discussed extensively in relation 
to the international level. Admittedly, the idea of justice does not enter the 
international realm for the first time, but it seems that it has not yet found its 
place. The demarcation between domestic and international realms perpetuates 
the impression that rules and norms familiar from the domestic context are not 
applicable at the international level.2 Allegedly, there are other more important 
concerns, such as raison d’état. 
                                                             
1 Death in Hogfather by Terry Pratchett. 





Not all, however, concur with the notion that simply because one is operating at 
the international level one ought to dismiss certain ideas. During the past four 
decades or so, much effort has been put into demonstrating how for example 
reasons of state do not necessarily dictate the neglect of moral considerations.3 
Whether dealing with for example decolonization, world hunger, human rights, or 
soft power, contributors to these debates have argued for a place for norms and 
ethics in international politics. Yet, perhaps only the most hardcore power- or 
security-maximizers have denied ethics its place at the international level. These 
authors have highlighted the prudence of self-interest in a world where a war of 
all against all is possible and where today’s friend might be the enemy tomorrow. 
It is unfortunate, though, that such theories tend to be both attractive and self-
fulfilling prophesies. 
There are also people who wish for world peace and draw inspiration usually 
from Kant linking perpetual peace with democratic peace. Allegedly, if the people 
who suffered from the consequences of wars were allowed to decide whether to 
go to war or not, there would be no more wars. In other words, if all states were 
democratic (good) and not something else (bad), all states would be peace-loving, 
and it would mark the end of inter-state wars. Regrettably such over-
simplifications hide crucial aspects, which ought to be taken into account. 
Despite there being a tendency for democratic states to avoid war with each 
other, the question is more about these states having solved and internalized how 
to solve political problems without resorting to arms than about the peace-loving 
nature of democracy as such. One need only examine the past five years of one of 
the oldest continuous democracies – the United States – in order to realize just 
how peace-loving democracies can be. It is not democratization per se that would 
end conflicts as the bitter experiences of Rwanda and Sudan demonstrate. In 1994 
Rwanda, a “democratic republic” since 1962, witnessed genocide killing an 
estimated 800,000 men, women, and children, and since 2004 Sudan, another 
                                                             
3 See e.g. an early effort by Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics 




“democratic republic” since 1956, has been accused of genocide.4 One might argue 
that neither of these states was truly democratic, but more importantly, it is 
evident at least in the Rwandan case how the decision-makers did not believe in 
the ideas of democracy and ignored the democratic process with devastating 
results. 
Both Rwanda and Sudan raised calls for humanitarian intervention.5 There have 
been other cases, where humanitarian intervention was demanded, but these two 
represent recent cases, where external, physical intervention was necessary in 
order to prevent the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent people. These 
two are also cases that have been labeled genocide,6 and they are cases where the 
international community stood by.7 Many wondered what happened to the 
solemn promise – “Never again!” – that was made in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, when the extent of the Holocaust was realized. This promise has been 
documented for example in the Genocide Convention. Although important in 
condemning genocide and acts of genocide as punishable crimes against 
humanity, the Genocide Convention, however, locates the main responsibility to 
punish the perpetrators with the state within whose borders the acts are 
committed.8 Obviously, there are some problems with this formulation. 
                                                             
4 See e.g. Barbara Slavin, "Powell Accuses Sudan of Genocide," USA Today, September 9 2004, 
available at <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-09-09-sudan-powell_x.htm>. See 
also International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina V. Serbia and Montenegro), 2007). Available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=667&code=bhy&p1=3&p2=3&case=91&k=f4&p3=5. 
5 In this thesis, humanitarian intervention is understood to include a military component. See below. 
6 See e.g. BBC, "US House Calls Darfur 'Genocide'," BBC News Online, July 23 2004, available at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3918765.stm>; Barbara Slavin, "Powell Accuses Sudan of 
Genocide," USA Today, September 9 2004, available at 
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-09-09-sudan-powell_x.htm>; United Nations, 
Secretary-General Observes International Day of Reflection on 1994 Rwanda Genocide (April 7, 2004), 
2004). Available at http://www2.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsen/sg04003e.htm; United 
Nations News Center, "Marking 10 Years since Rwanda Genocide, UN Officials Voice Regret and 
Resolve (April 7, 2004)," (United Nations, 2004). Available at 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=10344&Cr=rwanda>. 
7 One might also mention e.g. Cambodia in this context, but this thesis will focus primarily on 
Rwanda. 
8 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 




Considering the amount of literature on humanitarian intervention, especially 
since the 1970s, one would imagine that humanitarian interventions would be 
more common than they in fact are. The discrepancy between the amount of 
literature and the occurrence of humanitarian interventions cannot be explained 
by a lack of humanitarian crises; in any given year there have been several 
“hotspots” around the globe which could have been classified as grave 
humanitarian crises, and they were thus worthy candidates for humanitarian 
intervention.9  
On the other hand, it would be wrong to claim that nothing is being done. The 
United Nations (UN), acting on behalf of the wider international community of 
states, has currently 16 peacekeeping operations around the world. Since 1948, 
the UN has had 61 operations with over 41 billion dollars spent in total.10 The 
bulk of these operations, however, consists of traditional peacekeeping 
operations, and despite UN peacekeeping having evolved from simple ceasefire-
monitoring between warring parties at their request to “multidimensional 
peacekeeping,”11 uninvited humanitarian interventions remain rare. 
Whether uninvited, external intervention ought to be the rule rather than the 
exception in grave humanitarian crises could be the theme of another research 
project; instead, this doctoral thesis focuses on the justification of inaction by the 
international community in grave humanitarian crises. Such focus must inevitably 
address also international responsibility, which is the major theme of this thesis. 
In order to shed some light to the reasons for choosing this focus, consider that 
there seems to have been a normative shift in international politics from having to 
justify action in humanitarian crises to demands for action, even to such a degree 
that members of the international community have felt the need to excuse 
inaction. In other words, the burden of proof seems to have done an about-face. 
                                                             
9 Of course, this all depends on the definitions of humanitarian intervention and of humanitarian 
crisis, but one could consider for example the following: the current Iraqi refugee crisis, the conflicts 
in Congo, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Uganda, or Sudan, the situation in Kenya, or simply world hunger 
and its effects. 
10 United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Background Note, 30 November 2006 
(2006, accessed January 2007), available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>. 





This is no small feat in a world where allegedly “the standard of justice depends 
on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have 
the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”12  
The above quote from the Melian Dialogue has often been considered to mirror 
the “true” nature of international politics. Never mind that the Dialogue may have 
never proceeded as Thucydides recorded it,13 it has founded realist perspective(s) 
of international politics.14 Being more powerful than one’s peers, according to 
realists, allows actors – in this case states – the liberty of choosing their courses of 
action according to their interests without having to submit to the will of other 
actors. From this perspective, power enables, and questions of responsibility do 
not arise, because an actor is only accountable to oneself, if he is powerful enough. 
In cases where an actor is not superior in power, on the other hand, that actor 
might find himself answering to those superior to him. 
To present international responsibility in such crude terms as above is a gross 
over-simplification of responsibility as well as of the international system of 
states. To give an example to which most if not all realists might agree, consider 
that Great Powers have been expected to play – and they have willingly taken – 
certain roles regarding the maintenance of international order. Due to their 
power and hence position in the international system, Great Powers need to take 
an active stance in maintaining order, since order might not be realized unwilled. 
Although some kind of order might arise “spontaneously” or as a net effect of 
independent actions, maintaining of that order would require conscious efforts. 
This maintenance can usually be provided only by the Great Powers. Thus, their 
relative power and position imply responsibilities. The two world wars serve as 
illustrations of what can happen, when Great Powers, for whatever reason, fail to 
                                                             
12 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin Books, 1972), 
5.89. 
13 In the introduction to the History of the Peloponnesian War, M.I. Finley reminds us that Thucydides 
confesses in Book 1, 22 that the speeches in the History were not exact reproductions but that his 
method was “to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation.” Thus, 
we cannot know what Thucydides added, omitted, or changed in order to fit his personal 
preferences. 
14 Thucydides is often quoted as one of the founding fathers of realism. Interestingly, a convincing 
counter-case could be made for him being a constructivist. See Richard Ned Lebow, Coercion, 




play the roles imposed on or required of them. Weak Powers, in contrast, have not 
been expected to participate actively in the maintenance of international order, 
perhaps because they may have not been allowed to due to lack of standing 
among more powerful states. Nevertheless, Weak States have been expected to 
contribute to the maintenance of international order by not disturbing it. What 
could the above mean but that both the Great and the Weak States ought to 
behave responsibly within a given framework? Weak and Great Powers may have 
different parts to play, but no actor is without his or her responsibilities. 
If the above is correct, power seems to imply responsibility in a certain sense. The 
implied responsibility, or responsibilities, ought to be met, but there are no 
guarantees that they will be met. Nonetheless, there seems to be no good reason 
why the implied responsibilities must be limited to the maintenance of order 
defined as the absence of major war. One could make such a limitation, if one 
were content with the absence of war and desired nothing else. If that were the 
case, the expectations on the Great Powers would be limited to the mere 
maintenance of order, or better to the avoidance of chaos. Whether previously 
that has been the case is uncertain, it nevertheless seems clear that at least with 
the rise of human rights as the alleged new standard of civilization15 a simple 
absence of chaos is insufficient. In other words, as the calls for action in grave 
humanitarian crises demonstrates, states are expected to be proactive and further 
international order (and peace), and not just ensure their nonparticipation in 
reducing order (and peace). Furthermore, we can observe a correlating 
requirement to excuse inaction. 
As for example in the R2P report, the expectation to be proactive is assigned to 
the international community.16 It is the international community who is supposed 
to save the people from genocide or come to the rescue of tsunami victims. 
Already that such expectations exist are radical to some theories of international 
politics. Traditionally, sovereign states were territorially limited entities in a 
                                                             
15 Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?," International Affairs 74, no. 1 
(1998). 
16 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "The Responsibility to Protect," 




“billiard-ball” model.17 Now, states (and perhaps also other international actors) 
are part of an international community that might ultimately challenge the 
internal functioning of a state especially in matters relating to human security. In 
other words, it is implied that the international community exists above sovereign 
states, and that it is more than the sum of its parts. Is there hierarchy in the 
anarchical world? 
Among states, there might not be formal hierarchy at the international level, but 
there is at least some order and differences in status in the anarchy of 
international politics as for example the UN Charter illustrates. The Charter 
distinguishes between states assigning the permanent members of the Security 
Council a privileged position in comparison to other states. Since the permanent 
five were the victorious allies in the Second World War, it is no surprise that the 
order, which they created after the war, favors them. Moreover, the Council as a 
collective actor is acknowledged as the ultimate authority in matters pertaining to 
international peace and security. Article 51 of the UN Charter clearly affirms that 
individual and collective self-defense remains unimpaired “until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.”18 Thus, there seems to be at least theoretical ordering, if not a hierarchy 
in international politics. 
Whether the practice of international politics confirms the above conclusions, is, 
however, a different question. On many occasions the Security Council has been 
either ignored or its authority has not been recognized. The Council has also failed 
several times to maintain international peace and security, although thankfully 
this has not resulted in another world war. One explanation for this disharmony 
between theory and practice relates to noncompliance and existing sanctioning 
mechanisms. As the UN remains dependent of its members and their 
contributions, and since it has at its disposal only a few tools apart from symbolic 
sanctioning mechanisms, the strong might do as they please, especially if they are 
convinced that there will be no serious repercussions. After all, being a signatory 
                                                             
17 See e.g. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962). 




to a treaty or a charter does not limit a state’s options, it merely makes certain 
acts illegal or illegitimate. Yet, noncompliance by itself does not debase the UN or 
the Security Council as a collective actor. Even if faced with absolute 
noncompliance, the UN would probably not vanish, but we might ask whether it 
remained a relevant actor. 
These examples have been about demonstrating that there are levels within what 
has been called anarchy. Whether one could assert that there is hierarchy, is 
unclear and perhaps uninteresting. What seems clear, however, is that states 
themselves have created these levels. In addition, references were made to the 
possibility of ignoring actors or their actions. The “actor” that seems to have been 
ignored until recently is the international community. 
For some, calling the international community an actor might be an 
overstatement. Admittedly, the international community is an actor more at the 
level of ideas than in any concrete terms. There are no offices or dedicated 
spokespersons for the international community. Yet, the international community 
is often referred to, it is called to take action, and it is given responsibilities.19 If 
we act as if the international community existed, and if others act as if it existed, 
should we not pursue the possibility of including the international community as 
one central part of international politics? 
On the other hand, whether the international community really exists is not as 
important as asking whether it is useful to think that it does. Bank notes are just 
pieces of colored paper, but it is useful to consider that they hold a particular 
value depending on their numeration. In order for pieces of paper to pass for 
currency, however, a whole host of underlying assumptions and background 
conditions must be present. Similarly, certain background conditions must be 
present and many puzzles must be solved before we can consider that the 
international community is an actor. One condition for taking seriously the 
existence of the international community is letting go of some of the traditional 
                                                             
19 See e.g. The Responsibility to Protect report that assigns the international community certain 
responsibilities. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "The 




assumptions about international politics. The process of de- and re-learning 
international politics can be frightening, because it requires abandoning familiar 
ideas for a leap to the unknown. 
This thesis has less to do with the question whether the international community 
exists than with the benefits of acting as if it existed. Thus, for example, when 
addressing the main theme of the thesis – international responsibility vis-à-vis 
grave humanitarian crises – the issue of the international community arises 
inevitably, because it is argued that if such a responsibility can be said to exist, it 
would be a collective responsibility and fall foremost on and for the international 
community. Chapter three is devoted to this topic, and in it, I discuss 
responsibility in general and also model collective international responsibility 
regarding such grave humanitarian crises as for example genocide. Here, 
naturally, denying one would mean denying the other, as the collective 
responsibility would not exist without the international community. On the other 
hand, the existence of the international community might imply the collective 
responsibility but not necessarily. 
Recognizing the existence of the international community could facilitate the 
abandoning of simplistic representations of international actors such as 
portraying states as billiard balls.20 Of course, such images are not even meant to 
be accurate correspondents of reality. Yet, the power of analogies should not be 
underestimated nor should one overlook any other over-simplifications. To give 
an example from a recent article in the International Organization titled 
“Intervention and Democracy,” interveners (that were readily assumed to be 
states) were considered to be either democratic or non-democratic.21 Although 
the article suggests some interesting predictions about the differences in the 
democratizing effects of interventions between the United Nations, and 
democratic and non-democratic interveners, it completely fails to consider the 
context of different interventions. Moreover, the authors seem to forget how their 
                                                             
20 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1962), 19-24. 
21 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, "Intervention and Democracy," International 




predictions depend on current conditions remaining stable ad infinitum. Similarly, 
drawing an analogy for a thing from the billiard table gives one quite a different 
mental image than drawing another analogy for the same thing from a spider’s 
web or from chaos theory. In other words, the different metaphors and analogies 
focus our attention differently, and thus we “see” different things depending on 
the metaphors and analogies we use. 
The notion of international community suggests a plurality of interconnected 
actors who, despite their individual characteristics, share something in common. 
Moreover, it would also suggest the existence of two identities in addition to “I” 
and “you”: namely “we” and “us.” Like the etymological root of “interest” (inter-
esse) referred to something between us without it being neither yours nor mine, 
but something which could be discovered through processes of negotiation and 
discussion,22 so would the international community lie “between” international 
actors. Purely self-interested, self-referential, and two-dimensional actors, 
however, would not make the discovery of something existing between them. 
Thus, our theories and representations of the “world” must be more complex, if 
we are to even entertain the notion of an international community. 
Hence, in this thesis actors are considered to be individuals in the sense that they 
are all particular.23 Naturally, it is possible to categorize some actors as states or 
international governmental organizations, but while such categories may serve 
important purposes, they hide crucial differences among actors within a category. 
Not only do actors operate under historical conditions,24 over which they may 
have little influence, but they are also the products of historical processes. It is, 
however, not always possible to bring out these differences among for example 
states in the following pages. When references are made to such categories, one 
should remember that at no point of this thesis it is argued that for example all 
states are similar, even when referring only to “states.” One of the arguments 
                                                             
22 Friedrich Kratochwil, "Rethinking The "Inter" In International Politics," Millennium 35, no. 3 
(2007). 
23 By referring to states being particular, I do not mean to impose personhood on states, something 
which might be going too far at least at this point. See e.g. Alexander Wendt, "The State as Person in 
International Theory," Review of International Studies 30, no. 2 (2004). 




throughout the thesis is exactly that states, instead of being inanimate objects, are 
complex organizations capable of deliberation and choosing their own courses of 
action (out of limited possibilities), that they therefore can be ascribed a will, and 
that studying them ought to take this into consideration. 
Another underlying theme of this thesis is political will. Although the purpose has 
not been to address political will – or the lack thereof – directly, any discussion on 
non-intervention in humanitarian crises is clearly linked to the question of 
political will. Regardless of almost everything else, in a crisis the question remains 
whether there is sufficient political will to support a certain course of action. This 
is also one of the fundamental problems regarding humanitarian intervention; 
much of the discussion is directed at producing ever better arguments 
legitimizing intervention, yet little is said about the ways in which political will 
can be built in order to save strangers.25 Surely, good arguments and justifications 
are part of constructing political will, but without addressing adequately for 
example how the fate of others might be linked to our own fates, even the best 
justification for allowing humanitarian intervention would do little to turn the 
heads of the decision-makers. On the other hand, despite a theorist being capable 
of analyzing different options and their consequences, it might not be his place to 
advocate for one particular course of action. Yet, as “scientific” as it might be to 
keep one’s distance, “theory is always for someone and for some purpose.”26 
Some might claim that the reason for the lack of political will regarding issues of 
global concern is due to there being no inter-esse, i.e. there being no “international 
community” due to there being no identities corresponding to “we” and “us.” 
Perhaps regional identities exist, as in the case of the European Union despite 
such identity being suspect, but a true cosmopolitan community identity might 
remain an utopia. Yet, there seems to be a growing understanding that despite the 
borders between us, we are all members of humanity. Recognizing one’s 
membership in such an overarching community does not necessarily require 
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altruism. Just like in a family, the different members are free to pursue their own 
interests and even ignore the needs of the other members or the family as a 
whole. Taking others into consideration, or not, however, shapes a family. 
Similarly, even though the deaths of even hundreds of thousands on the other side 
of the world do not directly affect us, they – like our responses – nonetheless have 
an effect on the kind of humanity we are part of. 
Moreover, not only are these issues of ethical and moral concern but they are also 
of very practical and political concern. For the political and practical significances 
to become clear, one need only to consider the distances people are willing to 
migrate from all parts of Africa to Europe in the hopes of finding a better life. We 
would do well by at least attempting a solution at the source of the problem and 
not only when it is at our doorstep. 
There is, however, always more talk than action, and to this also I must plead 
guilty. In my defense, I try to show in the following chapters how on a conceptual 
level in international politics we have moved to a completely new discussion, and 
how we would do well by re-evaluating our own positions in it. Moreover, I also 
show how it is possible to perceive of international collective responsibilities and 
to assign shares of the collective responsibility to the individual members of the 
collective without committing a fallacy of composition or falling into vicious 
circles mired with collective action problems. 
In order to substantiate my claims, the next six chapters focus on the issues just 
mentioned. In chapter one, I flesh out my general research approach and I discuss 
humanitarian intervention as an exception and the roles interpretation and 
argumentation play in politics. Chapter two, on the other hand, serves to set the 
departure point for the research by showing how both the assumptions in the 
humanitarian intervention debate and the kind of right the right of humanitarian 
intervention would be, if it existed, require a focus on responsibility. Chapter 
three, then, focuses explicitly on responsibility and international collective 
responsibility in relation to such grave humanitarian crises as genocide. Chapter 
four describes a model of responsibility and illustrates its functioning with the 




test in chapter five, where the Rwandan genocide in 1994 is summarized before 
examining some of the international responses to it with the help of the 
responsibility model. The final chapter reviews the issues from the first five 









GENERAL RESEARCH APPROACH 
 




Although they were written almost seventy years ago, the words of E.H. Carr find 
their resonance still today: “sound political thought and sound political life will be 
found only where both [utopia and reality] have their place.”28 Carr, often misread 
to advocate only realism, understood that politics could not stand on only one leg: 
although we must remain sensitive to the realities in our lives, we cannot live 
without dreams, which in turn inform us in what kind of political projects we 
should engage. Similarly, there is a tension between different kinds of 
methodologies for understanding politics. For example, empirical knowledge can 
help in understanding or in explaining the general, while other methods might be 
more suitable for the analysis of the particular and exceptional. As students of 
politics, however, we should follow Carr’s advice and aim at understanding both 
the general and the exceptional so that reality and utopia could find their place in 
our conceptions of politics. 
In this chapter I try to follow Carr’s advice and incorporate both reality and utopia 
in my understanding of international politics. In other words, this chapter is 
dedicated to outlining how I conceive of international politics, at least as far as it 
is relevant to the topic of the thesis.  
                                                             
27 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 10. 
28 Ibid. 
Chapter 1: General Research Approach 
[16] 
 
The reality of things, how things are (despite being contestable most of the time), 
is that humanitarian intervention is exceptional, and this is discussed in the first 
section of this chapter. This has not, however, been the case always. Despite 
efforts of pushing the first humanitarian intervention ever further in time,29 there 
was a time, when there were no humanitarian interventions, or at least the people 
at that time did not call them with such terms.  
This brings me to the second section of this chapter, namely the role 
interpretation plays. Here I discuss how we interpret things most of the time, 
even when conducting “pure” empirical research. Interpretation, however, is not 
without its pitfalls, some of which are discussed below. 
The third section focuses on argumentation, because that is one way to solve 
differences in interpretation. It is also central to any notion of politics. Despite 
there being talk of for example “power-politics,” the arbitrary use of one’s power 
would hardly qualify as politics. To put it in different terms, even when power is 
used, it is used as part of an argument as will be illustrated below. 
If solving conflicts of interpretations calls for the use of arguments, how is one to 
make sense of different, even contradicting, arguments? This is the topic of 
section four, where an analogy is made between evaluating arguments and 
adjudication. Courts engage in evaluating the different arguments put forward by 
a plaintiff and a defendant, who are most of the time arguing for the exact 
opposite of each other. Thus, learning from the methods judges use would not be 
a wasted effort. 
Finally, before a concluding summary of the chapter, section five explains how 
casuistic reasoning is the underlying approach used in this thesis. Casuistry, after 
all, focuses on the particularity of each case, and as it has been mentioned earlier, 
each humanitarian intervention is unique. Admittedly, casuistry may have a bad 
reputation, but it is due more to misinterpretation of how casuistry operates 
rather than to what can be achieved with its use. 
                                                             
29 See e.g. Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in The Culture of 
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics., ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, New Directions in 
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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS AN EXCEPTION 
In the daily operation of international politics, humanitarian intervention is an 
exception. Not only are cases of humanitarian intervention few, but they 
contradict one of the fundamental principles among sovereign states, namely the 
rule of non-intervention in the affairs of other sovereigns. Moreover, if 
humanitarian interventions are justified as an exception to the “normal” rules, as 
they often are, they are, by definition, exceptional. In times of crisis, according to 
the advocates of humanitarian intervention, some of the “normal” rules ought to, 
and can be, extended. The question that remains, however, is when such an 
extension is justifiable. 
One should note that although rules can be broken unilaterally, extending rules 
can only be done intersubjectively. Thus, the question, when can the normal rules 
be extended, is a demand for reasons and justifications as to the circumstances 
that qualify for an exception. Clearly, this only begs a further question: What are 
good (enough) justifications and reasons for extending the applicability of normal 
rules?  
A quick look at history shows how what has been considered the norm at a given 
point in time may not have been universal or everlasting. Slavery and slave trade 
are clear examples of how something that once used to be normal is strictly 
forbidden and despised today. In fact, it is considered that there is not even the 
possibility of justifying slavery under any circumstances. Another example is debt 
collection. As Finnemore explains, debt collection was once accepted as a 
legitimate reason for the use of force.30 For a state to invade another state in order 
to collect debts would be unthinkable today. 
Of the legitimate justifications for the use of force besides self-defense, 
humanitarian reasons have gained currency. Humanitarian imperatives have also 
become accepted as reasons for suspending the rule of non-intervention. This 
development took place especially during the 1990s, when military interventions 
into sovereign states were justified and legitimized using humanitarian rationales. 
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Clearly, humanitarian justifications may not have been the only basis for military 
action, but it appears that since the early-1990s they have become sufficient 
reasons by themselves. In historical perspective, this marked a distinction to 
earlier times, when humanitarian concerns were judged insufficient for 
suspending the rule of non-intervention. 
The 1970s provides an example of a period, when humanitarian justifications for 
military action were inadequate or even counterproductive. In 1971, during her 
intervention in East Pakistan, and in seeking to legitimize her action, India first 
included humanitarian justifications in her overall explanation of her action. 
When, however, it became clear that humanitarian concerns fell on deaf ears or 
were undermining the legitimacy of India’s action – whatever the reason may 
have been – the rhetoric changed quickly, humanitarian grounds were forgotten, 
and legitimacy was sought by focusing on self-defense.31  
During the Cold War, self-defense served as the primary justification for action 
that might today be labeled as humanitarian intervention.32 Some authors, such as 
Nicholas Wheeler in his Saving Strangers, have argued that these interventions 
should count as examples of humanitarian interventions, even if they were not 
explicitly justified on humanitarian grounds. Thus, with motive lacking from his 
threshold criteria, Wheeler is able to count India’s intervention in East Pakistan, 
Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia, and Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda as 
examples of humanitarian intervention during the Cold War. Others, such as 
Martha Finnemore, have argued that it was not that humanitarian reasons were 
invalid during earlier times, but that “humanity” was limited to white Christians.33 
Both strategies serve to demonstrate a practice of humanitarian intervention. In 
other words, by demonstrating a practice, these authors show how rules have 
been suspended or expanded before, and that they can be legitimately suspended 
again also in future cases. 
                                                             
31 See for example Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International 
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 55-77. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in The Culture of National 
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics., ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, New Directions in World 
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
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The inclusion or exclusion of humanitarian motives in determining whether a 
given intervention could classify as humanitarian intervention has stirred 
emotions. Wheeler’s exclusion of such motives as necessary may not suit some. 
Similarly, Finnemore’s inclusion of motives, which can only be called muddled, 
may not win the argument establishing a practice of humanitarian intervention 
from as far back as the nineteenth century. As Finnemore admits herself, the 
humanitarian claims were intertwined with geo-strategic interests of the 
intervening states.34  
The issue is further complicated by a distinction between intention and motive. 
For example Fernando Tesón has argued following John Stuart Mill that intention 
is relevant for characterizing and evaluating behavior. With this distinction, Tesón 
argues that for example the invasion of Iraq can be justified morally as a 
humanitarian intervention, because the intention was to liberate Iraq despite the 
Coalition having had questionable motives.35 
Although Tesón makes a valid distinction between intentions and motives, 
something which one ought to consider also regarding humanitarian 
interventions, his defense of the invasion in Iraq as a humanitarian intervention is 
problematic, as pointed out by for example Terry Nardin.36 If intention is what is 
willed, and motives are further goals one wishes to achieve with the intended 
act,37 and if one considered it sufficient that intervention is intended to have a 
positive humanitarian outcome, one can, like Tesón, count the operation in Iraq as 
morally justified as a humanitarian intervention despite the motives having been 
for example securing access to oil or other non-humanitarian motives. This, 
however, twists the whole notion of humanitarian intervention from concern 
                                                             
34 Ibid. 
35 Fernando R. Tesón, "Ending Tyranny in Iraq," Ethics and International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005). 
36 Terry Nardin, "Humanitarian Imperialism: Response to 'Ending Tyranny in Iraq'," Ethics and 
International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005). 
37 Fernando R. Tesón, "Ending Tyranny in Iraq," Ethics and International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005): 5. 
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about the wellbeing and often indeed about the very survival of “strangers” to 
being about “us” rather than being about “others.”38  
I shall return to this issue of humanitarian motives later, but for the present 
discussion it is enough to note that in the contemporary world humanitarian 
claims and justifications are perceived as valid for the use of force in some 
circumstances. Moreover, humanitarian reasons may perhaps suffice by 
themselves, and perhaps they may be even required for the legitimate use of force 
except in cases of self-defense. 
It is understandable that legitimacy for earlier humanitarian interventions was 
sought through self-defense. During the 1970s, humanitarian intervention was a 
new topic even in the theory of international politics, and with the Charter of the 
United Nations, self-defense was the only recognized justification for the use of 
force in addition to enforcement action as authorized by the Security Council. 
Thus, where the Security Council had not authorized enforcement action under 
Chapter VII powers, unilateral interventions had as their best bet arguments 
referring to self-defense in order to receive the approval, or at least to avoid the 
disapproval, of the international community. It is remarkable how two decades 
later the same action could have been better legitimized with reference to 
humanitarian imperatives rather than to self-defense. Despite this apparent 
change, however, one should remember that the use of force is still forbidden 
except in self-defense or under instructions from the Security Council, and that 
humanitarian claims, even if legitimating factors, are not universally recognized 
exceptions. In other words, where one would not doubt the rightness of a state 
defending itself against the attack by another state, humanitarian imperatives 
(still) do not automatically guarantee the legitimacy of an intervention. 
Moreover, humanitarian imperatives are not the only candidates challenging 
traditional rules regarding the legitimate use of force. For example, counter-
terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction test the conventional 
rules and seek to modify them to fit the needs of the contemporary world. For the 
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present purposes, however, it is enough to observe that international actors 
operate within a “social” context, where actors may have several reasons for a 
particular act, and that actors justify or seek to legitimate their actions especially 
when they are clearly not within the commonly established and accepted rules. 
For some theorists of international politics, it may seem unorthodox to consider 
that states justify their actions. Even more surprising might be the implication 
that states debate, among themselves, over their actions as was hinted at above. 
Both of these statements require strong assumptions about international politics 
which might not fit for example realist or neo-realist theories. In these theories, 
states are motivated by the relative power advantage in comparison to other 
states, by national interests, or by systemic reasons; there is little room for 
justifications or debates. Although one might say colloquially that power, national 
interests, or systemic factors justify certain courses of action, more precisely 
speaking they explain state behavior and possibly proscribe how states should act 
in order to secure survival or to gain advantages. In these theories, in fact, the 
justification for particular state behavior is the self-preservation of that state. 
One might make the argument that states do not make any justifications, only the 
representatives of states make them. Thus, at a certain level of abstraction, it 
would be unnecessary to focus on what the representatives do or say. This line of 
reasoning, however, seems absurd, because it would simply make the study of 
states redundant. States do not act or make statements; there is no state to touch 
or to look at. We study them as if they existed but in fact we study the actions of 
the representatives of states, which we then superimpose on states. In sum, 
whether the representatives of states use realist theories or some other backing 
for their actions, the study of the justifications they use are worth our while. 
The practice of international politics supports the claim that states debate and 
justify their actions. Even the word “politics” implies discourse and interaction, 
not tyranny of the strongest, something which seems to have been forgotten at 
times at the international level, where it is often mentioned that discourse is mere 
rhetoric and that talk is cheap. If that were the case, however, it would be odd 
how much time and energy is spent on such “insignificant” things. States spend 
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great lengths of time and energy in making their various cases to their publics, 
whether to their domestic or international audiences. To give an example, 
consider how the United States may have been set on invading Iraq in 2003 
regardless of the Security Council’s decision, yet she still sought the approval of 
the international community and spent much of her time and energy to that end.39 
The usual reply is that even though it is all for the show of it, it just happens to be 
how the game of international politics is played. 
To say that the practice of international politics is marked with rhetoric and cheap 
talk might not be too far off the mark, but to say that it is not important would be 
to delude ourselves. Surely, many times there are gestures and talks at the 
international level that were never meant as anything but symbolic. Yet, even 
those symbolic gestures are part of the functioning of international politics, and 
one can only imagine how the world would be without them. Furthermore, not all 
talk is cheap, and what is being said is carefully listened to by the other actors. 
Finally, politics is about actors coming together in order to bargain, trade, and 
seek solutions to common issues to name only three examples. Actors seek the 
approval of others and their support, or they might choose to bandwagon, or to 
confront and to cause conflict. These things would not be possible with mere 
rhetoric and symbolic gestures. Thus, although some talk can be cheap, it cannot 
all be so. 
In addition, political actors have various political projects, and in order to realize 
these projects, actors engage in building their cases for them. In this respect, the 
international level is no different from the domestic. Whether it concerns a trade 
agreement, or gathering a coalition of the willing, states argue for their causes in 
order to obtain support and acceptance from their audiences or to avoid conflict 
and resistance at the minimum. After all, communication is one of the cheapest, 
yet most effective, resources that political actors possess. 
                                                             
39 For an alternative perspective on the Iraqi operation, see e.g. James Fallows, Blind into Baghdad 
(The Atlantic Online, 2004, accessed September 16 2004), available at 
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Usually, states need to address either the domestic or the international audience, 
if not both, on a particular issue. Some issues are no concern of the international 
sphere, and thus, not all things must be explained at the international level. From 
a domestic point of view, however, any international issue might become also a 
domestic issue needing explanation or justification for the domestic audience, this 
being true especially within democracies. Naturally, there are issues which 
require that both audiences are satisfied, but the way how to do it might depend 
on which audience is being addressed. In other words, on a particular issue, a 
state might highlight some aspects to the domestic audience, while focusing on 
(perhaps completely) different aspects when communicating with the 
international audience. Moreover, for example matters of national security might 
forbid certain topics or aspects of a topic to be discussed at either level. 
An objection to what has just been claimed might be the following: states do not 
need to address any audiences, especially if they are powerful enough. Surely, this 
might be the case, but which state is so powerful that it would not benefit from 
communication and from at least trying to gain support for its projects? Surely it 
would be folly not to use all means possible, including communication, in order to 
achieve one’s goals, or to at least cut the costs. On another level, the objection 
concerns the “need” in the sense as if there were some “jury” that must be 
satisfied. Admittedly, there is no world jury as such, but nevertheless the “world” 
listens and judges. If taking the hunt for the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq 
as an example, the “world” was very keen on first of all seeing the evidence 
demonstrating that there were such weapons in Iraq, and second, to be shown 
them after the invasion. Furthermore, to consider that the United States did not 
lose credibility with her “snake-oil peddling” would be naive. Finally, regardless 
whether there is a need to address the different audiences, states – even the most 
powerful ones – at least try to win the support of their audiences. In sum, the 
practice of international politics supports the above claims. 
One example of a forum, where states engage in political bargaining and in the 
practice of arguing, is the United Nations. Furthermore, within the UN, the 
Security Council provides another example. During (and outside) Council 
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sessions, states communicate, argue, and bargain with other states. Various issues 
might be linked when states bargain, and such issue-linkages might be fair or not. 
Important to note here is that states argue, even if some of their communications 
might resemble more threats than arguments. Nevertheless, within the Council, 
the communication, arguing, and bargaining serve the purpose of guaranteeing 
nine votes out of fifteen, which any resolution must meet in order to be passed.40 
Despite not being fully democratic, the Council procedure ensures that passed 
resolutions, unless they remain at a high level of abstraction and therefore 
meaningless, are the result of a political agreement among the members of the 
Council.41 This political agreement, however, might not be reached thanks to such 
communicative action, where the participants talk and argue with reasons until a 
mutually satisfied conclusion is reached.42 A conclusion is more likely to be 
reached when a concerned party uses reasons supporting his favored conclusion 
and ensures the cooperation, or at least the indifference of others, by offering (or 
threatening to withdraw) support for the projects of others or by using traditional 
“carrot-and-stick” strategies. 
In most circumstances, political arguing, bargaining, and justification take place ex 
ante. Just as in the Iraqi case, the United States attempted to justify, and thus 
legitimize, her invasion of Iraq before crossing the border. Despite perhaps having 
been determined to proceed with the invasion whether wider support than the 
coalition of the willing was forthcoming or not, the United States nevertheless 
could have changed her course of action, or mended her plans according to the 
feedback she received from the domestic and international audiences.43 In this 
sense, seeking justification ex ante leaves more room for maneuver than 
justifications ex post facto. 
                                                             
40 Naturally, a resolution cannot be passed if even one of the five permanent members opposes it 
since each permanent member has a veto over any resolution. 
41 One might criticize the Security Council for passing too abstract resolutions too often. 
42 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols. (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1984). 
43 In fact, this is probably what happened. In other words, the American administration most likely 
mended its initial plans after receiving feedback from its domestic and international audiences. 
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Justifications ex post facto might be harder than ex ante, especially if one’s actions 
have not received wide support. For one, what have come to pass cannot be 
changed anymore, and it might be difficult to put the right spin on things 
afterwards, more so if there have been embarrassing episodes. Moreover, 
justifications ex post facto might transform into excuses and into the need to 
excuse oneself. In situations, where one’s actions have not received support or 
they have even been condemned, a pressure or expectation to excuse oneself 
might rise. As an example, one can think of the excuses the international 
community made for not intervening or doing enough in Rwanda in 1994.44 
To claim that states might excuse themselves is another point of controversy. For 
the most part, theories of international politics have little to say about this issue. 
To take realism and neo-realism as examples, a state is responsible and 
accountable only to itself (and maybe to its citizens), and therefore the issue of 
internationally excusing oneself is a non-question. Other, non-mainstream 
theories such as allegedly “constructivist” theories, also, seem to have little to say 
about this topic. As far as I am aware, there is no seminal work on this theme. That 
there is little work on this topic, however, is not proof that it is an unimportant 
point. 
Once again, I refer to states’ and their representatives’ behavior in order to 
illustrate how international practice supports my claims. One of the clearest 
examples of states’ excusing themselves is from the aftermath of the Rwandan 
genocide in 1994. World leaders, including the President of the United States Bill 
Clinton, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and the Belgian Prime Minister Guy 
Verhofstadt, expressed their regret, as official representatives of their state or 
world organization, and apologized for failing to prevent the killing of hundreds of 
thousands of Rwandans.45 Thus, even if it might be rare that states excuse their 
actions, those occasions are worth examining. 
                                                             
44 I shall return to this better in the following chapters. 
45 See for example BBC, "Belgian Apology to Rwanda," BBC News Online, April 7 2000, available at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/705402.stm>; BBC, "UN Admits Rwanda Genocide 
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If a state, or its leader, attempts to excuse an act, there are several aspects that 
deserve our attention. First, an excuse is an indication of a wrongful act, or of an 
act that was not according to commonly accepted rules. Second, there are such 
things as commonly accepted rules. Third, commonly accepted rules are an 
indication of a community. Fourth, a community where excusing takes place is 
clearly more than simple coexistence; it is a social community. By social 
community, I mean that the members of the community interact meaningfully 
towards each other.46 In other words, there seems to be much to examine in 
relation to this issue, and it is the purpose of this thesis to study it at least partially 
and to have some insights to the functioning of international politics from this 
perspective. To continue this line of analysis at this point would take the present 
discussion too far off the mark at this point. These four points, however, run 
through the thesis and will be returned to at suitable occasions. 
Coming back to the topic at hand, namely humanitarian intervention, states have 
sometimes justified intervention on humanitarian grounds, but they have also 
excused their non-intervention in some grave humanitarian crises as was 
illustrate above. Both of these points raise a question: When are humanitarian 
justifications sufficient to legitimize humanitarian intervention, and when is non-
intervention excusable in a grave humanitarian crisis?47 For the time being, I focus 
on the first part of the question. 
Clearly, humanitarian justifications are sufficient for an exception to the rule of 
non-intervention when there is a sufficiently grave humanitarian crisis, or at least 
this is the gist of the humanitarian intervention arguments. To frame it in these 
terms is to beg the question: What constitutes a sufficiently grave humanitarian 
crisis? From a humanitarian perspective, an answer to this question would refer 
to the exceptional humanitarian suffering or distress. The key word seems to be 
“exceptional,” because an exception to the “normal” rules can be made during 
exceptional times. In colloquial terms, this translates into the following statement: 
                                                             
46 See e.g. Max Weber, Soziologische Grundbegriffe, 3rd ed. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1976). 
47 Naturally, these both questions assume that humanitarian intervention is not part of the normal 
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Humanitarian justifications for intervention are sufficient in a “bad enough” 
humanitarian emergency.  
There are many grave humanitarian crises in the world but not all of them would 
necessarily justify military intervention by a state, or an international 
organization, into another sovereign state. In other words, how to define a grave 
enough crisis that could justify humanitarian intervention? A prudent attempt at 
defining a grave humanitarian crisis might leave aside any numbers of deaths 
either in their absolute or relative (percentage) form. Such definitions would be 
easily contested, arbitrary, and perhaps abused. Instead of numbers, a grave 
enough humanitarian crisis could be defined as a crisis that shocks the conscience 
of mankind.48 With this definition, Michael Walzer captures quite accurately our 
common understanding of what kinds of circumstances we think of when we hear 
the words “grave humanitarian crisis.” Unfortunately, there is little precision to 
this definition. For one, how are we to know if a particular crisis shocked the 
conscience of mankind? Nicholas Wheeler, on the other hand, defines a grave 
humanitarian crisis as one in which “the only hope of saving lives depends on 
outsiders coming to the rescue.”49 Although Wheeler’s definition is more precise 
than Walzer’s, it is not without its problems either: How are we to know 
beforehand that the only hope lies with outside intervention? Afterwards it might 
be possible to construct a counter-factual demonstrating how outside 
intervention would have been crucial, but before or during a crisis it might not be 
so clear whether the only hope was limited to outsiders. Admittedly, in the 
Rwandan case, it seemed clear that the only hope really lay with the outsiders,50 
but perhaps the point is really more about whether we would wish to limit the 
definition of a grave humanitarian crisis to situations where it can be known that 
the only hope would lie with the outsiders. There might be circumstances where 
the conscience of mankind would be shocked, yet there could be hope that the 
                                                             
48 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 3rd ed. (New 
York: Basic Books, 2000), 107. 
49 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 34. 
50 Perhaps the hope lay with the outsiders also in the sense of them not interfering. There have been 
allegations that the French assistance to the Rwandan government, and thus to the genocide 
perpetrators, hindered the advancement of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. 
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crisis could be solved without direct outside intervention, even though outside 
help could bring an end to the crisis more swiftly. In such circumstances, should 
we not allow for the outside help and for humanitarian interventions? 
As it has become evident, it is difficult to define a grave enough humanitarian 
crisis that could justify an exception to the rule of non-intervention. Although only 
a couple of definitions have been examined, it seems clear that no single, 
unchallenged definition exists. If it existed, most of us would use it. Perhaps one 
should not blame the theorists for the lack of a single, commonly accepted 
definition; a definition of this kind falls under mental and institutional facts.51 
Social things are not simply “out there” waiting to be observed, but they require 
interpretation, and our perceptions shape them. For this reason, it is beneficial to 
consider an interpretative or a hermeneutic approach in the sense of engaging in 
“imaginative reconstruction” of the “significance of various elements of social 
action.”52 In other words, instead of trying to provide the definition of a grave 
(enough) humanitarian crisis or exceptional enough circumstances, it would be 
better to focus on the significant elements that are part of a definition. In this way, 
we can have a better understanding of the relevant circumstances without losing 
focus. 
What are the significant elements of a grave humanitarian crisis? At least five 
significant elements come to mind. First, the scale of a crisis is important: How 
many people are directly (and indirectly) affected, whether in absolute or relative 
terms? Whichever criteria one uses, the amount concerned must be considerable 
enough. Second, the way in which people are affected by the crisis is part of a 
definition of a grave humanitarian crisis. Although a financial crisis might affect 
millions of people, one would not label it a humanitarian crisis, unless there were 
other reasons for it. In other words, the way, in which people are affected by a 
grave humanitarian crisis, ought to correspond at least loosely with the notion of 
being shocking to the conscience of mankind. Third, outside help can be a defining 
                                                             
51 Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal 
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 
1991), 21-28. 
52 Daniel Little, Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 68. 
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character of a grave humanitarian crisis. In other words, the need for outside help, 
or the positive humanitarian impact it could have, might classify a given crisis as 
grave enough and justify an exception to the rule of non-intervention. Fourth, 
another significant element is the speed with which a crisis unfolds. Here the 
question is crucially linked to allowing for an exception to the rule of non-
intervention. For example malnutrition due to structural reasons is a grave 
humanitarian crisis, yet its slow process might neither justify nor require 
breaching the rule of non-intervention. In contrast, if the deaths of tens of 
thousands were imminent due to malnutrition and their government was 
unwilling to cooperate with outside help, the rule of non-intervention might be 
justifiably extended. This last point brings me to the fifth significant element of a 
definition of a grave humanitarian crisis, namely the willingness and the ability of 
the particular government(s), on whose territory the crisis is located, to provide a 
solution to the crisis. Humanitarian intervention, as it is understood in this thesis, 
is distinguished from humanitarian assistance, where the former includes an 
element of unwelcome humanitarian action, while the latter denotes cooperation 
with the local government. 
The just discussed five significant elements of a definition of a grave humanitarian 
crisis contribute to an evaluation whether a given crisis is grave enough to justify 
an exception to the rule of non-intervention on humanitarian grounds. Such an 
evaluation, however, remains the result of interpretation. To give an example, let 
us consider the last significant element: willingness by the local government to 
provide a solution. It might be that a government would show signs of 
cooperation without actually cooperating. Formally, the government of the Sudan 
promised to cooperate with the UN sanctioned investigators, but there are doubts 
that the cooperation has been as extensive as it could have been.53 In other words, 
although some pitfalls may be averted with the help of a good definition, new 
challenges lie ahead.  
                                                             
53 United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 1999, S/1999/1257. 
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The new challenges are related to the interpretation of the answers we have for 
each significant element of the definition. The question is not whether or not a 
given crisis is grave enough; the question is whether given circumstances are 
interpreted or can be interpreted to constitute a grave enough crisis. The 
significant elements focus on points which should be part of this interpretation 
and evaluation, but by themselves they do not tell us much about a particular 
crisis. In other words, the exceptionality of given circumstances is a matter of 
interpretation and degree. Thus, because interpretation is so central, the next 





Scientific realism assumes that “the world exists independent of human beings, 
that mature scientific theories refer to this world, and that they do so even when 
the objects of science are unobservable.”54 Scientific realism is correct in 
observing that our planet would not stop revolving, or that states exist even if we 
cannot touch or see them. Where scientific realism fails, however, is in fully 
acknowledging that the social world would not exist without (social) human 
beings. Thus, even though the existence of a given state does not depend on any 
particular person or people, states have not existed throughout history, and when 
they have, they have come in many different shapes and forms. In other words, 
despite its merits on some questions, scientific realism might not offer the best 
tool for examining all aspects of the social world.  
One reason for the shortfall of scientific realism is its dependency on an idealized 
image of observation in the natural sciences.55 Even in the natural sciences, 
observation is not without its problems, because observation is done through the 
lenses of theories. Things do not have an essence waiting to be discovered, but the 
meanings of things are created through our perceptions and interpretations. In 
this task, we use theories to help us make sense of what we observe.56 One might 
counter these claims by pointing out that measuring is an objective way of 
observation. Measuring, however, remains meaningless unless the results – and 
even the tool used for measuring – are placed within a context. To use Friedrich 
Kratochwil’s example, a deviation of one millimeter is meaningless when building 
a skyscraper but highly significant when making a watch.57 Moreover, no such 
thing as a meter or a yard exists naturally in the world, but both are conventions, 
                                                             
54 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 47. 
55 See e.g. Stephen E. Toulmin, Return to Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 
ch. 4. 
56 As told by the students in LSE, in one of his lectures Karl Popper entered the room, and as he sat 
down, he asked the students to observe. Only after a good while did someone ask what they were 
supposed to observe. In other words, observation requires one to have an idea what to observe. 
Thus, at least a minimal “theory” is required. 
57 Friedrich Kratochwil, "Leaving Sovereignty Behind: An Inquiry into the Politics of Post-
Modernity," (European University Institute, Florence, Italy: 2007, forthcoming as a chapter in an 
edited volume by Richard Falk and Ramesh Thakur). 
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made and agreed by people, for the convenience of measuring a certain distance. 
Furthermore, those conventions are tied to other conventions.  
To illustrate this final point, let us consider the definition of a meter (m). Bureau 
International des Poids et Mesures (International Bureau of Weights and 
Measures), the final authority58 on the seven base units of the International 
System of Units (SI), defines a meter as “the length of the path travelled by light in 
vacuum during a time interval of 1/299 792 458 of a second.”59 Not only is it 
evident that the time interval chosen is, if not arbitrary in many senses, a matter 
of convention and not something likely to correspond with the “essence” of a 
meter. In addition, a meter is defined by referring to a second, another measuring 
unit, which is equally nothing more than a convention. A second, on the other 
hand, is defined as “the duration of 9 192 631 770 periods of the radiation 
corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the ground 
state of the caesium 133 atom.”60 Even if the caesium 133 atom’s particular 
periods of radiation correspond with the second, and even if those periods might 
occur naturally in the world, the second is defined in this particular way, because 
the caesium 133 atom’s behavior corresponds (approximately) with earlier 
definitions of a second, and because its behavior is stable and can therefore be 
used reliably for calibration. Thus, if even our tools and units of measurement are 
conventions, should we not abandon the Cartesian quest and accept that also our 
results are not ultimate truths? 
To conclude that interpretation is central in the social world is not necessarily to 
simplify matters. In any given situation at any given time there exists a multitude 
of different objects for interpretation, and thus, one must decide first of all what 
objects are of relevance to one’s study, and whether relevant conventions exist 
creating shortcuts so that we can almost neglect interpretation. For example, 
money is a convention where it has been agreed that certain pieces of paper are 
                                                             
58 This is another convention. 
59 Note also that this is the most recent definition, and that there is no guarantee that it will be the 
ultimate definition. See the BIPM’s website at the following URL: 
<http://www.bipm.org/en/si/base_units/>. 
60 Ibid. 
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legal tender. Clearly, not all pieces of paper are legal tender, only notes of a certain 
kind, and which have been officially issued by the national central bank, and only 
to the value of the numeration imprinted on them. Most of the time, there is little 
doubt whether a particular note is legal tender, and thus, transactions can occur 
quickly, because one does not have to pause to interpret whether a note is worth 
100 dollars or not. There are, however, situations, when due to discoloring or for 
some other reason such as when one is handed a 600 euro note with pictures of 
semi-nude men or women on it,61 one should wonder whether the particular note 
is legal tender. In other words, until we encounter a border-line case, we might 
not notice that we interpret things around us. In relation to science, our theories 
assist in determining which things are relevant, and whether they are in need of 
further interpretation. 
The philosophy of science, on the other hand, attempts to clarify whether our 
theories allow us to conclude anything, or at least anything meaningful. For 
example, the idea of falsification provides a way of knowing whether a given 
theory can be correct.62 Falsification, in a nutshell, is based on the idea that 
scientific hypotheses or theories must be falsifiable. Karl Popper illustrated his 
idea of falsification and the problem of induction with the example of white and 
black swans. In the example, after first stating that all swans are white we 
discover a black swan, thus challenging our primary statement. Despite Popper’s 
deep insights, he has received much criticism,63 which, however, would move the 
discussion too far away from the present purpose, if they were discussed here. 
The purpose of referring to the philosophy of science and falsification was not to 
begin a discussion on the merits of falsification or of the criticism it has received. 
                                                             
61 The European Central Bank hosts a display of counterfeit euro notes that were accepted as legal 
tender by shopkeepers. Apart from odd numerations such as 300, 600, and 1000 euro, some of them, 
if one looked closer, have pictures of semi-naked men or women imprinted on them. 
62 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Routledge, 2002). 
63 See for example Paul K. Feyerabend, "Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of 
Knowledge," in Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology, ed. M. Radner and S. 
Winokur, Minnesota Sudies in the Philosophy of Science (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1970); Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1970); Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes," in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Fashionable 
Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science (New York: Picador, 1998). 
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The purpose was to provide a further illustration of the centrality of 
interpretation. Let us consider Popper’s swan example. In the example, 
falsification only applies, if we agree that the black bird resembling a white swan 
in all but its color can be taken to be a black swan. This conclusion does not obtain 
necessarily. We could have agreed to hold on to our primary statement, which 
made clear that swans can only be white. Naturally, we would have had to call the 
black bird something else other than a swan, but inventing a new name would 
surely not have been difficult. Scientific examination, on the other hand, might 
have informed us that the two birds, the white swan and the black bird 
resembling a swan, had the same DNA for the most part. With this information, 
one could have made a strong case for calling the black bird a swan, thus 
requiring a revision of the initial statement. Yet, the acceptance that birds, which 
do not share identical DNA, can nevertheless belong to the same category, namely 
swans, would beg the question: How much of the DNA must be shared for two 
similar, but not identical, birds to be put into the same category? Clearly, the 
question is flawed, because two beings can share identical DNA only if they are 
identical twins. Nonetheless, there is a percentage of DNA that swans must share 
for them to be called swans regardless of their color, and that figure is most likely 
arbitrary and context-dependent. In other words, whether because of arguments 
derived from the DNA of the black swan or otherwise, there might be good 
reasons to conclude that it is a black swan, but that conclusion was the result of 
interpretation, not the product of discovering the “essence” or “nature” of the 
black bird. 
 Misinterpretation, or conflicts of competing interpretations, is naturally always a 
possibility. Even two people who witness the very same event, side by side, could 
experience, and therefore interpret, that event differently. Similarly, which “facts” 
or “evidence” are taken into account may change completely a given 
interpretation. To give an example, consider that two people see a man drive a car 
and hit a dog. After stopping the car, the man gets out of the car, and shoots and 
kills the wounded dog. Now, the first witness might think that the car hit the dog 
accidentally, and that the man realized how badly hurt the dog was and decided, 
mercifully, put it out of its misery. The second witness, however, could easily 
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interpret the events so that the driver had purposefully hit the dog and finished, 
with a gun, what he had intended to do with the car. Whether the driver had seen 
the dog, whether he had lost control of his vehicle, whether the dog had ran 
unexpectedly from the side of the road, or whether the driver had driven behind 
the dog, are all details that could change our interpretation of what “really” 
happened. 
Sometimes, on the other hand, it is of little importance whether agreement is 
reached over a particular interpretation. In a friendly conversation it is of no real 
importance whether one establishes a mutually satisfactory interpretation of the 
weather conditions as partially cloudy, overcast, or cloudy. In contrast, at times it 
can be of utmost importance that no misinterpretation takes place. One can only 
think how disastrous it could have been during the peak of superpower rivalry 
had one of the superpowers gravely misinterpreted the intentions of the other. 
Most of the time, however, general agreement over interpretation exists. In the 
above example, there were no contesting interpretations of the dog being first run 
over by the car and being shot afterwards. At stake was the question why it had 
happened. A similar example can be given regarding traffic rules. Traffic rules 
leave little room for misinterpretation. The meaning of such rules as “drive on the 
right-hand side of the road” or “always stop at red light” can hardly be 
misinterpreted. When traffic accidents happen, it is not because the rules have 
been misinterpreted, but mostly because they have been ignored. To give another 
example of interpretation and rules, the rules of soccer specify that the winner is 
determined according to how many goals each team has scored. A goal, then, is 
scored when the ball passes over the goal line.64 In other words, the rules of the 
game allow us to interpret the events, which would otherwise remain 
meaningless. 
Conflicting interpretations, however, are likely when the tools used to help the 
task of interpretation (such as rules) are themselves in dire need of 
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interpretation. An example of rules which strongly require interpretation is the 
following. Although we might all agree that killing another person is forbidden 
and condemnable except in cases of self-defense, we might not agree on what 
constitutes self-defense or whether killing in particular circumstances was self-
defense. The general rule “do not kill” functions in clear cases, but when 
exceptions are allowed, matters are complicated significantly. As Jonsen and 
Toulmin remind us, “once we move far enough way from the simple paradigmatic 
cases to which the chosen generalizations were tailored, it becomes clear that no 
rule can be entirely self-interpreting.”65 
Moreover, interpretation is often linked with appraisal, at least in the social 
sciences, where norms play a significant role. When interpreting, we engage in 
acts of appraisal in order to know whether that which we interpret is for example 
“good” or “bad” or “irrelevant.” It is in this manner of combining interpretation 
with appraisal that we give meaning to things. 
In international relations, as elsewhere, essentially contested concepts exist.66 As 
the earlier discussion illustrated, grave humanitarian crisis – not to mention 
humanitarian intervention – is an example of a contested concept. Not only do we 
disagree on what constitutes a grave emergency, but we might not agree on 
whether the circumstances of a given case fulfill the description. Similarly, despite 
being such central concepts to the working and jurisdiction of the Security 
Council,67 threats to international peace, breaches of international peace, or acts 
of aggression are not self-explanatory. Certainly, there are legal texts and 
precedents that help in determining whether a particular case is for example an 
act of aggression. The emphasis, however, is on the word “help;” cases or 
circumstances do not interpret themselves. It is hardly so that a state would send 
an ultimatum to another state and begin it with “Dear adversary, this is an act of 
                                                             
65 A. R. Jonsen and S. E. Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (London: 
University of California Press, 1989), 8. 
66 Walter Bryce Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 
(1956). See also James W. Davis, Terms of Inquiry: On the Theory and Practice of Political Science 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). 
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aggression…” Even if a state sent such an ultimatum, much would still depend on 
what followed the first line. 
Contested concepts are perhaps best examined by focusing on their use and how 
actors themselves interpret them. Here the concept “threat to international peace” 
serves as an example. There are many interpretations of what could constitute a 
threat to international peace. From the top of my head, I could invent a number of 
situations which could count as threats to international peace. Some of my 
musings might correspond with for example the Security Council’s earlier 
interpretations, while the rest might not. How the Council interprets (or has 
interpreted) the concept, however, is much more important than the musings of 
any other single actor. The UN Charter, after all, assigns the Council as the 
authority for determining the existence of any threat to the peace.68 Thus, as a 
first step in understanding the concept of threat to international peace, one ought 
to examine which circumstances have led the Security Council to call them a 
threat to peace. Certainly, one should not rely solely on the Council’s 
interpretation, because it may have been contested by other international actors. 
The Council’s work, not to forget, is subject to the whims or interests of each 
permanent member and their veto power. Thus, the interpretation of 
interpretation is important, and despite being essentially contested in their 
nature, the general meaning of contested concepts can be known. The meaning of 
such concepts depends on their intersubjective usage. 
Moreover, concepts change over time, or better, what they refer to change over 
time. To give an example, the Security Council’s interpretation of “threat to 
international peace and security,” and what it refers to, has changed in the past 
decades quite radically. At least since the 1990s this concept included not only 
traditional (military) threats but also new forms of security threats.69 Davis has 
                                                             
68 Ibid., Article 39. 
69 See e.g. Resolution 688 (refugees threaten international peace and security), Resolution 731 and 
1044 (terrorists threaten international peace and security), Resolution 748 (Libya’s nonresponse 
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correctly drawn attention how most of the debate concerns marginal cases or 
interpretations and the drawing of conceptual boundaries.70 Humanitarian 
intervention is certainly a marginal case, or an exceptional case as has been 
argued, that requires shifting the boundary of legitimate and legal action at the 
international level, if it is to be accepted among other legitimate and legal acts. 
Thus, on a higher level the discussion concerning humanitarian intervention has 
been about the position of that boundary. 
For some, the existence of several definitions of humanitarian intervention 
demonstrates that there is little agreement over the position of the boundary 
delineating legitimate action towards humanitarian ends. On the other hand, the 
lack of one universal definition should not necessarily be taken as a sign of 
weakness. Being aware of multiple definitions gives one an advantageous position 
for evaluating the actual circumstances of a given case from several angles in 
order to determine whether that particular case could fall within one or several 
definitions. Similarly, an examination of different meanings reveals which parts of 
a definition are widely accepted, and which are contested. The contested parts of 
a definition are part of the problem in drawing clear boundaries, and there seems 
little one can do about them, except being aware of such fuzzy boundaries.71 
One method for determining, where the boundary lies, is through argumentation. 
Academics as well as other professionals debate whether a particular act 
constituted or could constitute a humanitarian intervention, and in this debate 
one evokes reasons. Likewise, political actors engage in argumentation. Naturally, 
power relations loom in the background, but nevertheless, international political 
actors engage in bargaining, they link issues for better leverage, and justify and 
argue for their acts of commission or omission. Even a rudimentary form of threat 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Security Council, Security Council Resolution Number 748 of March 31 1992, SC/RES/748/1992; 
United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution Number 794 of December 3 1992, 
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Number 1053 of April 23 1996, S/RES/1053/1996; United Nations Security Council, Security Council 
Resolution Number 1054 of April 26 1996, S/RES/1054/1996. 
70 James W. Davis, Terms of Inquiry: On the Theory and Practice of Political Science (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2005). 
71 Ibid.  
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could be perceived as a form of argument.72 Admittedly, sometimes conclusions 
are hard to reach, or arguments may have fallen on deaf ears. Yet, most important 
to note is that actors engage in arguing with each other, because it is a sign of 
accepting the other – at least as “somewhat worthy” of dialogue73 – and 
acknowledging one’s own position within a wider community. The next section 
clarifies better my thoughts on argumentation. 
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ON ARGUMENTATION AND ARGUMENTS 
An important element in executing political projects is argumentation. There is a 
myriad number of political projects, and some of them might be more 
praiseworthy than others, but they all share an inherent need to be “constructed,” 
among other things with the help of reasons, arguments, claims, and justifications. 
These are needed in order to invite others to participate in the projects, or at a 
minimum, to secure the non-interference of others.  
Some might claim that coercion bypasses effectively the need to argue one’s case. 
Coercion, however, is relatively costly, unsustainable in the long run, and – short 
of simply using random brute force with the target having to guess what he is 
supposed to do – a form of argument. To explain this last part better, consider a 
back-alley robbery, where the robber holds a man at gunpoint demanding his 
valuables or his life. Even in this case, the robber makes his case by establishing a 
link between the handing over of valuables and the gun pointing at the victim. By 
saying: “Your valuables or else,” the robber in fact makes the following argument: 
“Either you give me your valuables, and I let you live, or I take your life and your 
valuables. It is better for us both, especially you, that I only take your valuables.” 
The gun trumps all counter-arguments, and is in that sense the ultimate backing 
for the robber’s argument. 
The above example should not be interpreted to suggest that international politics 
operates at gunpoint but to show how arguments are central even when using 
brute power or force. By itself, the gun would hardly do much. First of all, it must 
be pointed at the victim with a clear indication that it is loaded, and that the 
person holding the gun is not afraid to use it. Moreover, at least a suggestive 
signal is required as to what the person holding the gun desires. It would be an 
odd robbery indeed, if at all unless a robbery á la Monty Python, if the gun was 
held for example sideways and not a word was spoken. Perhaps it seems strange 
to claim that threats are a form of argument, because argumentation is usually 
associated with positive circumstances or to situations, where the other person is 
in a position to make counter-arguments. To claim, however, that the victim in the 
example has no choice, would be mistaken. The victim can make his counter-
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argument in several ways, all of which will undoubtedly fail miserably, if the 
robber’s gun is loaded, and if he in fact is not afraid to use it.  
To some, my view on argumentation may seem too liberal. How is one to 
differentiate between coercion and argumentation, debate and authoritarian rule? 
The claim that I have made, however, is a simple one. Argumentation takes place 
where reasons, and backings for those reasons, are evoked. Whether the parties 
to an argument have an equal standing, or whether one is in fact in any position to 
counter such reasons, are different questions. To illustrate, the robber could have 
simply shot the man and taken his valuables; he did not need to engage in any 
argumentation or to give his victim a chance to keep his life. 
In terms of how arguments proceed, little has changed since Aristotle, as Corbett 
explains: “we must state our case, and we must prove our case – the proof 
involving not only the substantiation or our own arguments but also the 
refutation of opposing arguments.”74 How arguments have been analyzed, on the 
other hand, has focused on differentiating between the propositions made in a 
given argument. Conventionally arguments, or perhaps better syllogisms, are 
described to be composed of a minor premise, a major premise, and a 
so conclusion, where the conclusion follows necessarily from the two premises. A 
simple example could be: humanitarian intervention can save human lives (minor 
premise), saving human lives is good/desirable (major premise), and so 
humanitarian intervention is good/desirable. 
To describe arguments in this manner, however, would be to over-simplify as 
Stephen Toulmin argues. According to him, there are three main reasons, why a 
more complex description of arguments is required. First, the Aristotelian model, 
as described above, is an inaccurate description of arguments. In contrast to 
premises, “arguments are like organisms” with “both a gross, anatomical structure 
and a finer, as-it-were physiological one.”75 The main anatomical units of 
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arguments are “the main phases marking the progress of the argument from the 
initial statement of an unsettled problem to the final presentation of a 
conclusion.”76 The finer physiological level, on the other hand, is located at the 
level of individual sentences. At this level, “the idea of logical form has been 
introduced, and here … the validity of our arguments has ultimately to be 
established or refuted.”77 In addition, traditional syllogisms, such as “all A’s are 
B’s,” are deceptively over-simplified and hide crucial differences in the practical 
functions of syllogisms.78 
The second reason, why Toulmin calls for a more complex approach to arguments, 
is to bring out aspects that are neglected in the Aristotelian approach. Even simple 
arguments contain not only claims and data but also warrants for them. 
Arguments, such as “Given Data D, therefore Conclusion C,” require warrants (W) 
to make the step from D to C intelligible.79 In more complicated arguments one 
finds also qualifiers (Q), or “explicit reference to the degree of force which our 
data confer on our claim in virtue of our warrant,”80 conditions of exception or 
rebuttals (R), and backings for warrants (B).81 Thus, the structure of arguments, 






 Figure 1: Elements of arguments, reproduced from Toulmin (2003:97). 
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Toulmin’s third reason for advocating a more complex approach relates to being 
able to distinguish between analytic and substantial arguments. Unlike in 
substantive arguments, in analytic arguments “the backing for the warrant 
authorizing it includes, explicitly or implicitly, the information conveyed in the 
conclusion itself.”82 Clearly, this distinction between analytic and substantive 
arguments could not be done without first differentiating between backings and 
warrants. There is, however, a problem with genuinely analytic arguments: if “the 
purpose of an argument is to establish a conclusion about which we are not 
entirely confident by relating them back to other information about which we 
have greater assurance, it begins to be a little doubtful whether any genuine, 
practical argument could ever be properly analytic.”83 This is significant, because 
in the field of analytic arguments the so conclusion may in fact follow necessarily, 
whereas in the substantive arguments this is not necessarily the case. As an 
example, mathematical arguments appear genuinely analytical in the sense that 
the conclusions follow necessarily from the premises. Mathematical arguments, 
however, seem to be a special case, allowing for the Aristotelian simplification, 
whereas most other arguments are substantive. In sum, the default description of 
arguments should not be based on a special case of arguments.84 
Toulmin’s more complex description of arguments supports a better evaluation of 
competing arguments. In other words, by comparing the different elements within 
and across arguments, one is in a better position to decide on the merits of a 
particular argument among competing alternatives. Most importantly, the 
elements supporting an argument must make the steps from data to conclusion 
coherently and in an intelligible fashion. Whether this is the case determines 
whether the argument is plausible or a “good” argument. Whether a particular 
argument makes the steps better than other arguments determines whether it is 
superior to others. 
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For the elements of an argument to carry it from data to conclusion, they must be 
appropriate within the context in question. For example, the color of fire engines 
has no relevance in determining whether the fire engines are well-equipped to 
extinguish fires. The elements are thus context-dependent. As a first step, then, 
the evaluation of competing arguments begins by ensuring that all the elements in 
the arguments are appropriate before continuing to evaluate, whether the 
elements compose a coherent whole. 
In addition, the evaluation of arguments benefits from separating between 
different fields of arguments:  
Two arguments are said to belong to the same field when the date and 
conclusions in each of the two arguments are, respectively, of the same 
logical type; they will be said to come from different fields when the 
backing or the conclusions in each of the two are not of the same logical 
type.85  
Logical types are for example historical reports, predictions, observations, and 
geometrical axioms. Thus, in evaluating arguments, one should distinguish 
between field-invariant (or constant) and field-dependent (or variable) elements. 
Evaluating elements across logical types is either tricky or futile. 
The upshot of this last point is that the merits of arguments can be evaluated only 
within a given argument’s field. Mathematical arguments can be appraised within 
the field of mathematics and legal arguments within a given legal system. In 
contrast, the terms of assessment, such as impossible, likely, and plausible, 
operate across fields. As expressed by Toulmin, “all the canons for the criticism 
and assessment of arguments … are in practice field-dependent, while all our 
terms of assessment are field-invariant in their force.”86 
Thus, the assessment of arguments is possible, when the elements of different 
arguments are explicitly examined. Such an evaluation, however, must first 
determine, whether the argument’s elements are relevant, and whether the 
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conclusion is intelligible given the elements. In comparing and contrasting two 
different arguments, the first step is to determine, whether they both belong to 
the same field, and then as a second step to evaluate their individual merits within 
the field. This naturally implies that there is no universal standard, but that all 
arguments must be evaluated within their own appropriate contexts. In order to 
clarify this process of evaluation, I wish to discuss adjudication as a practical 
example of assessing competing arguments. 
Chapter 1: General Research Approach 
[46] 
 
ADJUDICATION AS AN ANALOGY TO EVALUATING ARGUMENTS 
In the previous section, it was suggested that adjudication could provide an 
analogy for evaluating between competing arguments. Although adjudication 
concerns the assessment of competing claims within a particular legal system, it 
nevertheless provides an illustration of a method through which a decision is 
reached in situations where a self-evident conclusion is not available. 
Various legal scholars have suggested models of adjudication. For example, 
Ronald Dworkin has famously argued for a “one right answer” theory of 
adjudication.87 Dworkin asserts that a discoverable, exclusive, and correct answer 
exists to each question faced by a judge. To credit Dworkin, his theory might serve 
as a good guide in paradigmatic or uncontroversial cases, where there are no 
multiple, equally plausible answers. Thus, in the vast majority of cases, Dworkin’s 
theory might be helpful. The situation is different, though, when one moves away 
from paradigmatic cases to ones, which can have multiple plausible answers. In 
such cases, some extra-legal criteria must exist, on which the judge can base her 
decision, a point which Dworkin excludes. Moreover, to conclude in such cases 
that the chosen decision was the only “correct” conclusion, by virtue of it having 
been chosen among equal alternatives, would be simply wrong. 
Legal positivists, such as H.L.A. Hart, Joseph Raz, and Neil MacCormick, have also 
proposed their own versions of adjudication.88 These theories, however, face 
similar problems as theories proposed by natural lawyers. Although the 
separation of law from ethics or morality is certainly useful if not required in 
many cases, it might not always be possible, especially if we are to choose one 
answer among multiple equally plausible answers. Again, in such cases, there 
must be something outside the law that allows for selecting one rather than 
another answer. The cases, where multiple equally plausible answers exist, are 
comparatively rare – and in this sense hard cases – but despite their rareness, a 
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theory of adjudication should nevertheless provide a guide how to arrive at a 
conclusion in such hard cases. 
Joel Levin, on the other hand, provides an account of adjudication that 
incorporates extra-legal aspects into the decision-making process.89 In Levin’s 
theory, judicial decision-making operates on three levels. The first level 
represents the answers to the questions that come before the courts.90 The second 
level covers the criteria that allow for the first-level answers.91 Finally, the third 
level includes larger beliefs and attitudes “which tell what criteria can be used to 
reach a legal decision (as opposed to those respecting taste, politics, morality, 
religion, etc.)”92 Levin’s system operates so that a proposition can be used on 
more than one level, but if it is used on several levels, it is used in a logically 
different way.93 Moreover, each higher level serves to justify any lower level.94 
Certain parallels are evident between Levin’s account of adjudication and 
Toulmin’s description of arguments. In both cases, conclusions are reached 
gradually through steps or levels. In other words, both accounts consider the 
conclusions as constructions. These constructions are composed of various 
elements that can be used in different ways depending on the context and the 
needs of the case at hand. Such constructions are plausible, or “correct,” when the 
elements are valid, and when the elements connect within and across levels in 
ways that justify the conclusion. Thus, there are two guiding questions: 1) Are the 
elements of an argument logical, rational, factual, plausible, acceptable, or 
something else? and 2) Do the parts construct the whole? 
Moreover, adjudication takes place within a particular legal system that is 
embedded in a particular society and particular procedural rules. As has been 
argued, in certain hard cases, the law may be insufficient by itself to provide for an 
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answer, and thus extra-legal references are required. These extra-legal references, 
however, whether norms or non-legal societal rules, reflect the particular society, 
in which the legal question was posed. Again, the discussion returns to the 
requirement of taking into consideration the framework within which one 
operates. Thus, for example moral questions in international politics ought to be 
discussed within the moral framework of international politics, and not with 
reference to individual morality. As already pointed out by Machiavelli, morality 
may have a different role among princes than among common people.95 Naturally, 
this does not imply that morality plays no role in the international sphere, 
although such conclusions may have been drawn, but that our examination of 
morality at the international level should reflect the practice of international 
politics as a whole. 
Humanitarian intervention provides an example of a moral question at the 
international level. It also illustrates how morality operates differently at the 
international than at the domestic level. Let us consider only one aspect of 
humanitarian intervention, namely its justifiability. The justification for 
intervention arises in grave humanitarian crises, such as in genocidal situations. If 
one considers the domestic realm, however, even a single killing can cause moral 
outrage. Naturally, the value of human life is the same, regardless of the level, but 
the threshold criteria seem to differ depending on the level one considers. 
Similarly, we seem to allow more when acts are committed in the name of our 
country than when they are committed in the name of individuals.96 
Humanitarian intervention is particular also for the reason that it lies at the 
crossroads of three different frameworks, namely international politics, 
international law, and morality. One could consider these three separately, but 
what is attempted in this thesis is the combination of these three fields. This is 
done by using a casuistic approach. 
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CASUISTRY AS THE UNDERLYING APPROACH 
Also known as case ethics or case morality, casuistry “resolves cases of 
conscience, applying the general rules of religion and morality to particular 
instances in which circumstances alter cases or in which there appears to be a 
conflict of duties.”97 Despite being usually associated with religious morality or 
the teachings of the Catholic Church, the core ideas of casuistry can be applied 
also elsewhere. Thus, what follows is a brief description of the history of casuistry 
and an outline of casuistic reasoning in order to discuss the kind of reasoning 
used in this thesis.  
In its essence, casuistry involved the application of general rules in a particular, 
individual case. One of the main justifications for using this approach, when 
examining cases of humanitarian (non-)intervention, is that these cases are all 
quite different from each other, and that in all cases the general rules of 
international politics must somehow be accommodated. As was argued at the 
beginning of this chapter, each grave humanitarian crisis is unique, and each 
humanitarian intervention exceptional. Nevertheless, each individual case takes 
place within the wider framework of international politics. This framework, on 
the other hand, is not set in stone but it is in constant flux, thus disallowing a “one 
size fits all” approach. Moreover, humanitarian intervention represents a case, 
where there is a clear conflict of duties. To give an obvious example, on the one 
hand there is a perfect duty of non-interference by all states. On the other hand, 
the decision-makers of states have duties as members of humanity. This conflict is 
complicated by for example the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report and the 
subsequent adoption of its main ideas by the General Assembly.98 According to the 
report, and as acknowledged by the General Assembly, the international 
community is expected to take on the responsibility of states to protect their 
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citizens, when a state is “unable or unwilling to fulfill [its] responsibility, or is 
itself the perpetrator.”99  
As a theoretical approach, however, casuistry fell into disrepute since the mid-
seventeenth century. To scholars wishing to find certainty and to relate moral 
judgments to universal principles, casuistry appeared to excuse the 
inexcusable.100 Perhaps the most forceful attack against casuistry came from 
Blaise Pascal in 1656. In his Provincial Letters,101 Pascal criticized casuistry 
heavily. Yet, one can see that the critique was directed at bad casuistry rather than 
casuistry per se. By attempting to distinguish between “good” and “bad” casuistry, 
Jonsen and Toulmin have attempted to revive casuistic reasoning.102 “Good” 
casuistic reasoning admits that differences of moral opinion among conscientious 
individuals are expectable in marginal or ambiguous cases. This, however, is not 
extendable to clear or paradigmatic cases. Thus, “bad” casuistry’s possible consent 
to “anything is possible” finds no foothold with “good” casuistry. In other words, 
the strongest criticisms made against casuistry, and its relativistic nature, were 
misguided and should have been directed at the practitioners rather than at the 
approach itself. 
The roots of casuistry lie in antiquity: in Greek philosophy, in the judicial practices 
of Roman law, and in the traditions of rabbinical debate in Judaism.103 Starting 
with Greek philosophy, I shall explain the origins of casuistry before outlining its 
relevance to the research in the thesis. 
Of the Greek philosophers, Aristotle was perhaps the greatest practitioner of 
casuistic reasoning. In his epistemological discussion, Aristotle differentiates 
between theoretical knowledge or analytical reasoning, and practical 
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knowledge.104 Practical knowledge, moreover, could be technai, the technical 
knowledge of generic tasks or matters, or it could be a form of phronesis, the 
capacity to recognize and to understand specific kinds of cases. Both technai and 
phronesis are opposed to episteme, or theoretical knowledge. For Aristotle, ethics 
belongs in the realm of phronesis, because moral questions require perceptive and 
timely answers, as and when they arise. Episteme’s desire for universal and 
timeless truths cannot accommodate the needs of ethics, because ethics is 
concerned with questions that are concrete, temporal, and presumptive as 
opposed to abstract, atemporal, and theoretically necessary. 
The judicial practices of Roman law, on the other hand, shared Aristotle’s 
prudential thinking. In Rome, before her great expansion, formal adjudication was 
required only in marginal or ambiguous cases, which were referred to the College 
of Pontiffs. The Pontiffs were entrusted to apply their judgment wisely without a 
requirement to cite reasons or established rules. Their role was to arbitrate in the 
sense of exercising “judicial discrimination in assessing the delicate balance of 
facts at issue in a particular case.”105 Considered wise, the Pontiffs were to 
perceive the delicate balance of circumstances in each case and to arrive at a just 
or prudential conclusion. As Rome expanded and Emperor Constantine 
introduced judicial changes, the Pontiffs, however, lost their equitable 
jurisdiction. 
Judaism, though, has remained essentially similar throughout history in its 
method of interpreting and explaining the Talmud texts by those who are learned 
in them. Disputed issues are debated by a large enough schul, formed of learned 
rabbis, who attempt to reach a conclusion by weighing different points of view 
relevant to the dispute at hand. Similar to the Pontiffs, these learned men are 
revered in their prudence. The Judaic tradition, however, has incorporated certain 
egalitarian ideas, similar to ideas held in ancient Athens, so that “the egalitarian 
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wisdom of the people and the elitist authority of the rabbis coalesced into a mode 
of moral reasoning between the Roman and the Athenian.”106 
After antiquity, Christianity influenced the development of casuistry. In Europe, 
casuistry reached its heyday between the second half of the sixteenth century and 
the first half of the seventeenth century. Evidently, casuistic reasoning was 
applied to questions related to Christianity, whether to the interpretation of 
certain passages or to the application of the Church’s teachings in practice. 
Around mid-seventeenth century, though, casuistry fell into disrepute, when it 
seemed capable of providing support for two contrasting claims, thus paving the 
way to relativism and allowing one to excuse one’s actions either way. This 
position was not helped by the Cartesian quest for certainties and universal truths 
in the sciences that spread also to matters of morality.  
Contemporary research, however, has demonstrated how the Cartesian quest is 
untenable. To give an example, as Davis argues, two-value logic, on which 
scientific positivism is based, and which is required by deductive logic, allocates 
things into two categories such as “yes and no” or “true and false”. The problem is 
that in many cases we need a third category: “undecided.”107 These undecided 
cases are borderline cases, in the sense of being marginal or ambiguous. Davis’s 
research, among many others, has thus enabled a return to casuistic reasoning by 
focusing exactly on the borderline cases. 
The manner, in which casuistry enables a decision in marginal or ambiguous 
cases, is by examining the particulars of a given case. As a second step, one 
determines what the particular case is a case of on the basis of those details. 
Moreover, by locating the case within its context, one assesses which general 
rules are relevant and how they should be applied given the specifics of the case. 
A taxonomy, or a methodological map, highlighting significant similarities and 
differences among various cases enables the assessment, whether the particular 
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circumstances of a given case are significant enough to require that the case be 
treated differently than other similar but not identical cases. Thus, instead of 
deciding what something is a case of and then applying predetermined rules to 
the case, casuistry both situates cases within their contexts and adds another 
layer of deliberation. 
In relation to humanitarian crises, one often hears the complaint how similar 
cases are treated differently. Why did we intervene in Kosovo but not in Rwanda? 
Equally often, the added layer required by casuistry is absent in these outcries. 
Before jumping into conclusions, one could ask whether the particulars of 
different but similar cases might allow for a different response from the 
international community despite their apparent similarity. In the Kosovo versus 
Rwanda situation, the answer would undoubtedly increase the shame of those 
who decided to leave Rwandans to care for themselves but supported 
intervention in Kosovo. Alternatively, one might ask whether selective responses 
by the international community to grave humanitarian could be based on the 
particulars of the different cases, and if so, what criteria should be used. 
In this thesis, thinking similar to casuistry is used in the following chapters. For 
example, the subsequent chapter examines first the humanitarian intervention 
debate before asking what kind of a right the right of humanitarian intervention 
would be if it existed. Although casuistic reasoning is implicit in this chapter, one 
can note how the use of for example a typology of rights fits well with the casuistic 
tradition. Similarly, chapter three, which focuses on responsibility, considers how 
certain details might affect the interpretation of a given situation or the 
distribution of responsibility. Chapter four, moreover, continues this line of 
thinking with a “practical” demonstration of a model of shared responsibility. 
Finally, chapter five questions the acceptability of the justifications certain 
international actors made in relation to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and uses 
casuistic reasoning in the evaluation process. The final chapter is dedicated to 
stock-taking, and as such does not apply casuistic reasoning to any particular 
questions. One might, however, note that even in chapter six the manner of 








A POINT OF DEPARTURE 
 




Having outlined in the previous chapter the general approach taken in this thesis, 
this chapter discusses the starting position of the research. The point of departure 
in this thesis may seem controversial to some, because in many respects it 
represents a reversal of traditional presumptions. Usually, the discussion on 
humanitarian intervention has focused on the question whether the right of 
humanitarian intervention exists.109 Here, for heuristic purposes of clarification, 
however, it is assumed that there is a right of humanitarian intervention under 
certain circumstances, namely in grave humanitarian crises.110 This assumption is 
made in two different contexts in this chapter. The assumption is made for the 
first time, when examining the literature on humanitarian intervention, while the 
second time is when the discussion focuses on the kind of right the right of 
humanitarian intervention would be, if it existed. These two contexts represent 
also the two main parts of this chapter. 
The first part of this chapter examines the literature. The amount of literature that 
there is in relation to humanitarian intervention is simply too vast to be covered 
                                                             
108 Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822 
(London: Gollancz, 1973). 
109 Or so at least until the R2P report. 
110 This assumption is justified given the General Assembly’s recognition that the international 
community shares a responsibility to protect victims of grave humanitarian crises. See e.g. United 
Nations General Assembly, World Summit Outcome, 2005, A/RES/60/1. This recognition, however, 
does not include individual right to intervene. In other words, although there are clear indications 
that the rule of non-intervention can be extended for humanitarian motives, the question still 
remains when and by whom it can be done. 
Chapter 2: A Point of Departure 
[56] 
 
completely. Thus, certain cuts have been necessary. Moreover, instead of reciting 
what other authors have written, the literature is approached by examining the 
implicit assumptions made within it. It will be argued that these implicit 
assumptions amount to an argument claiming that there first of all should be a 
right of humanitarian intervention and secondly, that there is a responsibility to 
exercise the right. In other words, in the literature, there exists a link between 
rights and responsibilities. 
The second half of this chapter considers the link between right and responsibility 
by asking what kind of a right is in question. By using a Hohfeldian approach to 
rights, it is argued that the kind of right the right of humanitarian intervention is, 
if it exists, depends on the right-holder, and that there is a connection between the 
right to intervene and the responsibility to exercise the right. This connection, 
however, is not straightforward as will be explained below. Moreover, by using 
this method it is possible to clarify who could be the right-holders and on what 
basis. 
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SOME REMARKS ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
Most of the discussion on humanitarian intervention concentrates on two periods: 
interventions before the end of the Cold War and interventions since its end. The 
earlier period, however, is normally limited to the years between 1945 and 1990 
with an emphasis on the 1970s. The most cited cases for this period are India’s 
intervention in Bangladesh in 1971, Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in 1979, 
and Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda, also in 1979. Some authors, such as 
Martha Finnemore, have argued that cases of humanitarian intervention are not 
limited to the post-Charter era. In her examination of humanitarian intervention, 
Finnemore argues that cases of humanitarian intervention date as far back as the 
nineteenth century.111 The debate, however, is whether all these cases can 
actually be included as examples of humanitarian intervention, because in most of 
them humanitarian motives were not self-evident or proclaimed by the 
interveners. Moreover, for example in the nineteenth century cases, the concept of 
humanity was restricted to white Christians, thus restricting the applicability of 
such cases from a modern perspective. 
The early 1990s, on the other hand, marks a distinct point in the history of 
humanitarian intervention. Since then, humanitarian motives have been cited 
explicitly by the interveners, who have also attempted to use such motives as 
justifications for their military action. The examples that are discussed most often 
include Iraq in 1991, Somalia in 1993, Rwanda in 1994, the Former Yugoslavia 
throughout most of the 1990s, Sierra Leone from 1998, East Timor in 1999 and in 
2006, and more recently Darfur at least since 2004. Some might include also 
Afghanistan and the recent invasion of Iraq as cases of humanitarian intervention 
since September 11, yet they both raise more questions than they can settle. For 
example, Human Rights Watch has strongly criticized US government’s attempts 
to describe the Iraqi operation as a humanitarian intervention.112 
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The explicit use of humanitarian justifications is a striking difference between 
cases before and after 1990. Cases that date before 1990 were justified mainly in 
terms of self-defense. It seems that humanitarian justifications were considered 
insufficient as the Indian example demonstrates. In 1971, when India intervened 
in Bangladesh, she used humanitarian justifications in combination with self-
defense arguments. Later, however, India withdrew her humanitarian 
justifications, most likely because of the perceived possibility that they hindered 
her cause. In contrast, since the early 1990s, humanitarian justifications have 
been explicitly used to justify interventions as for example Somalia, Rwanda, 
Kosovo, and Darfur demonstrate. To some extent, one might even argue that 
humanitarian justifications are now required in order to legitimize intervention. 
The difference between Cold War and post-Cold War cases of humanitarian 
intervention can surely be assigned to a normative change at the international 
level. The acceptability, if not even the requirement, of humanitarian justifications 
for the use of force reflects a shift within the wider discussion concerning the use 
of force and its exceptions. As forbidden by the UN Charter, force can be used 
legitimately either in self-defense or as authorized by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII powers. Neither of these exceptions, however, directly assaults 
traditionally perceived sovereignty of states and its fundamental rule of non-
intervention. In contrast, allowing for humanitarian justifications as legitimate 
reasons for the use of force outside one’s own boundaries conflicts with the rule 
of non-intervention, a point which has caused much concern. 
States, and especially newly sovereign, non-Western states, have been protective 
of their interpretation of sovereignty as exclusive.113 Similarly, some authors have 
expressed concern over the possibility that allowing for humanitarian 
justifications as legitimizing factors for the use of force can open the flood gates of 
selfish abuse of those justifications. The debate, however, seems one-sided, at 
least in terms of volume. In other words, one finds many accounts of the 
rightfulness of humanitarian intervention but few counterarguments apart from 
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references to the rule of non-intervention and concerns about the proliferation of 
the concept to areas and cases, where it does not fit.  
Thus, to describe the “discussion,” it is characterized by authors seeking better 
and novel ways to assert the same argument, namely that humanitarian 
imperatives ought to override the rule of non-intervention in grave humanitarian 
crises,114 as if they were fighting a silent enemy, or as if the previous arguments 
had not been persuasive enough. That the case for humanitarian intervention 
must be remade over again reveals much about the international order. To 
paraphrase Mervyn Frost, the exception of humanitarian intervention has not 
become the rule, because it is still the exception of justifying humanitarian 
intervention, and not the rule of non-intervention in grave humanitarian crises, 
that requires special attention.115 
One cannot, however, deny that a normative change has taken place. As supported 
by state practice, humanitarian imperatives have been accepted as legitimating 
factors for intervention, at least in some cases. This change is surely connected 
with the rise of the human rights regime and its growing importance since the 
mid-twentieth century. The question that remains, however, relates to the scope 
of this change. This thesis attempts to provide at least a partial answer to this 
question by examining international responsibility in relation to grave 
humanitarian crises. The existence of a responsibility to intervene, or to alleviate 
human suffering in grave humanitarian crises, would indicate that there has been 
a profound normative shift in this regard. 
In the next section I discuss the humanitarian intervention debate in more detail. 
The purpose is not to provide a summary of the whole discussion but to focus on 
the assumptions that the discussants make. It is argued that the advocates of the 
right of humanitarian intervention argue for a fundamental change in the 
responsibilities of states and of the international community. 
                                                             
114 The newest twist in the discussion is the concept of responsibility to protect, to which I shall 
return later. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "The 
Responsibility to Protect," (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). 
115 Mervyn Frost, Ethics and International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 105. 
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A DISCUSSION OF THE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION DEBATE 
Before discussing the humanitarian intervention debate, two disclaimers are in 
order. First, the following pages focus on the humanitarian intervention debate, 
and little attention is given to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report and the 
discussion it consequently stirred.116 The reason for this is simple; the aim is to 
highlight the background and evolution of the debate, of which the responsibility 
to protect is the latest stage. Subsequent chapters, on the other hand, address 
responsibility along with the R2P report. The second disclaimer concerns the 
manner, in which the humanitarian intervention debate is approached. The 
implicit assumptions within the debate are at the locus of this discussion. Hence, 
no attempt is made to provide an exhaustive account of the literature, but rather 
to draw attention to the kinds of arguments that have been made. In what follows, 
some characterization may appear stereotypical, but this is done in order to 
clarify the distinctions involved. 
Writing in 1859, John Stuart Mill may have been one of the first to discuss 
“humanitarian” intervention,117 but it was only in 1973, when the debate received 
an impetus from Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley.118 Franck and Rodley’s article 
set in motion an intensifying debate whether the right of humanitarian 
intervention existed or should exist. This debate has drawn mainly from the fields 
of international politics, international law, and moral philosophy. 
                                                             
116 See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "The Responsibility to 
Protect," (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). See also e.g. Gareth Evans and 
Mohamed Sahnoun, "The Responsibility to Protect," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 (2002); Rebecca J. 
Hamilton, "The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine--but What of 
Implementation?," The Harvard Human Rights Journal 19, no. Spring (2006); S. Neil Macfarlane, 
Carolin J. Thielking, and Thomas G. Weiss, "Review: The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone 
Interested in Humanitarian Intervention?," Third World Quarterly 25, no. 5 (2004); Max W. 
Matthews, "Tracking the Emergence of a New International Norm: The Responsibility to Protect and 
the Crisis in Darfur," Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 31, no. 1 (2008); 
Carsten Stahn, "Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?," The 
American Journal of International Law 101, no. 1 (2007); "U.S. Officials Endorse "Responsibility to 
Protect" Through Security Council Action," The American Journal of International Law 100, no. 2 
(2006). 
117 John Stuart Mill, "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," in Essays on Equality, Law, and Education: 
Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. John M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984). 
118 Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, "After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention 
by Military Force," American Journal of International Law 67, no. 2 (1973). 
Chapter 2: A Point of Departure 
[61] 
 
Three central questions have marked the debate. First, what is humanitarian 
intervention, and how does it differ from other kinds of interventions?119 Second, 
if the right of humanitarian intervention exists, who is (are) the right-holder(s)? 
Third, when can the right-holder(s) exercise the right?120 This last question was 
addressed in chapter one in relation to exceptional circumstances that justify 
humanitarian intervention. Thus, in what follows, attention is given to the other 
two questions. 
The first question regarding the definition of humanitarian intervention has 
received a plurality of answers. Although there seems to be a general 
understanding of what constitutes an example of humanitarian intervention, 
there is no agreement over the “proper” definition of humanitarian 
intervention.121 As Davis reminds us, the reason for the plurality of definitions 
might not lie with the theorists but with the concept and its fuzzy boundaries.122 
Nevertheless, despite their differences, most of the definitions of humanitarian 
intervention are quite similar. Fundamentally, humanitarian intervention is 
distinguished from humanitarian assistance by being uninvited by the targeted 
state. Moreover, humanitarian intervention is usually associated with the use of 
force, or at least the use of military with or without the use of force, in order to 
achieve humanitarian objectives. Lastly, humanitarian interventions are aimed at 
rescuing people, who are not the citizens of the intervening state(s). As Wheeler 
has put it aptly, humanitarian intervention is about saving strangers.123 
                                                             
119 Some may consider “humanitarian intervention” an oxymoron. See e.g. Stewart Patrick, The Role 
of the U.S. Government in Humanitarian Intervention, (U.S. Department of State, 2004, Remarks to the 
43rd Annual International Affairs Symposium, "The Suffering of Strangers: Global Humanitarian 
Intervention in a Turbulent World", Lewis and Clark College, April 5, 2004). Available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/31299.htm; Shashi Tharoor and Sam Daws, "Humanitarian 
Intervention Getting Past the Reefs," World Policy Journal 18, no. 2 (2001). See also Alex de Waal, 
"No Such Thing as Humanitarian Intervention: Why We Need to Rethink How to Realize the 
“Responsibility to Protect” in Wartime," (Harvard International Review, 2007). Available at 
<http://www.harvardir.org/articles/1482/>. 
120 A fourth question, namely whether there is a responsibility to intervene, has been introduced 
more recently. I shall return to this question explicitly in the following chapters. 
121 Anthony F. Jr. Lang, "Humanitarian Intervention - Definitions and Debates," in Just Intervention, 
ed. Anthony F. Jr. Lang (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 2-4. 
122 James W. Davis, Terms of Inquiry: On the Theory and Practice of Political Science (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2005). 
123 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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The inclusion of humanitarian motivations in the definition of humanitarian 
intervention, on the other hand, divides the participants to the discussion. For 
example Wheeler has omitted motivations from his threshold criteria.124 Through 
this omission, Wheeler has been able to count some of the Cold War cases as 
humanitarian interventions, thus arguing for a custom of humanitarian 
intervention, at least since the 1970s. Moreover, Wheeler is more concerned with 
the consequences of intervention rather than its explicit justifications. We are, 
after all, interested in knowing whether the end result was an improvement in the 
humanitarian conditions of the initial circumstances predating intervention. 
On the other hand, for example Holzgrefe insists on humanitarian motives as part 
of the definition of humanitarian intervention.125 This insistence attempts to 
delineate better between humanitarian and other kinds of interventions. The 
danger in omitting humanitarian justifications, according to authors including 
motives as part of their definition, is that almost any intervention might be 
counted as humanitarian just as long as the end result was somewhat better than 
the situation during a crisis. Since already the end of a crisis clearly marks an 
improvement in the humanitarian conditions, humanitarian intervention could be 
abused during times of crisis, if one does not insist on humanitarian motives as 
part of the threshold criteria for determining whether a particular intervention 
could be counted as humanitarian. 
To discuss the inclusion-exclusion of humanitarian motives in the definition of 
humanitarian intervention, it is advisable to consider the justification for the use 
of force in humanitarian crises. The justification for humanitarian intervention 
relies on the argument that the use of force is necessary for bringing about a 
positive end state, namely the termination of hostilities against innocents and the 
alleviation of their suffering. In other words, the positive humanitarian outcome is 
not supposed to be some happy coincidence of the use of force; a positive 
humanitarian outcome is supposed to result from deliberated, planned action. 
                                                             
124 Ibid. 
125 J. L. Holzgrefe, "The Humanitarian Intervention Debate," in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, 
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Moreover, the use of force is justified only when it is likely that it will result in a 
positive humanitarian outcome. To put it differently, the use of force would not be 
justifiable, if it was likely that it would not make a difference, or if it could worsen 
the situation. 
Some, on the other hand, might argue that the use of force is justified by the crisis, 
the human suffering. Arguing thus, a particular kind of crisis justifies the use of 
force, which is necessary for solving the problem. Whether or not the end result is 
in fact an improvement plays a secondary role in determining whether the 
intervention could be labeled humanitarian. After all, not all humanitarian 
interventions result in a positive outcome as the experience from Somalia so 
vividly demonstrates. In other words, should we discount interventions as 
humanitarian when they fail to achieve humanitarian objectives, even though they 
have been explicitly justified on humanitarian imperatives, and when there have 
been no geo-strategic interests involved on the part of the intervener(s)? 
Moreover, as mentioned in the previous chapter, some such as Tesón make a 
distinction between intensions and motives. Following John Stuart Mill, Tesón 
differentiates intention as something that is willed, and motives as further goals 
one wishes to achieve with the intended act.126 As Terry Nardin argues, however, 
Tesón’s argument twists the whole notion of humanitarian intervention to being 
about “us” rather than being about “others.”127 As humanitarian intervention is 
understood within the bounds of this thesis, it should incorporate at least some 
humanitarian motives and not just intentions. Otherwise, the very idea why 
humanitarian intervention became an issue in the first place is lost. 
In sum, although it might make sense to concentrate on the consequences of 
intervention, and to exclude humanitarian motives especially when examining for 
example the Cold War cases, a too narrow focus on the consequences of 
intervention at the price of the motives seems unjustifiable especially in the 
contemporary world. Evidently, the positive end state is part of the justification of 
                                                             
126 Fernando R. Tesón, "Ending Tyranny in Iraq," Ethics and International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005): 5. 
127 See e.g. Terry Nardin, "Humanitarian Imperialism: Response to 'Ending Tyranny in Iraq'," Ethics 
and International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005): 23. 
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the use of force, in the sense that it is considered to be able to bring about a 
positive humanitarian outcome, but the desire or motive to bring about that 
outcome should be acknowledged. Otherwise the following simplified, 
hypothetical example could be counted as a humanitarian intervention: Consider 
that state A desired to intervene in state B in order to take control of state B’s oil 
reserves at a time, when state B was undergoing domestic turmoil resulting in the 
deaths of thousands of innocents. Consider further that state A’s intervention and 
seizure of the oil reserves happened to tip the balance in state B to favor the 
revolutionary forces enough to bring about a change in government and peaceful 
times. It would be strange indeed, if cases like this could be counted as 
humanitarian interventions, something that would be possible, if humanitarian 
motives are not part of the definition of humanitarian intervention. 
If humanitarian motives ought to be part of a definition of humanitarian 
intervention, so ought the lack of invitation by the targeted state. If humanitarian 
aid is requested by the government of a state, the resulting operation is best 
described as humanitarian assistance. In such situations, there is neither a conflict 
with the rule of non-intervention nor is the sovereignty of the targeted state 
challenged. Cases of humanitarian assistance are not covered in this thesis, 
because they pose different questions than those that are of interest in this 
dissertation. 
The third fundamental aspect of a definition of humanitarian intervention is a 
present or imminent grave humanitarian crisis. As discussed in chapter one, it 
might not be self-evident what constitutes a grave enough humanitarian crisis to 
justify intervention. Evidently, the circumstances must be exceptional enough to 
justify the extension of normal rules, including the respect for the rule of non-
intervention. Whether it is a question of conscience-shocking circumstances,128 of 
outsiders being the only hope,129 or of an overwhelming humanitarian 
                                                             
128 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 3rd ed. 
(New York: Basic Books, 2000). 
129 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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necessity,130 from a humanitarian perspective, the “stakes are too high, the 
suffering already too great”131 in circumstances that justify humanitarian 
intervention.  
The fourth part of defining humanitarian intervention relates to the manner, in 
which the operation would be undertaken. Following Just War tradition, 
humanitarian intervention should be conducted in a manner that would not 
contradict neither the initial motives (and intentions) nor undermine the 
humanitarian character of the intervention. Clearly, actors hardly ever act for 
single motives, and to expect that humanitarian interventions occur out of pure 
altruism might be utopian. The argument, however, is not that humanitarian 
intervention should be motivated solely on humanitarian grounds, rather that 
humanitarian motives should play a significant part. In this sense, the manner, in 
which an intervention unfolds, should reflect on those motives. Similarly, the 
intervention should not cause more suffering than not intervening, thus 
remaining true to its character as “outside help.” 
These four parts of a definition of humanitarian intervention are how the concept 
is understood within this thesis. In other words, humanitarian intervention is 
understood as the use of force across state borders by a state (or a group of states 
such as a coalition or an intervention organization) aimed at preventing or ending 
a grave humanitarian crisis of individuals or groups other than its own citizens, 
without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied, and in 
a manner which is consistent with the humanitarian aims of the intervention.  
By providing a definition of humanitarian intervention, I could be accused of 
hypocrisy. After all, have I not been arguing that defining concepts with clear 
boundaries is difficult, if not impossible? Moreover, many elements of my 
definition are controversial. To name four examples, I have included motives as 
                                                             
130 This definition is from a memorandum by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in 
which the UK explained her understanding of the legal basis of possible NATO action in Kosovo. 
Quoted in Richard Caplan, "Humanitarian Intervention: Which Way Forward?," in Just Intervention, 
ed. Anthony F. Jr. Lang (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 135. 
131 Michael Walzer, "Arguing for Humanitarian Intervention," in The New Killing Fields: Massacre and 
the Politics of Intervention, ed. Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 21. 
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part of my definition. Similarly, my definition is highly state-centric. Third, I have 
not included the Security Council in my definition. Lastly, my definition is 
imprecise.  
To answer such objections,first, I wish to make it absolutely clear that the reason 
for providing this definition is to clarify how I understand the term within this thesis. 
The purpose is not to operationalize the concept with this definition or to claim 
inside knowledge of what “humanitarian intervention” really means. My definition 
simply outlines one understanding of the concept and the elements that I deem 
central. Second, the state-centricity of my definition is due to the fact that in the 
contemporary world it is only states and inter-governmental organizations that 
can intervene in the sense that I understand humanitarian intervention. Third, the 
exclusion of for example the Security Council should be clear. My definition is 
about the act of humanitarian intervention, not about who would commit it. 
Finally, I acknowledge that the boundaries of my definition are fuzzy, because 
much interpretation is needed for example in determining a grave enough crisis 
as well as sufficiently humanitarian motives. 
The second question that has received much attention relates to the right of 
humanitarian intervention: Does a right of humanitarian intervention exist, and if 
so, who are the right-holders? Most answers to this question begin by examining 
the rightness of intervention during times of grave crises. It is considered that 
because it is right to alleviate suffering by for example ending genocide, there 
must also be a right to intervene. Terry Nardin, for example, has argued for the 
moral basis of humanitarian intervention according to principles that “have been 
known for centuries, if not millennia.”132 In some senses, then, Nardin’s argument 
aims to establish also a custom.  
The usual way to establish custom, however, relates to cases of humanitarian 
intervention and to the demonstration that historically speaking humanitarian 
intervention is not new. As mentioned earlier, Wheeler establishes a strong 
record of humanitarian interventions during the Cold War by omitting 
                                                             
132 Terry Nardin, "The Moral Basis for Humanitarian Intervention," in Just Intervention, ed. Anthony 
F. Jr. Lang (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 25. 
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humanitarian motives from his threshold criteria.133 Finnemore, on the other 
hand, considers the change in the extent of humanity from having been limited to 
white Christians to its universality in contemporary times. In this way, she 
establishes a custom or practice of humanitarian intervention as far back as the 
early nineteenth century.134 Whether Wheeler’s or Finnemore’s attempts at 
establishing a custom are sufficient is doubtful. Wheeler’s omission of motives 
from this threshold criteria, as discussed above, remains dubious, while 
Finnemore’s acknowledgement that “humanitarian action was rarely taken when 
it jeopardized other stated goals or interests of a state,”135 and that “in the 
nineteenth century European Christians were the sole focus of humanitarian 
intervention”136 weakens the applicability of her arguments in relation to 
contemporary humanitarian interventions. Nevertheless, it is clear that actions 
similar to our current understanding of humanitarian intervention have occurred 
in the past, even if it is unclear whether they amount to a custom recognized by 
for example international law. 
The right of humanitarian intervention is alleged also on the basis of international 
law, of which custom forms a significant part. By re-examining international law, 
authors, such as Tesón, and Arend and Beck, have argued that humanitarian 
intervention is at least permissible, even if the right has not been codified.137 
Moreover, Brian Lepard has constructed a fresh interpretation of international 
law based on ethical principles derived from world religions.138 Drawing from 
world religions, Lepard argues that a restrictionist interpretation of law denying 
the legitimacy, if not also the legality, of humanitarian intervention is 
                                                             
133 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). 
134 Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in The Culture of 
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics., ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, New Directions in 
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135 Ibid., 168. 
136 Ibid., 184. 
137 Anthony C. Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN 
Charter Paradigm (London: Routledge, 1993); Fernando R. Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention: An 
Inquiry into Law and Morality (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1988). 
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insupportable. Simon Chesterman, on the other hand, has argued that 
“humanitarian intervention is illegal but … the international community may, on a 
case-by-case basis, tolerate the wrong.”139 Although establishing a custom lends 
weight to these legal arguments supporting humanitarian intervention, there is 
clearly no positive legal right to intervene. 
The most recent evolution of the debate has been to rephrase it. The International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) attempted to 
rearticulate the debate and to draw attention to the victims of grave humanitarian 
crises with its Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report.140 In simple terms, the R2P 
report advocates a new interpretation of sovereignty that includes the 
responsibility of sovereign states to protect their citizens. Where states are 
unable, unwilling, or themselves the perpetrator of atrocities, the responsibility to 
protect is transferred to the international community.141 
In sum, the answer to who is the right-holder of the right of humanitarian 
intervention is complicated. Various participants to the debate assign the right 
usually either to no one, the Security Council, regional organizations, or 
concerned states. 
The two central questions of the humanitarian intervention debate have divided 
the participants into three “camps.” By camps, I do not mean to imply that there 
are settled positions with clear membership of authors. Rather, by camps I refer 
to clusters of arguments supporting a particular position in the debate. Thus, a 
given author’s two different arguments might belong in different camps. The 
reason for this kind of – perhaps unusual – division is to avoid doing injustice to 
the authors in question, drawing arbitrary lists of membership, and pigeonholing 
the authors. Their arguments are too sophisticated, and their positions may have 
changed during the debate, to allow a clear division according to author. Instead, I 
                                                             
139 Simon Chesterman, "Hard Cases Make Bad Law: Law, Ethics, and Politics in Humanitarian 
Intervention," in Just Intervention, ed. Anthony F. Jr. Lang (Washington DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2003), 53. 
140 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "The Responsibility to Protect," 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). 
141 See e.g. para. 2.29 of the report. 
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focus on the main arguments are support a given main position in the debate. 
Emphasis is on the kind of arguments that are made for a given position in the 
debate. In other words, instead of labeling authors, arguments and clusters of 
arguments of a kind compose a camp.  
The first of these camps represents the orthodox position by interpreting 
sovereignty as exclusive and absolute. The second camp is sympathetic to the 
concerns of the first camp but admits that morality might require the breaking or 
bending of rules on some occasions. Finally, the third camp argues that the rules 
have changed, or that they should be changed, and that the right of humanitarian 
intervention should be recognized. Below, each camp is discussed in more detail. 
At this point, however, a disclaimer is in order. In what follows, certain 
stereotypes can be recognized. For example, I represent the first camp as 
corresponding with an undergraduate perspective on realism. Clearly, neither 
realism nor the first camp are as simple but more sophisticated and varied. 
Similarly, authors, such as for example Chesterman and Brownlie,142 make more 
nuanced arguments than what is presented below. Yet, the simplification seems 
justified given that the purpose is only to sketch a general image of the debate as a 
background condition to the original contribution of this thesis. 
Moreover, although one might have the impression, the three camps are not 
necessarily part of the same discourse. The “debate” began already in the early 
1970s and gained momentum to reach its heyday in the 1990s. Although the 
debate still continues, it has now changed remarkably. In addition, there was no 
single debate as such, but rather interested parties who wrote regarding ethical, 
philosophical, political, and legal aspects in relation to contemporary events. As 
there is no Just War “theory” but rather a tradition, so there is no single 
humanitarian intervention “debate.” Thus, it is worth remembering that this 
description of the debate is a simplification done for the purposes of this thesis. 
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The first camp could be described as the orthodox position, which the arguments 
of the other camps attempt to overcome. Following a realist interpretation of 
sovereignty as exclusive, the arguments of this camp deny that any right or duty 
of humanitarian intervention exists. In a Machiavellian world, states are left to 
their own devices, and the citizens other than one’s own state are not the concern 
of the international community, much less of any other state. Assistance can be 
given, but acts of altruism are not considered prudent in a world, where the friend 
of today might be the enemy of tomorrow. Finally, according to this camp, claims 
of humanitarian concerns are mere rhetoric in the world of realpolitik. 
Furthermore, while there is no duty demanding states to assist strangers, there is 
a perfect duty of non-intervention. In a rule-consequentialist fashion, it is 
considered better to follow the existing, conventional rules, even if justice might 
be sacrificed for order in some cases. The “justice for order” tradeoff is deemed 
tolerable, as Louis Henkin argues: “Violations of human rights are indeed all too 
common and if it were permissible to remedy them by external use of force, there 
would be no law to forbid the use of force by almost any state against almost any 
other.”143 In addition, states have no right to risk the lives of their own soldiers in 
order to possibly save strangers, especially in cases where no vital national 
interests are involved.144 
Few would confess belonging to this first camp.145 Yet, whether imaginary or real, 
this camp sets the bar for the other two. In other words, the arguments of the first 
camp are tackled by the other two camps, even in the absence of a protagonist of 
the first camp. Perhaps this is telling of the impact of “mainstream” IR in the 
(sub)consciousness of authors. In any case, the first camp has sympathy for the 
victims of grave humanitarian crises. It simply feels that its hands are tied in an 
unfortunate tradeoff between single cases and the wider international order. 
                                                             
143 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1979), 145. 
144 Allegedly, this was Samuel P. Huntington’s argument as quoted in Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving 
Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 31. 
145 Here, however, one might think of such authors as Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," 
Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (1999). 
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According to this camp, it would be imprudent to recognize any right of 
humanitarian intervention, whether implicitly or explicitly. 
The second camp, on the other hand, separates law from morality without 
excluding either from the practice of international politics. Humanitarian 
intervention, according to this camp, is illegal but nevertheless excusable at times 
due to moral imperatives, a point which for example Simon Chesterman makes.146 
Thirty years before him, Franck and Rodley reached a similar conclusion: the 
question of humanitarian intervention belongs in the realm of morality, where 
each decision-maker should come to terms with his or her own conception of 
what is right.147 Thus, the use of force for humanitarian reasons is not sanctioned 
by law but by moral imperatives. Given the right circumstances, which 
unfortunately denote a grave crisis, and a combination of other factors, 
humanitarian intervention might be excusable. By making this excuse or 
exception to the normal rules, the rules that are broken or extended are, however, 
strengthened in a certain sense. In other words, breaking the rules requires 
recognizing them in the first place. 
This second camp does not argue for a change in the rules of international politics. 
It merely points out that humanitarian efforts, even if they require force, should 
not be condemned outright. Legal acts are divorced from legitimate acts as was 
the case with Kosovo,148 and in a sense this camp is very practical. In the words of 
Kofi Annan in relation to the Rwandan genocide: had there been a coalition of the 
willing, should it have stood by in 1994, if it had not received Security Council 
authorization legalizing the intervention?149 
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Finally, the third camp of the humanitarian intervention debate is the strongest in 
its advocacy of the right of humanitarian intervention. Not only is it considered 
that the Security Council may authorize humanitarian interventions, but that in 
some cases humanitarian interventions could be legal even without such 
authorization.150 In other words, external intervention in grave humanitarian 
crises is morally desirable and legal, or at least interventions, which are motivated 
by humanitarian concerns, should be considered legal.151 By establishing a custom 
of humanitarian intervention,152 authors are in a position to argue that customary 
international law supports their position. In addition, by reinterpreting existing 
legal documents such as the UN Charter, for example through the lenses of word 
religions,153 authors find further support for their legal claims. 
In many ways, this third camp includes the most enthusiastic advocates of 
humanitarian intervention. Whether in attempting to assert the existence of the 
right of humanitarian intervention or its desirability, this camp faces the biggest 
challenge in overcoming the orthodox position represented by the first camp.  
The three camps differ in their interpretations of international law, of the role of 
the Security Council, and of the place of morality in international politics. 
Morality, according to the first camp, has no place in international politics, and 
legal support for humanitarian intervention is nonexistent. Moreover, as asserted 
by this camp, the Security Council might have the power to authorize 
humanitarian interventions, but it lacks the jurisdiction. Allegedly, the Security 
Council has no jurisdiction over domestic matters of states, which is protected by 
Article 2.7 of the UN Charter. Thus, crises requiring humanitarian intervention fall 
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under the jurisdiction of those sovereign states, in which the crises occur. To 
explain, Article 2.7 safeguards states’ domestic jurisdiction except under Chapter 
VII enforcement measures. Chapter VII powers, however, require a threat to or a 
breach of international peace and security, or an act of aggression. Traditionally, 
humanitarian crises have not been interpreted to constitute any of these. Hence, 
the first camp concludes that the Council does not have the necessary jurisdiction 
to authorize humanitarian interventions. As a final nail, the first camp reminds us 
that the rule of non-intervention was established for a good reason. 
The second camp, on the other hand, agrees with the first that humanitarian 
interventions have little legal support. At the same time, however, this camp 
considers strange the insistence that humanitarian interventions are illegal. As 
the first camp appears to subscribe to a view where the strong do as they will and 
the weak as they must, it is strange indeed to insist on respecting the rules with 
regard to humanitarian crises. Reviewing the practice of international politics, the 
second camp reminds us that international law is not sacrosanct. Thus, more 
important than focusing on whether international law is breached is whether it 
has been breached for the right reasons. The second camp attempts to strike a 
balance between international law and politics without forgetting neither moral 
imperatives nor the raison d’état. 
In relation to the Security Council, the second camp accepts that the Council has 
jurisdiction to authorize humanitarian interventions. The Council is charged with 
the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security” (Article 24.1), and it can take “such action by air, sea, or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” (Article 
42). Most importantly in the context of humanitarian crises, the Security Council 
can use its discretion in determining “the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (Article 39). In other words, the Security 
Council can interpret its own jurisdiction. Thus, for the second camp, legal 
support for humanitarian interventions can be found in Security Council 
authorizations. Whether the Council can reach such a decision is, however, 
another question. 
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Unauthorized interventions, however, are not endorsed by the second camp as 
legal interventions. Yet, by focusing on the practice of international politics, and 
by divorcing legal acts from legitimate acts,154 the second camp argues that in 
some cases, unauthorized humanitarian interventions should not be condemned. 
In other words, international politics is not void of moral choices, which could 
legitimize an otherwise illegal act. 
The third camp, in contrast, places morality at the center stage. While agreeing 
with the second camp, it takes the argument further by claiming that the Security 
Council might have a duty to intervene in grave humanitarian crises. Moreover, in 
cases where the Council fails to act, the right, or even a duty, to intervene filters 
wider. Thus, international law is interpreted primarily through the lenses of 
morality. Allegedly, humanitarian interventions are not only desirable but 
required in some cases. By emphasizing human security and people(s) as the 
source of sovereignty, the third camp argues that the Security Council must play a 
proactive role. 
The three camps, as described above, form the core of the humanitarian 
intervention debate at least as it was until the Responsibility to Protect report.155 
Obviously, not all arguments were described nor all participants included. In 
contrast, emphasis was placed on the positions the arguments take and on the 
kind of arguments that have been made within the debate. This was done in order 
to provide the background for the following chapters and in preparation for a 
discussion of the implicit arguments within the debate. 
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SOME IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS WITHIN THE DEBATE 
The previous section outlined arguments made within the humanitarian 
intervention debate by dividing them into three different camps. This section 
examines these arguments further with the aim of addressing some of the implicit 
assumptions. For the present purposes it is sufficient to focus on only some of the 
arguments, namely on arguments advocating for the right of humanitarian 
intervention, whether understood as the right thing to do (legitimate) or as there 
being a legal right. These arguments are labeled pro-humanitarian intervention 
arguments within this thesis. 
To summarize pro-humanitarian intervention arguments in a crude fashion, 
states and such inter-governmental organizations as the Security Council and 
NATO are the main actors. These actors are the most important because of their 
capabilities to execute interventions and because of their general standing within 
international politics and international law. Due to the growing significance of the 
human rights discourse and the pressure by human interest groups, states and 
governmental organizations find it increasingly difficult to ignore their 
humanitarian obligations.156 Moreover, domestic and especially human rights 
conditions seem to have become accepted as a legitimate concern of all states.157 
Although expressions of concern can take many forms, the use of force can be a 
legitimate expression, if it is used to alleviate human suffering on a grand scale. In 
some ways, peace has become the justification for war.158 
To discuss the implicit assumptions within the pro-humanitarian intervention 
arguments, let us consider first the deontological assumption they make. It is 
assumed that under certain circumstances intervention should take place. Clearly, 
rights do not necessarily imply that they ought to be exercised, but the argument 
for having the right of humanitarian intervention is exactly that it will be 
exercised given certain circumstances. In other words, the argument for having 
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the right of humanitarian intervention is also an argument about the use of that 
right, namely that it ought to be exercised in grave humanitarian crises. If this 
were not the case, it would be strange to argue for the right in the first place. To 
illustrate, consider that, without a doubt, the right of humanitarian intervention 
did not exist. Consider further that acts of humanitarian intervention were 
deemed illegal and illegitimate. In this case, to argue for the right of humanitarian 
intervention incorporates assumptions about the right-holder and circumstances, 
which justify its use. After all, the purpose of having the right is to establish the 
legality and legitimacy of committing acts of humanitarian intervention. 
Otherwise, why argue for the right? 
The second implicit assumption within the pro-humanitarian intervention 
arguments is that there is a right-holder who possesses the right of humanitarian 
intervention. This point should be self-evident unless one considered that 
humanitarian interventions could occur own their own. Who should be the right-
holder, however, is not self-evident. 
Generally speaking, in the humanitarian intervention debate, three main options 
as to the right-holder are suggested: 1) some argue that no legitimate nor legal 
right-holders exist;159 2) that the Security Council is the right-holder and also the 
source for authorizing humanitarian interventions;160 and 3) that unilateral or 
multilateral interventions, even without explicit Security Council authorization, 
are at least legitimate if not legal.161 For the time being, it is irrelevant which of 
these options is considered most convincing, although I shall return to these three 
options below. Important for the present discussion is to note how the pro-
humanitarian intervention arguments are built to support one of these three 
options. 
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The third assumption within the pro-humanitarian intervention arguments is that 
the right-holder (assumption no. 2) ought to exercise the right of humanitarian 
intervention under certain circumstances (assumption no. 1). In other words, the 
third assumption refers to a responsibility, if not even a duty, of the right-holder 
to exercise the right due to possessing the right. The right itself may not imply a 
responsibility to exercise it. Rights, after all, enable one to do something, protect 
from something, or function as trumps. The argument for having the right of 
humanitarian intervention, however, is an argument about using it in grave 
humanitarian crises. 
The point of interest is the responsibility, to which the pro-humanitarian 
intervention arguments refer implicitly. For one, it is surprising how long the 
debate has taken to address this responsibility, and looking into the reasons for 
the shift within the debate at the change of the millennium might prove 
illustrative of a normative change in the practice of international politics, which 
was in turn reflected within the debate, or vice versa. Such an inquiry is, however, 
beyond the scope of this thesis. A second issue that arises from the implicit 
responsibility relates to the kind of right in question. Is it not a curious kind of a 
right, if its possession implies a responsibility to use it? I wish to pursue this 
question further. 
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WHAT KIND OF A RIGHT IS IT? 
Before answering what kind of a right the right of humanitarian intervention is, it 
is necessary to focus first on the right-holder. As mentioned above, there are three 
likely candidates for the right-holder(s) of the right of humanitarian intervention. 
Deciding which one is the most convincing among these three candidates requires 
a heuristic assumption that the right of humanitarian intervention exists, because 
the purpose is not to engage with the debate whether or not it exists. This debate 
surrounding the existence of the right seems to have been entrenched, if not 
exhausted, for quite some time, and it is better to move on to the implications of 
its existence rather than to rehearse the familiar arguments. 
The three usual options as to the right-holder are 1) no one, 2) the Security 
Council, and 3) “concerned” states whether unilaterally, multilaterally, or through 
regional organizations or the UN. Given the contemporary circumstances, the 
Security Council is the most convincing candidate for several reasons. For one, UN 
member states have forfeited their right to use force to the Security Council 
except in cases of self-defense.162 The Security Council, on the other hand, can use 
or authorize under its Chapter VII powers the use of force in cases, which breach 
or threaten international peace and security. In addition, the Council can use its 
discretion in determining, which situations constitute a breach of or a threat to 
international peace and security, thus effectively determining its own 
jurisdiction.163 Since within this thesis humanitarian intervention is understood to 
incorporate a military element, any humanitarian intervention would require the 
Security Council’s interpretation of a breach of or of a threat to international 
peace and security, and an authorization by the Council, to be legal. Second, 
precedent cases confirm a Security Council practice to authorize humanitarian 
interventions, and these cases have been accepted as legitimate and legal.164 
Somalia was the first clearest example with Resolution 794, which authorized the 
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United States to take military action under a Chapter VII mandate.165 Another 
example is Resolution 929, which authorized the French-led Operation Turquoise 
in 1994 to use “all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives set 
out” in Rwanda.166  
The other two options, on the other hand, are less convincing. Due to the just 
mentioned reasons, there certainly seems to be at least one actor who could 
possess the right of humanitarian intervention, namely the Security Council. As to 
the third option, as Byers and Chesterman argue, arguments that unilateral 
intervention is legal require unwarranted assumptions about the international 
legal system.167 In other words, although unilateral or multilateral interventions 
might be candidates for legitimate action, they do not wield similar legality as 
Security Council action. Thus, in terms of legality, the Security Council is the best 
candidate for the right of humanitarian intervention. 
The legality of Security Council’s humanitarian intervention is heavily related to 
the Council’s ability to use Chapter VII powers. The use of these powers require 
“the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” 
as determined by the Council itself.168 It may have been only since the early 1990s, 
when grave humanitarian crises have been interpreted to constitute a threat to or 
breach of international peace and security. Yet, it is evident from the Security 
Council resolutions that this new interpretation, or even practice,169 is becoming 
ever stronger. For example, as the president of the Council stated, “massive 
displacement of civilian populations in conflict situations may pose a serious 
challenge to international peace and security.”170 Similarly, three years later, a 
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different president of the Council acknowledged that the Security Council “has the 
responsibility to address humanitarian issues relating to situations of conflict and 
to take appropriate action.”171 In this same document, also the representative of 
France reminds the Council that it has the primary responsibility “to deal with 
situations in which violations of international humanitarian law and human rights 
threaten international peace and security.”172 Finally, in addition to the above 
examples of Somalia and Rwanda, the Security Council has interpreted grave 
humanitarian crises as threats to international peace and security, as for example 
the Great Lakes region in Africa in 1996 demonstrated.173 
Thus, a strong case can be made that the protective provisions of Article 2.7 of the 
UN Charter might not apply to the Security Council in grave humanitarian crises. 
This argument is supported by the Security Council’s own practice, and it seems 
that there have been no serious objections to it by for example the vast majority of 
states. Moreover, the UN Charter itself lends its support with its emphasis on 
human rights and their promotion and respect.174 Finally, the Security Council’s 
candidacy as the right-holder for the right to intervene is strengthened by the fact 
that interventions bypassing the Council are not considered legal. This final point 
deserves further attention. 
International treaty law does not support interventions without Security Council 
authorization, and the international customary law’s perhaps only suitable 
supporting case, Kosovo, is too controversial to lend credibility to such claims – 
not to mention that one case hardly establishes a custom. Kosovo, however, 
reveals a crucial detail. As the Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
concludes in its report, NATO action was illegal despite being legitimate.175 NATO 
intervention was illegal, mainly because it did not receive prior Security Council 
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authorization, but it was legitimate, because it was justified, all diplomatic 
avenues had been exhausted, and it resulted in liberating the majority population 
of Kosovo from Serbian oppression.176 Evidently, the Commission used a linguistic 
twist in order not to condemn NATO action in Kosovo or to restrict available 
options in the future. 
At first glance, the Commission’s distinction between legal and legitimate may 
seem odd. In common parlance, these terms are used interchangeably, yet there is 
a significant difference between them. The two terms are related in the sense that 
legal acts are also legitimate in most cases,177 but legitimate acts are not 
necessarily legal. This distinction arises from the different points of reference. For 
legal acts, the reference point and authority is existing law, whereas the 
legitimacy of an act is determined with the help of inter-subjectively shared 
norms and standards without any necessary reference to law. In addition, this 
distinction is similar to distinguishing between having a right and something 
being right. Having a right relates to some form of established and recognized law, 
while something being right belongs to the realm of morality. Within the current 
discussion, the right of humanitarian intervention would be a legal right. 
Nonetheless, this would not forbid legitimate acts of humanitarian intervention. 
Thus, the International Commission’s conclusion on Kosovo implies that 
humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization might be 
legitimate, or right in the sense of being in accordance with our consciences of 
what is just. By framing NATO action as legitimate, the purpose was presumably 
to acknowledge the Security Council’s authority but at the same time to underline 
that NATO action should not be condemned, because exceptional times required 
exceptional measures, with or without the Council. If the Commission’s conclusion 
can be taken as an indication, it seems that unauthorized humanitarian 
interventions may be legitimate but that there is no guarantee of such legitimacy. 
Since there is no legal right that would trump objections and establish the legality 
of unauthorized interventions, the choice to intervene in the absence of Security 
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Council authorization is left to the individual decision-makers, who must 
knowingly risk taking illegal action. Hence, without the Security Council’s support, 
actors risk in engaging in illegal and illegitimate acts. The legitimacy of their 
action, however, may be established, and in such cases decision-makers may be 
praised for their acts, but one should note that it might be a fundamental 
characteristic of legitimate acts that they receive their legitimacy only a 
posteriori.178 In other words, the world remains the judge and jury for legitimizing 
international acts, and judgment is passed only ex post facto. 
In determining the legitimacy of unauthorized interventions, one should consider 
among other things the actions before intervention, the arguments for intervening 
and the manner, in which intervention is or was conducted, as well as the 
consistency between the arguments and the actual execution of the intervention. 
Here, for example, the academia and the media can play significant roles in 
providing legitimacy to unauthorized interventions. The Security Council, 
however, remains perhaps as the strongest retroactive legitimizer. Through its 
resolutions, the Security Council may determine afterwards that a given 
intervention was legitimate, if not also legal, even if the Council had not 
authorized the intervention beforehand. An upshot of this last point is that the 
Security Council can act as the legitimate and legal user of force as well as the 
legitimizer and the legalizer of the use of force. 
For the present purposes, it is unnecessary to go into detail about the legitimating 
justifications of an unauthorized intervention. They are surely case-dependent 
and correspond to similar arguments as in the Kosovo case.179 I would, however, 
draw attention to multilateralism as a legitimating factor, because it is sometimes 
argued that multilateralism per se legitimizes humanitarian interventions.180 It 
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seems strange to argue that there is something inherent in multilateralism which 
legitimizes action, because a wrong committed by many does not magically 
transform into a right. Similarly, the number of actors committing an act has no 
relevance to the legitimacy of that act.181 The justification of an act is independent 
of the number who commit it. Murder remains murder, while justified self-
defense resulting in manslaughter is self-defense, regardless of how many people 
were involved. Admittedly, when a hundred people claim self-defense against one 
person, they may be in a weaker position than for example a group of states 
intervening without Security Council authorization. Nevertheless, the legitimating 
factor would be, respectively, whether that one person was in a position to 
threaten all one hundred persons with imminent death, such as in a suicide-
bomber case, or whether the intervention was justified also on other grounds. 
Moreover, claiming that multilateralism safeguards against exploiting the 
intervention towards the national interests of the intervener is nonsensical, 
because if “governments have mixed motives, so do coalitions of governments. 
Some goals, perhaps, are cancelled out by political bargaining that constitutes the 
coalition, but others are super-added; and the resulting mix is as accidental with 
reference to the moral issue as are the political interests and ideologies of a single 
state.”182 It is equally worth remembering that “coalitions of the willing” are self-
selective and rarely altruistic. 
To summarize, the Security Council is the best candidate for having the legal right 
of humanitarian intervention (if it exists). Interventions without Council 
authorization are illegal and risk being also illegitimate. Thus, for the present 
purposes, and continuing to assume that the right of humanitarian intervention 
exists, the Security Council is considered to be the right-holder. It is important to 
note, however, that the Security Council’s right remains at the collective level, and 
that it is not transferred to the individual members of the collective. Only when 
acting in unison can the Council exercise its right. Moreover, the Security Council 
can either intervene with blue-helmets, thus retaining operational command and 
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control, or it can authorize a third party to intervene in its stead.183 In its purest 
form, the first option is hardly possible, because the Council remains dependent 
on member states’ contributions. There is, however, a significant difference in 
whether the Council exercises its right directly or transfers it to a third party. For 
one, authorizing a third party effectively establishes the third party’s right to 
intervene. Thus, there are in fact two right-holders that ought to be considered: 
the Security Council and any third party as authorized by the Council. Second, the 
fact that the Council may transfer its right is highly relevant in determining what 
kind of a right is in question, as will be shown below. 
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A TYPOLOGY OF RIGHTS 
One can think of rights in many ways. For example, H.L.A. Hart famously 
distinguishes between special and general rights.184 For the present purposes, 
however, Hart’s division is unhelpful, because if general rights “are rights which 
all men capable of choice have in the absence of those special conditions which 
give rise to special rights,”185 and since it is neither desirable nor practical that the 
right of humanitarian intervention would be held by all, one can only conclude 
that the right of humanitarian intervention is a special right. Such conclusion 
hardly warrants further interesting reflections. 
On the other hand, a more useful division between different kinds of rights was 
developed by Hohfeld.186 Hohfeld’s dual distinction between rights according to 
their correspondents and their reference groups, against whom a particular right 
is “claimed,” allows for an extended discussion revealing not only the kind of right 
in question but also related deliberation about the consequences of the right of 
humanitarian intervention being this rather than that kind of a right. 
Before proceeding, it is useful to remember the context within which Hohfeld 
contributed. His typology of rights was published already in 1913 at a time in the 
United States, when public law was to an extent unrecognized, unknown, or 
perhaps unwanted too.187 His typology was originally aimed at private law 
relations, yet in the following pages I use his typology for more public relations 
purposes. 
The significance of Hohfeld as such is somewhat irrelevant to the larger argument 
that I wish to make. I argue that the usual treatment of the right of humanitarian 
intervention is too simple, and that there is no single right of humanitarian 
intervention but rather rights in the plural. I further argue that the kinds of right 
in question have significant consequences to its use, and they also reveal how we 
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perceive of the functioning of international politics, at least as far as is relevant to 
this part of international politics. On an even general level, I argue that the usual 
binary logic of there being or not being a right not only obscures the issues at 
hand but also ensures that our discussions finish at dead-ends. For all this, 
Hohfeld per se is not relevant. It just happens to be that by using a Hohfeldian 
typology, I can make these arguments in a convincing manner. 
There is, however, a more recent contribution by Carl Wellman, which could be of 
use to the present topic.188 In his discussion, Wellman takes the Hohfeldian theory 
of rights to a new level by considering which rights are real rather than illusory. 
Real rights “have practical implications, most notably the legal and moral duties 
they imply.”189 Wellman discusses also at length who or what can be a right-
holder. In what follows, I shall focus on a modified version of Hohfeld’s typology. 
The reason for this is that in the overall argument, as explained in the previous 
paragraph, there seems to be little advantage in complicating the matters by 
focusing also on Wellman. For one, this would not only force me to compare and 
contrast the work of the two gentlemen but it would also force me to enter such 
topics as choice and agency, point on which the two might differ notably. Thus, 
although Wellman could be an added backing for my argument here,190 it would 
seem to complicate matters unnecessarily for the argument I wish to make within 
the field of international politics. 
Returning to Hohfeld, his typology of rights is two-dimensional but not binary. 
One dimension is the distinction between rights in rem and in personam, or 
multital and paucital rights as he calls them. Multital and paucital rights differ in 
their specificity of the group that holds a given right’s correspondent, and 
whether there is an implied duty requiring positive action. To clarify this 
distinction better, consider that rights as claims can imply duties on other 
actors.191 A right might require committing a positive act, and not a mere 
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omission, and in such cases, the right would be paucital or in personam.192 A good 
example of such rights follows from contracts. Consider that if Anne owes Bill 
hundred dollars, Bill has the right to expect that Anne pays him this amount. 
Correspondingly, Anne has the duty to pay Bill. In contrast, property rights serve 
as an illustration of rights in rem, or multital rights as claims. Property rights 
imply duties on all other persons, including even future or hypothetical persons. 
These kinds of rights hold “not against some specific namable person or persons 
but rather, in the legal phrase, against the world at large.”193 Moreover, in ‘saying 
that “the whole world” has a duty to stay off my land, all I can mean, of course, is 
that any person in a position to enter my property has a duty to stay out.’194 Here 
no positive action is required, because an omission suffices to fulfill the duty to 
stay out. 
Hohfled’s second dimension in his typology of rights relates to his main 
contribution, namely in arguing that ‘the term “rights” tends to be used 
indiscriminately to cover what in a given case may be a privilege, a power, or an 
immunity, rather than a right in the strictest sense.’195 Rights in their strictest 
sense are best understood as claims, which imply correlating duties on others.196 
On the other hand, rights as privileges, as powers, or as immunities have as their 
correspondents “no-right,” liability, and disability.197 Some examples help to 
illustrate these differences better. 
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Privileges, which are sometimes described as “weak rights,”198 refer to the 
possibility of doing something. Thus, for example, Anne can give Bill permission to 
use her car, if he so wishes, and if she is not using it herself.199 Bill can use the car 
but has no duty to take it. Yet, Anne cannot complain, if Bill actually takes the car, 
but neither can Bill complain, if the car is not available. In other words, Bill has the 
privilege to use the car, and Anne has a corresponding no-right against Bill taking 
the car, when she is not using it herself. 
A right as power, on the other hand, “is an ability to cause, by an act of one’s own, 
an alteration in a person’s rights, either one’s own rights or those of another 
person or persons, or both.”200 Property rights provide again an example: As a 
property owner, I have the power to give rights of passage or entry to others. In 
addition to powers, one could also possess “meta-powers,” which Thomson define 
as “the ability to cause oneself and others to acquire or lose powers.”201 Persons in 
positions of authority, such as judges, normally possess not only powers but also 
meta-powers in this sense. For example, when passing judgment on the rightful 
owner of a piece of land, a judge exercises her meta-powers by awarding property 
rights containing powers, such as the power to grant rights of passage, to one of 
the claimants. Yet, there is another way to understand meta-powers. A meta-
power could also denote the ability to determine how a given rights is to be used 
and what are its limits.202 For example, when determining the rightful owner of a 
piece of land, a judge not only awards property rights to the owner but also sets 
limits to how those rights can be exercised, namely within the limits set by law. 
Rights as immunities provide protection against rights as powers: “for X to have 
an immunity against Y is just for Y to lack a power as regards X.”203 Alternatively, 
                                                             
198 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 45-
52. 
199 Hohfeld uses a salad example, where Anne would give Bill permission to eat her salad if he can. In 
this example, Anne could not complain, if Bill eats the salad, but neither could Bill complain, if Anne 
manages to hold so fast on the plate that he cannot eat it. 
200 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 57. 
201 Ibid., 58. 
202 I owe this second interpretation of meta-powers to Friedrich Kratochwil. 
203 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 59. 
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‘an immunity is one’s freedom from the … power or “control” of another.’204 
Fundamental human rights serve as examples of immunities, because they 
provide protection from for example one’s state’s legal or physical abuse. 
Thomson argues that Hohfeld’s typology overlooks a further distinction that 
should be made between privileges and liberties.205 Unlike Hohfeld, Thomson 
differentiates between the two, because liberties entail a claim of non-
interference while privileges make no such claims. In order to explain this better, 
let us return to the above car example, where Bill has the right to use Anne’s car, if 
he so wishes, and when Anne is not using it herself. In the example, Anne makes 
no assurances as to the availability of the car. In fact, Anne is in a position to 
frustrate Bill’s desire or need to use the car without breaking her promise by 
simply using the car all the time, or by not using it when Bill would not be able to 
drive it anyway. Because of this detail, Thomson would argue that Bill is not at 
liberty to use the car, and that hence Bill’s privilege cannot be equaled with a 
liberty. According to Thomson, we cannot say that a person “is at liberty to do a 
thing unless both he is under no duty at all to not do it (thus has a privilege 
against everyone doing it) and everyone else is under a duty toward him not to 
interfere with his doing it.”206 For Bill to have a right as liberty to use the car, Anne 
would have had to promise that the car is available, whenever he would like to 
use it. In other words, proper rights as liberties are compound rights in the sense 
that they contain other rights.207 
In sum, the two dimensions of this Hohfeldian208 typology of rights can be brought 
together as shown in table 1. Since multital rights (or rights in rem) and paucital 
rights (or rights in personam) are not further types of rights, such as claims or 
                                                             
204 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, ed. 
David Campbell and Philip Thomas (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 28. 
205 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 53. 
206 Ibid., 53-54. Emphasis removed. 
207 The merits of making the distinction between rights as privileges and rights as liberties are 
debatable. For the present purposes, however, this distinction is worth making, because it highlights 
certain details that would be lost otherwise. See below. 
208 To emphasize, the proposed typology is not Hohfeld’s typology, because a modification has been 
made that takes into consideration Thomson’s distinction between rights as privileges and as 
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privileges, but two different versions of claims or privileges, the horizontal axis of 
the table is divided into multital and paucital, whereas the vertical axis is divided 
into claims, privileges, liberties, powers, and immunities. There are thus ten 
different “kinds” of rights in this typology as shown in table 1. 
 
 
 “VERSION” OF A RIGHT 
KIND OF RIGHT In rem or multital In personam or paucital 
Claim   
Privilege   
Liberty   
Power   
Immunity   
 
Table 1: Modified Hohfeldian typology of rights. 
 
With the help of this typology of rights, the next step is to determine, which of 
these rights correspond best with the right of humanitarian intervention as held 
by the Security Council and any third party as authorized by the Security Council. 
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THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S RIGHT 
The first right-holder of the right of humanitarian intervention to consider is the 
Security Council. Before asking whether the Council’s right is more multital than 
paucital, one should determine whether the Security Council’s right is a right as 
claim, as privilege, as liberty, as power, or as immunity. A process of elimination is 
sufficient to determine which of these five corresponds best with the right of 
humanitarian intervention as held by the Security Council. 
Two kinds of right can be excluded immediately: immunity and privilege. 
Immunities are excluded because the right of humanitarian intervention as 
immunity would denote for example protection from intervention or from the use 
of force as prescribed by Article 2.4 of the UN Charter.209 Privileges, on the other 
hand, are excluded because they do not include guarantees of non-interference by 
other actors. It would be odd, and in contradiction with the UN Charter, if other 
actors could legally interfere with Security Council’s humanitarian intervention.210 
Hence, three kinds of right remain: claim, liberty, and power. 
To be sure, the Security Council’s right has the characteristics of a right as claim 
including a corresponding duty of non-interference by others, yet the right also 
incorporates elements of a right as privilege. In analogy to the car example, one 
could say that UN member states have agreed, both through explicit agreement 
and practice, to give the Security Council the right to intervene in situations 
breaching or threatening international peace and security, that the Council is 
under no duty to intervene but can use its discretion in determining when and 
where to intervene,211 and that states cannot challenge a Council decision to 
intervene, at least not on the basis of an infringement on their rights. Likewise, in 
cases of non-intervention, states can voice their objections to the Security 
Council’s decisions, but apart from taking the matter to the General Assembly or 
to the International Court of Justice – or by intervening themselves – there does 
                                                             
209 Fundamental human rights provide further examples of immunities. They provide protection to 
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210 See e.g. Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
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not seem to be a clear path to challenge the Security Council’s decision. Despite 
the provisions of Uniting for Peace212 it seems unlikely that recourse to the 
General Assembly would be taken, as is evident from the lack of such action 
during the past five decades or so. Similarly, as the Pan Am case illustrates, 
resorting to the International Court of Justice against the Security Council would 
most likely be equally fruitless.213  
That the Security Council’s right has both the characteristics of a right as claim 
and a right as privilege encourages one to interpret the Security Council’s right as 
a right as liberty. The right is a right as claim, because there is a corresponding 
duty of non-interference, and the right is a privilege, because there is a 
corresponding no-right. The combination of these two points, however, indicates 
that the Security Council is best described to be at liberty to intervene. In other 
words, instead of describing the Security Council’s right of humanitarian 
intervention either as claim or as privilege, it can be called a right as liberty, a 
right which combines both the characteristics of rights as claim and as privilege. 
On the other hand, the Security Council can authorize others to intervene on its 
behalf. This indicates that the right is also a right as power, because by 
authorizing, the Council effectively gives the right to a third party. Thus, the 
Security Council’s right is best described as having a dual character: a right as 
liberty and a right as power. 
Whether the Council possesses meta-powers is less straightforward. As discussed 
above, meta-powers can denote either the ability to give powers to other actors or 
to regulate the use of granted rights by other actors. In the first sense of the term, 
                                                             
212 United Nations General Assembly, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377 of November 3 
1950, A/RES/377. 
213 Generally speaking, the International Court of Justice is reluctant to become involved so that it 
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the Security Council does not have meta-powers. Counter-factually speaking, if it 
did, it would mean that the Council could pass on the right of humanitarian 
intervention to a third party, who in turn could pass it on to a further party. This 
is hardly a possibility in the contemporary world. In the second sense of the term, 
however, the Security Council has meta-powers, because it would regulate the use 
of the right it gave to a third party. Even if the Security Council gave a carte 
blanche authorization to a third party, the right of humanitarian intervention 
would remain against a certain other and within a certain context. Moreover, the 
Council would retain the possibility of revoking the authorization. Thus, the 
Security Council’s right as power would include meta-powers in the sense of 
regulating the use of the right it would invest on a third party. 
Is the Security Council’s right to intervene more paucital than multital? In a 
certain sense, the right originates from a “contract” and practice among states. 
States have thus bestowed the right to the Security Council, and therefore the 
right has a paucital character. This interpretation is supported also by the 
specificity of the right, in the sense that the right is to be exercised against a 
specific other. Moreover, despite it being possible to argue that for example UN 
member states have a certain obligation to contribute towards Security Council 
action,214 international practice demonstrates how that obligation remains at a 
theoretical level, and how all contributions remain voluntary. In contrast, the 
Security Council’s right implies for example a duty of non-interference, which can 
be fulfilled by mere omission. This last point supports interpreting the right as a 
multital right. 
In addition to omissions being capable of fulfilling the implied duties of the 
Security Council’s right of humanitarian intervention, the multital character of the 
Security Council’s right is supported on another account. It is not specified in 
detail against whom the right is to be exercised. The right can be exercised against 
states, in which people face a grave humanitarian crisis, but because any state 
may be a host to a grave humanitarian crisis, for example due to a natural 
disaster, the other, against whom the right is to be exercised, includes also future 
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and hypothetical states. In other words, one cannot say that the right is to be 
exercised against a specific, namable other. Due to the impossibility of pre-
determining the other, apart from limiting it to states which face grave 
humanitarian crises, or to states which abuse their peoples, I argue that the 
Security Council’s right of humanitarian intervention is more multital than 
paucital. After all, otherwise we could actually have to name those states, against 
whom the right of humanitarian intervention applies. 
To summarize the Security Council’s right of humanitarian intervention, it was 
argued that the right would be best understood as a multital right, which has a 
dual character. On the one hand, the right is a right as liberty, and on the other 
hand, it is a right as power. Alternatively, one might say that the Council’s right is 
a bundle of rights, because embedded in the notion of the right of humanitarian 
intervention are, among others, the Council’s right to determine whether a grave 
humanitarian crisis exists, whether there is a threat to or breach of international 
peace and security, whether there is need for outside intervention, and who is to 
intervene and how. In other words, despite using a single term “right of 
humanitarian intervention,” in the case of the Security Council it denotes a lot 
more than just the legal right to intervene in a grave humanitarian crisis. A whole 
host of other concepts and systems need to be in place, before one can use such a 
short-hand, if its use is to make sense. 
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AN AUTHORIZED THIRD PARTY’S RIGHT 
Since the Security Council can authorize others to act on its behalf, one should 
consider also the kind of right an authorized third party would have. In what 
follows, it is considered that the Security Council bestows the right of 
humanitarian intervention to a generic third party, which could be either a single 
state, a coalition of states, or inter-governmental organizations. I shall not 
distinguish between these possibilities below, because the right of humanitarian 
intervention, as granted by the Security Council, would remain the same 
regardless of the kind of actor receiving it. Similar to determining the Security 
Council’s right, I begin with a process of elimination. 
Three kinds of right can be excluded immediately: rights as power, as immunity, 
and as privilege. First, the authorized third party’s right of humanitarian 
intervention cannot be a right as power, because the Security Council does not 
have meta-powers in the sense that it can grant rights as powers to other actors, 
at least in the case of the right of humanitarian intervention.215 Second, the right 
would not be a right as immunity, because a right as immunity would refer to the 
opposite of what the right of humanitarian intervention implies.216 Last, the 
authorized third party’s right of humanitarian intervention is not a privilege, 
because others have a duty of non-interference in the execution of the right. 
Conceivably, the authorized third party’s right of humanitarian intervention could 
be described as a right as claim. Yet, if it were a claim, however, there ought to be 
a corresponding duty. Supposing that State X had been authorized by the Security 
Council to intervene in State Y, what could the corresponding duty of Y be with 
regards to X?217 It is difficult to imagine what the corresponding duty could be, 
especially because all the possibilities seem to resemble a duty of allowing or 
welcoming the intervention. Not only is it implausible that such duties existed, but 
                                                             
215 See above. 
216 One might argue that once authorized, the third party would become immune from interventions 
on itself. As discussed both above and below, the Security Council can invoke the right it granted or 
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it would also complicate matters theoretically, since humanitarian intervention is 
distinguished from humanitarian assistance by being uninvited intervention into 
another state.218 One might argue, however, that once the humanitarian 
intervention was underway, the targeted state has a duty to cooperate. Such 
duties would contradict the inherent right to self-defense.219 Since humanitarian 
intervention denotes military action, claiming that a state should welcome such 
action effectively strips the state of its right to defend itself. Whether a state, 
which abuses its citizens should have a right to self-defense, is however a 
question, which takes the present discussion too far from the mark, and which 
should be taken up elsewhere.220 
The process of elimination has left right as liberty as the last choice, and on the 
surface it seems that the only difference between the Security Council’s right and 
the authorized third party’s right is that the Council may pass on its right while 
the authorized third party cannot. Yet, other differences exist which cast doubt on 
characterizing the authorized third party’s right as liberty. The authorized third 
party’s right would include certain general and particular limitations. The general 
limitations refer to the general manner, in which an intervention should be 
conducted, and to the kinds of states that could be targeted. Particular limitations 
refer to the exceptional circumstances calling for intervention, to the specific 
state(s) which should be targeted, and to the timeframe during which the right 
would remain valid. Moreover, the Security Council could still revoke the 
authorization at any point. Thus, an authorized third party would not be at a 
complete liberty to exercise the right. Yet, all other actors except the Security 
Council have a duty of non-interference. For these reasons, an authorized third 
party’s right might be best characterized as falling somewhere between a right as 
privilege and a right as liberty. 
                                                             
218 This distinction is done at least in this thesis. 
219 One should note that as members of the United Nations, states have forfeited their right to use 
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The right of humanitarian intervention as held by an authorized third party would 
be against a specific other, as instructed by the Security Council, and not against 
the world at large. This makes it a paucital right. Moreover, the paucital 
interpretation is strengthened by the implication to commit the act of 
intervention. In other words, authorization is given with the understanding that 
the authorized party is willing and will exercise the right of humanitarian 
intervention. I shall come back to this point later. 
To summarize, an authorized third party’s right of humanitarian intervention 
might be best characterized as a paucital right which can be located between a 
right as privilege and a right as liberty. Since, in contrast, the Security Council’s 
right is a multital, dual right as liberty and as power, it seems that the kind of right 
the right of humanitarian intervention is depends on the right-holder. Thus, in 
table 2, “Security Council” is placed on both liberty and power, while “Third Party” 
is between privilege and liberty denoting its special character. 
 
 “VERSION” OF A RIGHT 
KIND OF RIGHT In rem or multital In personam or paucital 
Claim   
Privilege   
Liberty   
Power   
Immunity   
 
Table 2: Summary of the Security Council’s and an authorized third party’s rights. 
Third Party 
Security Council 
Chapter 2: A Point of Departure 
[98] 
 
CORRELATIVES OF THE KINDS OF RIGHT IN QUESTION 
In addition to being able to conclude that the kind of right depends on the right-
holder, Hohfeld’s typology of rights includes also correlatives of rights, which 
allow for more insights. Hohfeld listed duty as the correlative of right as claim, 
and “no-right,” liability, and disability as the correlatives of rights as privilege, as 
power, and as immunity.221 Multital and paucital do not have their correlatives, 
because they represent two different versions of claims, privileges, powers, and 
immunities. Instead of discussing all the correlatives, it is sufficient to focus on the 
correlatives of the kinds of right the Security Council and an authorized third 
party would have, namely on the correlatives of rights as privilege, as liberty, and 
as power. Unlike above, Hohfeld did not distinguish between rights as privilege 
and as liberty. Hence, the correlative of right as liberty requires some attention. 
Above, right as liberty was distinguished from right as privilege, because the 
former included a duty of non-interference by all others while the latter did not. A 
right as liberty, then, is a right as privilege in combination with a duty of non-
interference. Some might argue that this crude decomposition of right as liberty 
fails to acknowledge that the whole, liberty, is more than the sum of its parts. For 
the sake of the argument here, however, this seems excusable. Thus, the 
discussion on the correlatives will focus on no-right as the correlative of a right as 
privilege, on liability as the correlative of a right as power, and on the duty of non-
interference. 
Starting with no-right, Hohfeld exemplified it thus: ‘the correlative of X’s right that 
Y shall not enter on the land is Y’s duty not to enter; but the correlative of X’s 
privilege of entering himself is manifestly Y’s “no-right” that X shall not enter.’222 
In other words, Y has no rightful say regarding X and his entering (or not 
entering) his own (X’s) property. If one places this within the humanitarian 
intervention framework, the right of humanitarian intervention as privilege 
correlates with other actors’ no-right that the intervener executes an intervention. 
For example, if the Security Council authorized State X to intervene in State Y, and 
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because in this case the right of humanitarian intervention would be a right as 
privilege, other states would have a no-right regarding the intervention. Yet, 
because a right as privilege does not include assurances of non-interference, the 
no-right might not amount to a perfect duty of non-interference. To put it 
differently, although the right of humanitarian intervention as privilege trumps all 
legal attempts to interfere with an intervention, except when the Security Council 
intervenes in the intervention, other, non-legal or legitimate, interferences might 
be allowable. This is a somewhat similar argument as in the Just War tradition, 
where external intervention in a war is justifiable if for example it is to balance an 
earlier external intervention.223 In other words, although actors, who have not 
received authorization, are not in a position to initiate intervention, they can 
nevertheless monitor the situation, and legitimately interfere, if for example the 
authorized intervention is insufficient, poorly conducted, or simply aimed at 
selfish ends by the authorized actor. One can easily imagine that a neighboring 
state to a country, where a humanitarian intervention which despite initial 
humanitarian successes turned sour, could legitimately intervene, even if this 
neighboring state was not the original right-holder of the right to intervene. The 
legitimacy of this intervention by a neighboring state depends naturally on the 
circumstances, whether for example the original right-holder abused its right or 
was simply unable to meet the humanitarian goals, and whether the action taken 
by the neighboring state corresponded in general with the spirit of legitimate 
humanitarian interventions. 
The duty of non-interference that correlates with the right of humanitarian 
intervention as liberty applies to all other actors except the Security Council for 
two reasons. First, obviously, when the right-holder is the Security Council, the 
duty does not apply to itself. All other actors, however, have a duty of non-
interference arising from the right of humanitarian intervention and the UN 
Charter. Second, when the right-holder is an authorized third party, the duty of 
non-interference does not fall on the Security Council, because the third party’s 
right is not a pure form of a right as liberty. In other words, although the Security 
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Council can authorize a third party to act in its stead, the Security Council still 
retains the power to de-authorize the third party. Thus, while an authorized third 
party can expect (legal) non-interference from all other actors, it still answers to 
the Security Council, and the right, which it has been granted, can be revoked. 
Hence, compared to all other actors, the Security Council remains in a privileged 
position even when it authorizes others to act in its stead. 
A further point regarding the duty of non-interference invites discussion, namely 
whether also the targeted state shares this duty. If the targeted state had the duty 
of non-interference, when either the Security Council or an authorized third party 
intervened in it, the duty would be in conflict with the fundamental right to self-
defense. Perhaps better, the right to self-defense would be in conflict with the 
right of humanitarian intervention, if the two were considered to be separate. In 
other words, if the right to self-defense was granted to all sovereign states on the 
count of them being sovereign, the right of humanitarian intervention would 
conflict with it. On the other hand, if one followed for example John Stuart Mill’s 
old argument about “savage” nations and how they are not protected by the rule 
of non-intervention,224 or Donnelly’s more recent argument,225 one could argue 
that there is no conflict, because a state, which by its own actions – by for example 
committing genocide – forfeits the protection of the rule of non-intervention and 
the right to self-defense. Alternatively, in many cases where humanitarian 
intervention is necessary, the target might not be a sovereign state but a “failed” 
state or no state at all.226 Moreover, the UN Charter’s explicit statement that the 
right to self-defense remains unimpaired “until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security” lends support 
to this argument.227 After all, once the Security Council has decided to intervene or 
                                                             
224 John Stuart Mill, "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," in Essays on Equality, Law, and Education: 
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authorize intervention, it has taken necessary measures to address a breach of or 
threat to international peace and security, if this action was appropriate in the 
particular circumstances.  
Thus, the question is whether a state may lose its rights or some of its rights 
depending on how it treats its citizens. From a practical point of view, this 
question merits little attention. A targeted state would most certainly engage in 
self-defense if it could. From a theoretical perspective, the question is intriguing 
not only in relation to humanitarian intervention but to sovereignty in general. 
What kind of behavior would result in a state losing some of its rights? How does 
the process of losing rights take place? Can a state “re-earn” its rights? Moreover, 
does the sovereignty of a state belong to the state or to the people, and by 
extension; does the right to self-defense belong to the state or to the people? 
These are questions to which I unfortunately have neither the answers here nor 
would this be the appropriate place to answer them, since each might require a 
thesis of its own. Moreover, the twist provided by the Responsibility to Protect 
report, and its reformulation of the debate in terms of a responsibility rather than 
a right, has bypassed many of these questions in relation to grave humanitarian 
crises. Hence, for the time being, I will leave these questions and return to the 
discussion about the correlatives of the right of humanitarian intervention. 
The last correlative to discuss is the correlative to the right of humanitarian 
intervention as power: liability. According to Hohfeld, right as power is correlated 
with liability, which is understood as “responsibility,” as the “opposite of 
immunity,” or as “subjection.”228 As an example of liabilities, consider innkeepers 
who are under liabilities rather than duties: “Correlative to those liabilities are the 
respective power of the various members of the public. Thus, for example, a 
traveling member of the public has the legal power, by making proper application 
and sufficient tender, to impose a duty on the innkeeper to receive him as a 
guest.”229 With respect to the right of humanitarian intervention, the Security 
Council’s right as power casts the shadow of liability on states and relevant 
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international organizations. It is unclear whether this shadow of liability consists 
of only the possibility of being authorized to intervene or also of a requirement to 
volunteer. It is apparent, however, that once an actor is authorized by the Security 
Council and holds the right of humanitarian intervention, the actor ought to 
intervene as instructed by the Council. After all, authorization is given with the 
understanding that the authorized will exercise the right of humanitarian 
intervention, and it is this process of authorization that creates certain obligations 
to the authorized. Although states have clearly more say about their obligations 
and whether they intervene in a humanitarian crisis than innkeepers have for 
example about the appearance of their guests, states would not be able to escape 
the obligations arising from the process of authorization. Obviously, the Security 
Council would not authorize an actor without being convinced that the actor 
wanted to be authorized, and that the actor was capable of delivering what was 
required of it. The question, however, is more whether the Security Council has a 
liability to authorize humanitarian intervention, once for example a concerned 
state had made its case by demonstrating sufficient evidence of a grave 
humanitarian crisis and had asked for authorization.230 
This last point requires further consideration. Drawing from another discussion 
on liabilities, let us consider Wade L. Robison’s discussion on trust and the rule of 
law. Robison points out in relation to state troopers that “because the officer has 
such special powers … an officer also has a special liability to have a duty to 
ensure” that for example evidence is properly collected and handled.231 The 
possession of powers makes the power-holder liable for certain things. The 
Security Council’s right as power, in comparison, brings liabilities to other actors 
but also to itself due to a similar “possession.” Clearly, this liability might not be 
more than the requirement to address and consider cases of grave humanitarian 
crisis, but if for example the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) and Kofi Annan are right, it is much more than that.232 
                                                             
230 This is a central aspect in relation to the possible abuse of humanitarian intervention. 
231 Wade L. Robison, "Trust and the Rule of Law," (Rochester Institute of Technology, 2003). 
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SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE KINDS OF RIGHT 
The above discussion on the kind of right the humanitarian intervention is, if it 
existed, revealed several insights, and thus, the heuristic assumption that the right 
exists was justified. First, the discussion hopefully clarified how and why the 
Security Council would be the most suitable right-holder, given the contemporary 
international arrangement. Granting the right to the Security Council would not 
exclude other actors from the possibility of gaining the right (momentarily), but it 
would require following a process, in which the Council would authorize an actor 
desiring the right. The Security Council would thus play a central regulating role.  
Second, a distinction was drawn between legal and legitimate acts. In this context, 
unauthorized interventions would not be legal but they could be legitimate. Thus, 
the debate, whether the right of humanitarian intervention should be limited to 
the Security Council, or whether other actors should possess the right even 
without receiving authorization, is mistaken, or at least useless, because the lack 
of the right of humanitarian intervention does not limit the choices available to all 
actors. Legitimate interventions are possible in the absence of the right. Clearly, 
the aim is not to encourage a proliferation of intervention but to remind 
concerned actors of their options. Moreover, this point serves to show also what a 
hollow defense of inaction it is to hide behind the lack of a right of humanitarian 
intervention. 
Third, the Hohfeldian typology of rights demonstrated that the kind of right 
depends on the right-holder. For the most part, the discussion on the right of 
humanitarian intervention has assumed that there is one right, which a varied 
number of actors possess depending on the author in the relevant literature, but it 
should be clear that the use of plural – rights of humanitarian intervention – 
would be more appropriate, even if the principal right-holder were only the 
Security Council. The difference in the rights reflects the general position of the 
Security Council and the other rights, privileges, and powers as assigned to it by 
the UN Charter, other international treaties, and international practice. The 
                                                                                                                                                                  
State Unable, Unwilling to Protect Citizens against Extreme Violence, Security Council Must Assume 
Responsibility, 2005, SG/SM/10000, SC/8444. 
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Security Council holds a privileged position, which both enables and restricts its 
courses of action. In relation to humanitarian intervention, whether conducted by 
the Security Council or by other actors, the Security Council would remain the last 
place where ultimate responsibility rests due to its position and powers. 
Moreover, as has hopefully become evident, the binary logic of there being or not 
being a right is less than helpful. Rather, a closer examination with the help of a 
simple question, which seems to have remained unasked until now (what kind of 
a right is it?), demonstrated that the issues involved are not only more complex 
than is usually considered but they also give more hope regarding the future, 
especially in relation to using the right. 
A final main insight was that the right of humanitarian intervention per se does 
not imply a duty to intervene.233 If duties can be said to arise from the existence of 
the right of humanitarian intervention, they are due to the right as power by the 
Security Council and any consequent authorization by the Council. Thus, the 
implicit assumptions in the pro-humanitarian intervention arguments about the 
responsibility to exercise the right make their case starting from the desirability 
of intervention. Yet, also the existence of the right would support such 
conclusions. On the other hand, granting the Security Council the right of 
humanitarian intervention would increase its responsibilities not only directly 
but also indirectly, and it is doubtful whether in its present form the Council could 
manage such responsibilities. A Council reform, as well as some reliability of 
contributions to operations, would certainly be necessary, if the Council were 
granted a clear right of humanitarian intervention for that right to be meaningful. 
As with the earlier discussion about the implicit assumptions in the pro-
humanitarian intervention arguments, also here responsibility is indicated as a 
central theme. The issue of responsibility is central not because the right 
necessarily implies it but because the possession of the right requires its sensible 
and responsible use. Moreover, despite a focus on the kind of right in question, it 
is clear that the present discussion on rights would result in other dead-ends, 
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even if some of the dilemmas were solved. Thus, the ICISS did well in rephrasing 
the discussion. For example, the issue of conflict between the right to self-defense 
and the right of humanitarian intervention or the question, to whom does the 
right to self-defense belong, were bypassed by this reformulation. Instead of 
wading in a debate over a right – or rights as argued here – the discussion seems 














The previous chapter argued that the debate concerning the right of humanitarian 
intervention should address also issues of responsibility. Moreover, the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report,235 published in 2001, makes the focus on 
responsibility explicit. Subsequently, the discussion has focused on the report and 
its implications, leaving behind the discussion about the right of humanitarian 
intervention. The General Assembly’s adoption of the main ideas within the R2P 
report confirms that a significant step has taken place in reformulating the issues 
at stake, and that questions of responsibility rather than of rights should concern 
us.236  
To describe the R2P report in a nutshell, it brought the humanitarian intervention 
debate onto a new level. Instead of implicit assumptions or moral imperatives, the 
report argues in a straightforward fashion that inherent in the notion of 
sovereignty is the general responsibility to protect, which embraces three specific 
responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the 
responsibility to rebuild. Sovereign states have the responsibility to protect 
primarily vis-à-vis their own citizens, but in situations, where a state is unable or 
                                                             
234 Sir Winston Churchill. 
235 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "The Responsibility to Protect," 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). 
236 See especially paragraphs 138-139 in United Nations General Assembly, World Summit Outcome, 
2005, A/RES/60/1. 
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unwilling, or is itself the perpetrator of atrocities, the responsibility to protect is 
transferred to the wider international community.  
Instead of describing and criticizing the R2P report, I focus on two issues that 
seem to have been neglected both in the R2P report and in the World Summit 
Outcome, namely, first, the meaning of responsibility in the report and at the 
international level in relation to grave humanitarian crises, and second, the 
distribution of burden arising from the responsibility to protect when it is 
transmitted to the international community. As I shall show later, the R2P report 
defines “responsibility” in loose terms. It is possible, and even likely, that the 
International Commission did not wish to limit its work by providing a too strict 
definition, and thus allowing for a better evolution of its work and the concept of 
responsibility to protect. I shall argue, however, that there might be little reason 
to attempt a “better” definition, because the subject does not yield to strict, simple 
definitions. Nevertheless, a better conceptualization is possible, and I provide a 
conceptualization of “responsibility” in the “responsibility to protect” as it seems 
appropriate to me in light of the R2P report. 
I shall also argue that the responsibility in question is a collective responsibility. 
Although the state, whose citizens face a grave humanitarian crisis, has the 
primary responsibility, the responsibility to protect is nevertheless a collective 
responsibility shared by the international community. If this were not the case, 
the transfer from the individual state to the collective international community 
would risk committing a fallacy of composition. It is more sober to consider that 
the responsibility to protect is assigned by the international community to 
sovereign states as part of being sovereign together with the recognition of 
sovereignty. In this way, in cases where a state fails to fulfill its responsibilities, 
the responsibility is not transferred to the international community but it is 
merely reactivated. Obviously, collective responsibilities require collective burden 
sharing, which I will model at the end of this chapter. 
Thus, the first half of this chapter conceptualizes responsibility and international 
(collective) responsibility, while the second half provides a model for dividing the 
burden of a collective responsibility among the members of the collective. As just 
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hinted at, no attempt is made at providing a technical solution by first defining 
“responsibility” and by then applying this definition to the costs of fulfilling a 
collective responsibility. Instead, this chapter provides a demonstration that such 
technical “solutions” are unnecessary, and that a “road map” or a framework can 
be constructed otherwise. On a higher level, it is argued that technical solutions 
might not be the best ones to political problems, but one can hope to have 
signposts which bring focus and enable action without predetermining it.237 
A few remarks are still necessary. First, I shall use legal examples, yet a full-blown 
legal argument is neither the purpose nor it is attempted here. Legal examples are 
used to illustrate a particular point within the general argument, which could be 
best described as ethico-political. Second, it is acknowledged that legal, moral, and 
political responsibilities are not necessarily linked.238 For example, legal 
responsibility does not necessarily denote moral responsibility or political 
responsibility. Where it is required to distinguish between these three, I refer to 
legal responsibility as liability, to moral responsibility as responsibility, and to 
political responsibility as accountability.239 Third, the aim is to build on the R2P 
report, but some criticisms are necessary. Thus, despite having been influenced by 
the report, this chapter is aimed to stand on its own. Fourth, despite the 
discussion revolving around military action for humanitarian purposes, the Just 
War tradition seems irrelevant, at least within this chapter, because the purpose 
is not to question any of the following: the Security Council’s position as the right 
authority regarding military action, the requirement of right intensions (just 
cause), the requirement of proportionality, the requirement of reasonable 
prospects, or the requirement that force is used as a last resort. Finally, the 
collective responsibility model is a suggestion of how to conceive of collective 
responsibilities but no claims are made about its universal applicability or 
uniqueness in the sense of being the one and only possible formulation. 
                                                             
237 Here the influence of “good” casuistic reasoning is evident. See chapter 1. 
238 See e.g. H. D. Lewis, "Collective Responsibility," in Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate 
in Theoretical and Applied Ethics, ed. Larry May and Stacey Hoffman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1991), 23. 
239 For a good taxonomy of responsibility see especially chapter 2 in Peter Cane, Responsibility in 
Law and Morality (Oxford: Hart, 2002). 
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A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY 
The R2P report defines responsibility in three ways: 1) “state authorities are 
responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and 
promotion of their welfare,” 2) “national political authorities are responsible to 
their citizens internally and to the international community through the UN,” and 
3) “the agents of state are responsible for their actions … they are accountable for 
their acts of commission and omission.”240 Thus, the report clarifies who are 
responsible, for what, and to whom. Yet, one is hard pressed to find a clarification 
of “responsibility.” The deeper meaning of being responsible is left untouched. 
In order to shed light on being responsible, and thus on responsibility, and on 
what in my opinion is the understanding of responsibility in the R2P report, let us 
first consider the concept’s roots and its usage. Etymologically speaking, 
“responsibility” has its roots in the Latin word respondeo – I answer.241 A reaction 
to this statement could be either “what does one answer for” or “to whom does 
one answer.” In the former case, one could be answerable for something either in 
ex ante or in ex post facto sense.242 The latter reaction, in contrast, is about the 
relative position of the responsible person within a wider social structure, and 
about who can legitimately question that person’s actions. 
A brief examination of the use of “responsibility” is in order. Since the meaning of 
concepts is in their use and not in their reference points in the world “out 
there,”243 a brief Wittgensteinian examination is useful. In other words, examples 
from common use are the best illustrations of a concept’s meaning.244 First, 
                                                             
240 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "The Responsibility to Protect," 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). 
241 J. R. Lucas, Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 5. See also e.g. H. D. Lewis, "Collective 
Responsibility," in Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics, 
ed. Larry May and Stacey Hoffman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), 22-23. 
242 Toni Erskine, "Making Sense of 'Responsibility' in International Relations: Key Questions and 
Concepts," in Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and International 
Relations, ed. Toni Erskine (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 8. 
243 See e.g. Friedrich Kratochwil, "Of False Promises and Good Bets: A Plea for a Pragmatic Approach 
to Theory Building (the Tartu Lecture)," Journal of International Relations and Development 10, no. 1 
(2007): 3. 
244 The following common use examples of the word “responsibility” are taken from Catherine 
Soanes and Angus Stevenson, eds., The Oxford English Dictionary, Revised ed. (Oxford Reference 
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responsibility is often used in relation to taking responsibility for something, such 
as childcare. Second, one can be responsible for an act, an event, or a set of 
circumstances and be answerable for it or them, as for example when a terrorist 
group claims responsibility for a bombing. Third, responsibility can denote 
certain kind of behavior; responsibility requires the “exercise of discretion by 
deliberate and thoughtful decision in the light of a sound calculation of probable 
consequences and a fair evaluation of claims.”245 Thus, responsibility indicates 
also a person’s capacity to “act independently and take decisions without 
authorization.”246 Lastly, responsibility is assigned to certain roles and positions, 
such as to judges or to other office-holders. 
These common examples merit further discussion. As the second example 
illustrated, responsibility can be claimed. Claiming responsibility, however, does 
not require that one has actually committed the act for which one claims 
responsibility. For example, a terrorist group might claim responsibility for a 
bombing without actually having committed it. Alternatively, one can view this as 
taking upon oneself the responsibilities of others. 
In addition, it is clear from the examples how responsibility differs from duty and 
obligation. For a man to be called dutiful, all he needs to do is to fulfill his 
obligations or duties, but to be called responsible would require something more 
as Pennock argues: “A moron might be dutiful, but we would hardly speak of him 
as a responsible person.”247 Duties and obligations refer to cases which are simple 
and clear-cut. Responsibilities, on the other hand, indicate situations where 
“judgment or discretion is or ought to be exercised.”248 
A third additional remark relates to the transferability of responsibility, which 
requires a special focus. 
                                                             
245 J. Roland Pennock, "The Problem of Responsibility," in Responsibility, ed. Carl J. Friedrich, Nomos 
(New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960), 13. 
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TRANSFERABILITY OF RESPONSIBILITY 
In this subsection, I wish to address the issue of transferring responsibility. For 
example, in the case of responsibilities belonging to a particular office, one often 
considers that the responsibilities are transferred from one office-holder to 
another. In many ways, this might be the case. Yet, it might be best to consider 
that the responsibilities remain unmoved in the office, while the previous office-
holder is relieved from his responsibilities and the new office-holder is assigned 
those same responsibilities. This is just one example of some misleading 
arguments one might encounter, and by engaging other examples of such 
arguments, I hope to illustrate further insights about responsibility. 
Let us first consider the argument that responsibility is transferred, when a 
person is responsible for another person’s actions, because the latter is incapable 
of acting responsibly. Clearly, this argument is confused, because no transfer of 
responsibility can take place, if the other person could not act responsibly in the 
first place. To give an example, the responsibilities of children and mentally 
challenged people are not transferred to the people who care for them; 
responsibilities and liabilities are created to their custodians. When children learn 
to distinguish between right and wrong, and develop the ability to deliberate, we 
can expect them to act responsibly at least to a certain extent. In turn, old enough 
children take responsibilities upon themselves, while their custodians are 
relieved from some of the responsibilities. Thus, one is not born with 
responsibilities that are, at birth, transferred temporarily to one’s custodians. 
Instead, responsibility is something one learns and integrates as a member of a 
society. 
One might ask what about such cases, as when one’s friend is too intoxicated, is it 
not true that the friend’s responsibilities are transferred to oneself? Also in such 
cases of temporary incapability, responsibilities are not transferred. To give an 
example, a drunk driver cannot use his intoxication as an excuse or as an 
argument for a lesser sentence in case of an accident, quite the contrary! 
Admittedly, there is a law prohibiting driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating substances, and pleading guilty to being drunk while causing the 
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accident would clearly be self-incrimination. Yet, even in the absence of such a 
law, it would hardly be acceptable for someone to excuse his reckless driving by 
pointing out the amount of liquor he had consumed before sitting behind the 
wheel. We could, for example, be willing to accept a sudden medical reason for the 
temporal incapability of acting or driving responsibly. In other words, the 
responsibilities are present, but the question is whether the particular 
circumstances allow for us to overlook the responsibilities and the temporary 
incapability of being able to fulfill them.  
Another confused argument relates to the limits of transferability of 
responsibility, particularly to the transferability of causal responsibility. It is often 
argued that causal responsibility cannot be transferred, because it is “concerned 
with how a particular outcome is generated [and] does not even require that one 
is referring to an agent, let alone a moral agent.”249 For example, Hart attributes 
causal responsibility not only to humans but also for example to animals and 
events.250 Such arguments, however, confuse two distinct issues, namely causality 
and responsibility. In order to clarify this confusion, let us consider the following 
two examples: 1) The wind knocks down a tree; and 2) While cutting down a tree, 
I warn you not to approach but you reply: “I’ll take my chances,” and consequently 
approach and injure yourself.251 In neither of these examples would it make sense 
to say that the wind or I was responsible for what happened, despite “causing” the 
outcome, and I wish to explain why this is the case. 
In the two examples, both the wind and I caused the falling of a tree. The wind, 
however, did not intend to knock down the tree (how could it?), whereas I clearly 
intended to cut down the tree. Thus, despite the wind being part of the causal 
chain, it could not properly be called responsible for knocking down the tree, 
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because it had no choice, it was not even capable of having a choice, and the whole 
thing was a matter of chance having much more to do with the accidental 
combination air flow, the strength of the roots, soil quality, and other factors 
rather than with responsibility. In the other example, despite being also part of 
the causal chain and in fact intending to cut down the tree, my warning and your 
acceptance of the risk and possible consequences of coming closer placed the 
responsibility upon your shoulders. In other words, I may have been responsible 
for cutting down the tree, but not for your injuries. 
One reason for the confusion over “causal responsibility” might be due to 
neglecting liabilities or moral responsibilities that are present but not explicitly 
stated in cases which are used as examples. In a similar vein to the second 
example just mentioned above, Pennock points out correctly that “if I cause you to 
fall and injure yourself … I may be responsible; but this is because I am, under the 
circumstances, legally liable, or morally accountable, or both.”252 
Moreover, responsibility does not require being part of the causal chain, as an 
example from legal liability demonstrates.253 A classic legal example is that of 
escaped cattle, where the cattle owner could be found liable for damages caused 
by the escaped cattle without the cattle owner having been negligent or having 
done anything wrong himself. A landmark case of liability without negligence is 
the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher,254 which concerned the escape of water 
onto a neighboring land. Rylands was a significant step in developing legal policies 
relating to modern industry, risk allocation, liability, and negligence. Although the 
case may have codified only strict liability, and not absolute liability,255 for the 
present purposes it is sufficient to note how in the absence of negligence and 
without intending to cause the escape of water onto Fletcher’s land, Rylands was 
found liable. In other words, responsibility, liability, and accountability are due to 
                                                             
252 Ibid. 
253 One should also note here the earlier example of claiming responsibility and vicarious 
responsibility or liability. On vicarious responsibility, see e.g. Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and 
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255 See e.g. Frank C. III Woodside et al., "Why Absolute Liability under Rylands V. Fletcher Is 
Absolutely Wrong!," The University of Dayton Law Review 29 (2003). 
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specific rules that are applied within a set of circumstances, and in determining 
them, causality may or may not play a role. Thus, in the example of me cutting 
down a tree and you injuring yourself despite my warnings, the question of my 
liability would be determined within the existing law. A decision on this case 
would most likely take into consideration the sufficiency of my warnings, whether 
I had taken adequate precautions, and so on. 
One final remark about the transferability of responsibility is related to the 
warnings in the above example. If it is true that some responsibilities can be 
transferred, or better one can be relieved or excused from them, through 
contracts, warnings, and changes of office, it is also true that certain kinds of 
contracts are not valid, warnings may be insufficient, and retirement from office 
does not guarantee immunity from one’s actions while one was still in office. 
Another legal example serves to illustrate this point. Let us consider the famous 
American case MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,256 which removed privity from 
negligence actions. The significance of the case was that the car manufacturer was 
found liable to a distant third party, whereas in previous cases, such as in 
Winterbottom v. Wright,257 the case would have been dismissed, because no direct 
relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant. In other words, the 
court found that the car manufacturer was not relieved of certain liabilities, 
namely product safety, by selling the product to a reseller. Thus, some 
responsibilities, liabilities, or accountability cannot be transferred.258 
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The above MacPherson case serves to illustrate also a change in the 
conceptualization of liability. The ruling in this case broke away from earlier 
practice, which had been codified as in Winterbottom. According to earlier logic,  
Negligence claims were dismissed if the plaintiff failed to allege an 
undertaking by the defendant, if the plaintiff complaining of injury on 
defendant’s land had the status of a mere trespasser, if the plaintiff’s 
injury bore only a remote relation to the defendant’s negligence, or if the 
plaintiff suffered a type of harm (such as pure emotional stress) against 
which the defendant was not required to guard.259 
In contrast, MacPherson embraced a new model of negligence, and thus it was no 
longer required to ask whether a particular defendant owed a given plaintiff the 
duty of care. The new logic of tort of negligence imposed a general duty of 
reasonable care owed by all to all.260 Within eight decades, the conception of 
liability through negligence had thus undergone a remarkable transition.261 
It is no surprise that the conception of liability, or moral responsibility for that 
matter, changes over time. Legal systems adapt to new circumstances, to new 
laws, and to new interpretations of law. Similarly, our conception of moral 
responsibility has changed over time. To give an obvious example, the now 
infamous white man’s burden was lauded in its heyday. Moreover, new 
developments, such as technological breakthroughs, pose novel scenarios, to 
which our conceptualizations must adapt. 
Our conceptualizations are also context dependent.262 For example, a given 
understanding of liability is valid only within its own legal framework. Likewise, 
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even though there might be a certain level of global agreement over fundamental 
principles of morality, it is the application of those principles, or the agreement 
over exceptions to those principles, that differs from one society to another. In 
sum, our conceptualization of responsibility seems practical in being concrete, 
temporal, and presumptive in the sense that Jonsen and Toulmin use these 
terms.263 
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So far, the discussion has remained at an abstract level and it has not 
differentiated between individual and collective responsibility. A focus on 
collective responsibility is central to the discussion, because the responsibility to 
protect is a collective responsibility held by the international community. 
Moreover, as will be argued in the next subsection, international responsibility in 
relation to grave humanitarian crises is a collective responsibility. 
Most of the debate on collective responsibility centers on the question, whether 
“collectives are capable of bearing … responsibility for outcomes, even when none 
of their members is in any degree individually responsible for those outcomes.”264 
Most of the time, the focus is on collective moral responsibility, and it seems that 
neither side can be declared winner. One of the early rebuttals of collective moral 
responsibility came from H.D. Lewis, who asserts in his 1948 article that “it is the 
individual who is the sole bearer of moral responsibility.”265 In contrast, in an 
article published three decades later, David Cooper insists that collectives are 
more than the sum of their parts, because “there is such a thing as Collective 
Responsibility that is not reducible to Individual Responsibility.”266 Downie’s 
response to Cooper, however, demonstrates that “although there is a sense in 
which the actions and responsibilities of a collective cannot be analysed in terms 
of the actions and responsibilities of the individual persons, who compose the 
collective, it is not moral responsibility which is involved.”267 Thus, many of the 
later contributions, such as Joel Feinberg’s268 or McGary’s269 contributions, focus 
                                                             
264 Seumas Miller and Pekka Makela, "The Collectivist Approach to Collective Moral Responsibility," 
Metaphilosophy 36, no. 5 (2005): 634-35. See also e.g. Larry May, "Collective Responsibility, Honor, 
and the Rules of War," Journal of Social Philosophy 36, no. 3 (2005): 297. 
265 H. D. Lewis, "Collective Responsibility," in Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in 
Theoretical and Applied Ethics, ed. Larry May and Stacey Hoffman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1991), 32. 
266 D. E. Cooper, "Collective Responsibility," in Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in 
Theoretical and Applied Ethics, ed. Larry May and Stacey Hoffman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1991), 45. 
267 R. S. Downie, "Collective Responsibility," in Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in 
Theoretical and Applied Ethics, ed. Larry May and Stacey Hoffman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1991), 47. 
268 Joel Feinberg, "Collective Responsibility," in Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970). 
269 Howard McGary, "Morality and Collective Liability," The Journal of Value Inquiry 20, no. 2 (1986). 
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exclusively on moral responsibility, while others ask whether270 and what kind of 
a collective could be morally responsible.271 As Cane rightly observes, this puzzle 
“about group responsibility is a function of an excessively agent-focused 
approach.”272 
For the present purposes, however, the collective responsibility literature’s focus 
on moral responsibility poses more as a problem than as a source for solution. 
Admittedly, the focus in this thesis has been also, but not exclusively, on moral 
responsibility, yet as tempting as it might be to proceed in the footsteps of others 
and concentrate on moral collective responsibility, the aim of building on the R2P 
report would be lost. Surely, the International Commission intended more than 
assigning moral responsibility to the international community; it sought a way to 
make the international community act. Moreover, given that even the General 
Assembly has confirmed the existence of the collective responsibility “to help 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity,”273 it seems unnecessary to debate whether the international 
community can share a collective responsibility. Instead, following Cane’s 
example,274 attention should be given to the societal role of collective 
responsibility and to the kind of collective responsibility in question. 
It seems clear at least to me that the International Commission advocated for a 
practical conception of the international community’s collective responsibility in 
relation to grave humanitarian crises, and that this collective responsibility is 
similar to the conceptualization of responsibility outlined earlier. The reasons for 
                                                             
270 See e.g. Virginia Held, "Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible?," The 
Journal of Philosophy 67, no. 14 (1970). See also Manuel G. Velasquez, "Why Corporations Are Not 
Morally Responsible for Anything They Do," Business and Professional Ethics Journal 2, no. 3 (1983). 
271 See e.g. Stanley Bates, "The Responsibility of 'Random Collections'," Ethics 81, no. 4 (1971). See 
also Toni Erskine, "Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral Agents: The Case of States and 
'Quasi-States'," in Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and International 
Relations, ed. Toni Erskine (New York: Palgrave, 2003); Peter A. French, "The Corporation as a Moral 
Person," American Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 3 (1979). 
272 Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford: Hart, 2002), 165. 
273 United Nations General Assembly, World Summit Outcome, 2005, A/RES/60/1. 
274 Cane’s primary thesis is that responsibility should be analyzed in relational terms, namely in 
terms of the role responsibility plays in practical reasoning and regarding how we should behave 
toward others. See Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford: Hart, 2002). 
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this interpretation are the following: First, the international community is 
expected to take on the responsibility of states to protect their citizens, when a 
state is “unable or unwilling to fulfill [its] responsibility, or is itself the 
perpetrator.”275 Second, for the international community to bear the 
responsibility to protect, it does not have to be part of the causal chain: “While the 
state whose people are directly affected has the default responsibility to protect, a 
residual responsibility also lies with the broader community of states.”276 
Although the choice of word is “residual,” it would have made more sense to use 
another term, such as (re)activated, to describe the process better. As was argued 
earlier, it makes more sense to perceive of the international community’s 
responsibility as “dormant” or “deactivated” until and unless a particular state is 
unable or unwilling to protect its citizens or is itself the perpetrator. Otherwise 
questions and problems of transferability arise, as well as the possibility of 
committing a fallacy of composition. 
The third reason for drawing similarities between the earlier conceptualization of 
responsibility and the International Commission’s perception of responsibility is 
that the report clearly states that “the responsibility to protect implies an 
evaluation of the issues from the point of view of those seeking or needing 
support.”277 Thus, the report calls for the use of discretion and recognizes the 
international community’s ability to deliberate. Finally, the responsibility to 
protect is an inalienable responsibility arising from “sovereignty as 
responsibility”278 and from membership in a community: “in granting 
membership of the UN, the international community welcomes the signatory state 
as a responsible member of the community of states … the state itself, in signing 
the Charter, accepts the responsibilities of membership flowing from that 
signature.”279 
                                                             
275 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "The Responsibility to Protect," 
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In order to illustrate the kind of collective responsibility in question, let us 
consider briefly the history and evolution of fire departments. Before fire 
departments became institutionalized, it was common that on discovering fire, 
the discoverer had the responsibility (or duty) to alert the other members of the 
community and to ensure that the fire was either contained or extinguished. 
Naturally, all members of the community were expected to deliberate on the best 
course of action, and to work together to the best of their abilities. For example, a 
strong, young man was expected to contribute more than a pregnant woman, who 
may have been excused from the responsibility of contributing to the 
extinguishing of the fire.280 In addition, contributions to the common goal were 
unequal. Had everyone had to carry one bucket of water to the fire, or had 
everyone had to try to save an equal share of what could still be saved, the house 
would have burned down quickly and little would have been saved. In other 
words, coordination and dividing the burden along some set of criteria made the 
management of fires possible without fire departments. 
At a certain point in history, however, the task of extinguishing fires was 
delegated to professionals, who were properly equipped and trained, and who 
were required to respond to alarms of fire, while the rest of the society was not, or 
at least this is the case to a large extent today. Naturally, one is still required to 
alarm the fire department, and do what one can without risking oneself or others 
before the fire department arrives, but once the fire department arrives, 
“civilians” are required to step aside.281 In sum, the management of fires, and 
therefore also the responsibility to extinguish them, became institutionalized with 
the introduction of fire departments. 
Several puzzles were solved by institutionalizing the collective responsibility to 
extinguish fires. For example, fire departments are more efficient, because they 
can be especially trained and equipped for the sole purpose of extinguishing fires. 
                                                             
280 Here one should note that in the event that there was only the pregnant woman or pregnant 
women present, they would not have been excused from the responsibility. It is only the presence of 
others who are better suited to fight the fire that could “do” the excusing.  
281 At least this is the case under normal circumstances. In large forest or field fires, the fire 
department might ask for help from the general population, but even then, usually some training 
would be given before a layperson was allowed to help. 
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The institutionalization also bypassed collective action problems, located 
responsibility squarely with the fire department, and thus also allowed for better 
apportioning of praise and blame. Clearly, institutionalizing collective 
responsibility might not always be possible, but where it is, there can be several 
advantages to such a move. 
Obviously, the fire department analogy should not be taken literally. At the 
international level, there is no similar institutionalization of collective 
responsibility regarding grave humanitarian crises, and the Security Council, for 
example, has certainly not been provided with as good of a chance to meet its 
responsibilities as fire departments.282 Nevertheless, there seems to be something 
to the analogy, if considering for example the reactions to Rwanda in 1994, or to 
Darfur, Chad, and Kenya more recently; there is a strong expectation that the 
international community, and especially the Security Council, take action and put 
down the flames in such hot spots of the world. In what follows, this analogy, 
although imperfect, underlies the discussion. 
                                                             
282 There have been some calls to form an international “911” to respond to grave humanitarian 
crises. Perhaps the most sophisticated of these proposals is the SHIRBRIG. See Multinational 
Standby High Readiness Brigade at http://www.shirbrig.dk. On the Security Council’s 
responsibilities, see e.g. Article 24 of the UN Charter. 
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INTERNATIONAL COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND 
HUMANITARIAN CRISES 
In 2005, the General Assembly acknowledged the responsibility of states to 
protect their citizens and the subsequent responsibility of the international 
community to take collective action through the United Nations, including under 
Chapter VII powers if necessary.283 This act by the General Assembly resembles 
more an acknowledgement of moral responsibility and political accountability 
than legal liability. Moreover, once again, theory does not seem to meet practice, 
because although the concept of responsibility to protect may have been accepted, 
it is yet to be incorporated into practice.284 
Evidently, the International Commission chose to make its ethico-political 
argument via the concept of “sovereignty” instead through law, because 
international law would not support, without controversy, claims of state 
obligation or liability to intervene in other states.285 The legal discourse, however, 
clarifies the collective nature of this international responsibility as possibly 
something analogous to an obligation erga omnes. 
Obligations erga omnes are a special case of international obligations. The 
extraordinary character of these obligations is that they are binding on all states 
without exceptions, and that each state is considered to have a legal interest in 
their protection.286 Thus, consent is not a requirement of obligations erga omnes. 
Common examples of these obligations include the outlawing of aggression, the 
                                                             
283 United Nations General Assembly, World Summit Outcome, 2005, A/RES/60/1. 
284 See e.g. Warren Hoe, "Intervention, Hailed as a Concept, Is Shunned in Practice," New York Times, 
January 20 2008, available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/20/world/africa/20nations.html?_r=3&ref=world&oref=slogi
n&oref=slogin&oref=slogin>. 
285 The responsibility to protect is not only about intervention for humanitarian purposes, but the 
likely requirement to intervene, as many actual cases of crisis demonstrate, is a central part of the 
argument. 
286 See e.g. Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), 17. 
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outlawing of genocide, the protection from slavery, and the protection from racial 
discrimination.287 
An authoritative document on the outlawing of genocide is the so-called Genocide 
Convention.288 As verified by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), “the rights 
and obligations enshrined by the [Genocide] Convention are rights and 
obligations erga omnes.”289 Some, such as Ragazzi, have argued that these 
obligations are not restricted to the prohibition of genocide but include also the 
prevention and punishment of genocide.290 Such arguments are, however, 
contentious. Surely, the ICJ did not mean that states would have a duty to 
intervene in other states, to intervene even militarily if necessary, in order to 
prevent, punish, or end genocide. As Judge ad hoc Kreća explains: 
As an absolutely binding norm prohibiting genocide, it binds all subjects of 
international law even without any conventional obligation. To that effect, 
and only to that effect, the concrete norm is of universal applicability (a 
norm erga omnes) … The position is different, however, when it comes to 
the implementation or enforcement of the norm of genocide prohibition. 
The norm prohibiting genocide … is applicable by States not in an 
imaginary space, but in an area of the territorialized international 
community.291  
Moreover, as Judge Oda clarifies, these obligations 
are borne in a general manner erga omnes by the Contracting Parties in 
their relations with all the other Contracting Parties to the Convention – 
or, even, with the international community as a whole – but are not 
                                                             
287 See e.g. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, International Court of Justice, 33-
34 (1970). 
288 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (1948). 
289 International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, 1996. 
290 Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997), 96. 
291 “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kreća,” para. 101, pp. 765-766 in International Court of Justice, 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1996. 
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obligations in relation to any specific and particular signatory Contracting 
Party.292 
In sum, obligations erga omnes are shared among the members of the 
international community, but they do not belong to any particular individual 
member. They are collective obligations that cannot be transferred to the 
individual level. 
In comparison, the responsibility to protect, as enshrined by the R2P report, 
resembles in many ways an obligation erga omnes.293 For one, it is shared by all 
sovereign states, since it arises from peer-acknowledged sovereignty.294 In 
addition, all sovereigns can be considered to have an interest in upholding this 
responsibility, because it ultimately, in the report, grants states their sovereign 
status. Finally, the responsibility to protect does not belong to any particular 
member of the international community, because “if the state is unable or 
unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator, … it becomes the 
responsibility of the international community to act in its place.”295 For obvious 
reasons, the R2P report recognizes the Security Council as the “first port of 
call,”296 but this does not equal to assigning the responsibility solely to the 
Council. As the report emphasizes, if the Council “fails to discharge its 
responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations,”297 the General 
Assembly under “Uniting for Peace” procedure, regional or sub-regional 
organizations, or concerned states “may not rule out other means to meet the 
gravity and urgency of that situation.”298 
Coming back to the fire department analogy, the similarities should be evident. 
Upon discovering a “conscience-shocking situation” or genocide, states are 
                                                             
292 “Declaration of Judge Oda,” para. 4, p. 626 in Ibid. 
293 This is not to argue that the responsibility to protect is an obligation erga omnes. 
294 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "The Responsibility to Protect," 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). See also Foundation A in “The 
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expected to cry alarm and “call upon the competent organs of the United 
Nations.”299 The Security Council operates as the first port of call,300 and it is 
expected to act in order to alleviate the situation. Although perhaps “dormant,” 
the collective responsibility, however, remains valid at all times. Like in the fire 
department example, until the fire department arrives, or if it never arrives,301 the 
people close to the fire are expected to do what they can within reasonable limits. 
Similarly, there is an apparent implication in the responsibility to protect that the 
members of the international community would not be relieved of their 
responsibilities by simply informing the Security Council, especially in cases 
where the Council fails to act in a timely manner for whatever reason.302 
On the other hand, the fire department analogy fails on many accounts. Most 
importantly, the Security Council hardly enjoys a similar status and capabilities at 
the international level as fire departments in domestic circumstances. Moreover, 
the Council has not been provided with a standing, properly-equipped personnel 
ready to fight the flames at the sound of alarm, nor could it simply jump to a 
mission, even if it had such troops.303 There are certain procedures, provisions, 
and other requirements that must be met before the Council can act, and when it 
acts, it issues a resolution leaving the execution to the member states or to 
regional organizations. The Security Council’s role, however, is highly important 
in coordinating and legitimizing action. 
                                                             
299 See Article 8 in United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (1948). 
300 See ft. 296 
301 Also fire engines can break down. The probability of this ever happening is obviously minimized, 
and whatever small possibility might remain is covered by there being multiple fire engines in a fire 
department and several fire departments in a city. 
302 Note here how under the UN Charter, also the right of self-defense remains unimpaired until the 
Security Council has taken necessary measures. See Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
303 Originally the drafting process of the UN Charter envisioned that member states would make 
available the necessary personnel, equipment, finances, and other assistance at the call of the 
Security Council. The reality has been much different, though. See especially Articles 43, 45, and 47 
of the UN Charter. 
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Yet, exactly because the international responsibility is not institutionalized like 
the domestic responsibility to fight fires,304 criteria are needed for coordinating 
efforts and for dividing the burden of fulfilling the responsibility, especially if the 
Security Council fails to act. In sum, a central question is how to distribute the 
collective responsibility among the members of the collective without losing its 
collective nature. The next section outlines a model and one possible set of 
criteria for the division of the collective responsibility in relation to grave 
humanitarian crises.  
                                                             
304 One might be able to make the case that the current situation reflects a point somewhere 
between the situation before and after the introduction of fire departments, because there is some 
level of institutionalization of the responsibility. I owe this consideration to Chris Brown. 
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“VARYING DEGREES OF RESPONSIBILITY” MODEL 
In the above discussion, it was argued that the international community shares a 
collective responsibility in relation to grave humanitarian crises. Some might 
object because there is no clear legal liability. Instead of entering this debate, 
whether or not there is a legal liability to alleviate human suffering, I shall quote 
the World Summit Outcome, which acknowledges the existence of an 
international responsibility to protect victims of grave humanitarian crises. 
Whether this responsibility is only moral, political, or both, is beside the point at 
this stage. More interesting is to perceive of ways how to think about this 
collective responsibility of the international community. 
The international community is often equaled with all sovereign states, or with 
members of the United Nations, and in most cases rightly so. States are the 
privileged actors in the international sphere, and they are also the only actors 
capable of effectively intervening in other states. Also, regional and other kinds of 
governmental organization are usually subsumed under this heading, because 
they are often no more than the sum of their parts; they are a collection of states 
acting together for a common goal. Sometimes, the United Nations, the largest 
inter-governmental organization, and especially the General Assembly, is 
considered to be the “embodiment” of the international community. 
Yet, to favor all states equally as the only possible kinds of members of the 
international community appears unjustifiable, at least in relation to the 
responsibility in grave humanitarian crises. For one, not all states are capable of 
effectively intervening to alleviate for example genocide, not to mention the 
incapability of a large number of states even being able to solve their own 
problems. Moreover, some non-state and non-governmental organizations may in 
fact possess better capabilities and experience in dealing with grave humanitarian 
crises than most states. In addition, although the use of legitimate force remains in 
the hands of states, some grave humanitarian crises might not require the use of 
force, and even if they did, not all problems can be solved with force. Also, 
concerted action between state and non-state actors might be the best solution 
sometimes. Finally, some non-state actors exist for the sole purpose of alleviating 
Chapter 3: On Responsibility 
[129] 
 
human suffering. It would seem odd to discount such actors in a discussion about 
grave humanitarian crises. 
Thus, for the purposes of what follows, the international community is 
understood to constitute of states, of inter-governmental organizations, of 
regional organizations, of the international civil society, of international non-
governmental actors, of the international media, and of other international actors 
that might be relevant to the fulfillment of the responsibility to protect and the 
alleviation of human suffering in grave humanitarian crises. These are the actors 
that share the collective responsibility, but their individual allocation of the 
responsibility is unequal. Below, I explain the criteria used for determining the 
degree an actor shares in the collective responsibility. Rather than being a formal, 
mathematical model, the criteria are a (casuistic) way of thinking about the 
collective responsibility and the expectations regarding it. 
 




As mentioned above, the international community is considered to compose of 
very different kinds of actors, and one should differentiate between them. 
Although some theories of collective responsibility focus on corporations as 
collective actors,305 the similarity of being a collective actor but being internally 
composed of different kinds of actors is not extendable to the international 
community. Thus, these theories help little, because the international community 
is not like a corporation, yet it is a collective actor, or at least we act as if it were a 
collective actor.  
Some of the actors who compose the international community differ in their 
formal status. For example sovereign states enjoy a more privileged position than 
non-governmental actors in this respect. Other actors differ despite their formal 
equality. As an example, one can consider how the United States and Iceland are 
formally equal as sovereign states, yet there is little doubt about the practical 
inequality between them. These, and other similar, differences ought to be taken 
into consideration when distributing responsibility. 
Furthermore, the members of the international community exist in a 
territorialized world, where distance and geographic location matter. Some 
members of the international community will always be closer to any given crisis, 
while other members will remain at the other side of the planet. Similar to the 
continental duty to rescue, one would expect, and thus assign responsibility, first 
to those nearby. In cases where a nearby actor is unable to act, the expectation 
would naturally filter wider. 
Some actors, however, are global actors in the sense that they can act anywhere 
on the globe, if they so desire. For example, the international media can provide 
coverage from anywhere to virtually anywhere in the world. In a similar vein, the 
United States could intervene in a crisis anywhere in the world, if the political will 
was strong enough. Yet, to place such global actors at level with others would 
                                                             
305 See e.g. Peter A. French, "The Corporation as a Moral Person," American Philosophical Quarterly 
16, no. 3 (1979); Manuel G. Velasquez, "Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything 
They Do," Business and Professional Ethics Journal 2, no. 3 (1983). 
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discount their special character and their costs for acting globally. To put it 
differently, to assign the United States an equal share of the responsibility than to 
a strong state neighboring a grave humanitarian crisis would fail to recognize the 
costs the United States would have to bear in order to reach the crisis. In the most 
extreme case, the crisis might be situated on the opposite side of the globe to the 
United States. Hence, even in the case of global actors, distance plays a significant 
role. 
Proximity, though, can be more than simple physical proximity. In this globalized 
world, one does not have to be physically present in order to influence 
circumstances far away. Examples of non-physical proximity are special 
relationships among actors, privileged or other kind of special information about 
a crisis, common history with those affected by a crisis or with those causing it, 
and other non-physical involvement in a crisis or with its parties. Evidently, one 
would expect such actors to take on more of the collective responsibility rather 
than actors who have no ties to or knowledge of the crisis. 




In distributing the burden of fulfilling a collective responsibility, attention should 
be given to what the members of the collective could contribute. An obvious point 
of departure is material capabilities and resources. Intuitively, one would expect 
the actors with most capabilities and resources to contribute more than the rest, 
while actors with few capabilities and resources could contribute the least and 
still be fulfilling their share. A similar logic is used in determining the UN 
membership payments. 
Intangible capabilities and resources are also important. A good example of an 
intangible resource, which all international actors have, is voice. For example, in 
cases of genocide, it is important not only to work to stop it but also to condemn 
it. Moreover, voice can be used in many fora in order to, for example, rally 
assistance or distribute information. Voice is also the ability, which enables 
politics in the first place, and by voice I do not simply mean the making of audible 
sounds but speech, whether oral or written. Hence, resources should be 
interpreted imaginatively to include tangible and intangible things. 
The expectation that members of the international community should contribute 
some of their resources to a common cause is further determined by particular 
types of resources, whether a member has an abundance of a particular resource, 
and whether a certain resource is unique to some members. Thus, one would 
expect that actors make available relevant resources, which they have in 
abundance, or in which they have special competency or advantage compared to 
others. In other words, the expectation to pool relevant resources is based on the 
principle of comparative advantage. As examples, one could consider the 
following. Only a few militarily powerful states or inter-governmental 
organizations have global airlift capabilities. A good reputation and important 
networks may prove crucial in conflict settlement. Experience for example in 
civilian police training would be helpful in post-conflict situations. The 
international media can spread information and raise awareness globally. 
Transnational movements and non-governmental organizations can mobilize 
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support, strengthen and channel the political will to act, and provide help on the 
ground, sometimes in places where governments cannot go. 
On the other hand, some actors have a leading edge in several fields or types of 
resources. For example, the United States has a multitude of leading competencies 
and comparative advantages. To expect, however, that such an actor, due to its 
relative position, would have to take on most of the collective responsibility most 
of the time would effectively transform the collective responsibility into an 
individual responsibility of that single actor. In contrast, one would expect that 
such actors, as the United States, would contribute either heavily in one field or 
lightly across a range of fields. 
Moreover, some actors possess resources that provide checks and balances. For 
example, the international media or the academia might not be able to contribute 
directly in a humanitarian intervention, but they are in an advantageous position 
to observe and monitor the development of a crisis and the international 
responses to it. Not only can these actors provide special insights, but, for 
example, they are capable of engaging in a strategy of shaming, something that 
might be a powerful incentive to improve one’s record. 
The kind of sensitive focus on various resources and actors as just outlined above 
allows for an evaluation of actors’ performance, and hence also the apportioning 
of praise and blame. A “one size fits all” model, where all actors would be expected 
to contribute equally, would not take into consideration the differences in actors 
or in the actors’ special or relative resources. Intuitively, a more sensitive model 
makes sense. For example, one could not expect the international media or states 
without military forces, such as Costa Rica or Iceland, to contribute troops to a 
military contingent of a humanitarian operation.306 On the other hand, one could 
blame the media for the coverage, or the lack thereof, it provided of a 
humanitarian crisis, or one could question why Costa Rica did not condemn a 
particular genocide, or why Iceland did not use her voice within North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. 
                                                             
306 It is laudable that Iceland has participated in peacekeeping operations despite not having 
standing armed forces. 




The third set of criteria within the “Varying Degrees of Responsibility” model 
focuses on different kinds of crisis. To many, genocide is the most shocking kind of 
grave humanitarian crisis, but what about the enduring suffering from lack of 
access to sufficient food by over 850 million people, or the suffering from hunger 
of one third of the population in some countries?307 These are crises where 
military intervention might not help much in achieving humanitarian ends, but 
are they not grave humanitarian crises that ought to fall under the spirit of the 
responsibility to protect? I do not wish to imply that one kind of a crisis is graver 
than another; one should simply note that humanitarian crises come in many 
shapes and forms with the human suffering being the constant. 
Different kinds of crises, as well as different instances of similar crises, might 
require different approaches and solutions. One kind of a crisis might require the 
rapid deployment of neutral troops, while another might call for a long-term 
strategy which addresses the systemic causes. A third kind of crisis might concern 
only some of the members of the international community, whereas a fourth kind 
of crisis might demand a response from the international community as a whole. 
Thus, part of the expectation we assign to those, who are responsible to act, is a 
reflection on what kind of response, or kinds of responses, is (are) warranted by a 
particular crisis. In other words, we ask: “What is required to solve a given 
problem?”308 and we expect the responsible parties to live up to the answer we 
give. Part of the answer is determined by the conceptualization of the problem, 
because by framing the problem in these instead of those terms will start very 
different processes. Another part of the answer concerns the kinds of actors, 
strategies, and resources we think would bring about a solution. Both of these 
parts are informed by our theories about the world. Unfortunately, part of the 
problem here is that there is usually no agreement over our theories or their 
                                                             
307 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "The State of Food Insecurity in the 
World 2006: Eradicating World Hunger - Taking Stock Ten Years after the World Food Summit," 
(Rome, Italy: 2006). 
308 Naturally, this requires the assumption that there is first of all something, which is defined as a 
problem, and second, that this problem is solvable and ought to be solved. 
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effectiveness or appropriateness in a given crisis. Thus, there is a need for politics 
and argumentation. 
These three sets of criteria focusing on various actors, various resources, and 
various crises are the core of the “Varying Degrees of Responsibility” model. 
Instead of attempting to provide an exhaustive list of all possible factors that 
could play a role, emphasis was placed on a way of thinking about the issue of 
international collective responsibility, on the plurality of dimensions, and on the 
required sensitivity to details. Moreover, providing an exhaustive list might prove 
impossible; responsibility denotes deliberative action, which in many cases 
cannot be predetermined. Thus, in determining responsibility, in sharing it, or in 
apportioning praise and blame, the particulars of a given case guide us. 
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SOME REFLECTIONS ON RESPONSIBILITY AND THE SUGGESTED 
MODEL 
This chapter made use of analogous reasoning. For example, the development of 
fire departments was used to illustrate the institutionalization of a collective 
responsibility, which previously was ad hoc or there was a tacit understanding 
between the members of a community. This same example was later used to think 
about the responsibility to protect, and it was also in the background in the 
criteria of the “Various Degrees of Responsibility” model. The purpose of 
analogous reasoning was to compare similarities between things that are 
otherwise dissimilar, and thus the argument has not been that the evolution of the 
responsibility to protect is the same as the evolution of fire departments, or that 
at the international level there is something like fire departments, ready to relieve 
humanitarian crises where they may occur. It was also not argued that there 
should be something akin to the fire departments at the international level in 
relation to grave humanitarian crises. 
The purpose of the analogy was to draw attention to how we appear to think 
about the two cases in similar ways, and how one has the impression that there 
are similarities between the two.309 Interesting in the fire department example 
was how a collective responsibility first developed within a community, and how 
the collective responsibility was distributed according to some criteria among the 
members of the community before the responsibility was institutionalized in the 
hands of relatively few professionals. From the international perspective, on the 
other hand, the R2P report seems to argue for a similar kind of practical collective 
responsibility mixed with some level of institutionalization. Partially, the 
responsibility is institutionalized within the Security Council structure, but as the 
report argues, other actors should not rule out the possibility to act without the 
Council if the situation so commands. Moreover, even within the Security Council 
structure, the burden must be distributed, because the Council does not have any 
troops or material of its own. Thus, despite partial institutionalization, the 
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situation at the international level resonates with the conditions before the 
introduction of fire departments within domestic societies. 
The era before the existence of fire departments inspired a model of graded 
collective responsibility for considering the contemporary international 
responsibility vis-à-vis grave humanitarian crises. The criteria suggested in the 
“Varying Degrees of Responsibility” model emphasize a focus on various actors, 
various resources, and various crises in determining how to distribute the burden 
of fulfilling the collective responsibility, which the international community 
shares in grave humanitarian crises. Evidently, the suggested model is more 
philosophical than mathematical. No attempt was made to create a formal model, 
because as was argued at the beginning of this chapter, the very notion of 
responsibility does not fit formal models. Responsibility is a matter of 
deliberation and good judgment rather than “if … then” clauses. 
Admittedly, the “Varying Degrees of Responsibility” model is not without its 
faults. There are still no guarantees that any victims of grave humanitarian crises 
will be saved. There is no plain understanding of what constitutes a grave 
humanitarian crisis in the first place. There is neither a detailed division of 
responsibility nor an uncontroversial description of the meaning of this particular 
collective responsibility. Some of these faults cannot be helped, while others 
require a return to the first part of this chapter and the underlying argument in 
this whole thesis. 
During the first half of this chapter, while conceptualizing responsibility, it was 
argued that part of responsibility is being responsible. Being responsible, on the 
other hand, implies the capacity to act independently and the use of good 
judgment. Moreover, responsibility was differentiated from duties and obligations 
exactly because the former requires deliberation, whereas the latter two demand 
only the (blind) following of rules. Thus, since the subject is international 
responsibility, and not international obligations, the purpose was to imagine how 
to think about the responsibility rather than to establish rigid rules or best 
practices. 
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On the other hand, the “Varying Degrees of Responsibility” has its merits. Not only 
does the model demonstrate a way to think about collective responsibilities that 
corresponds with our intuitive understanding of this particular responsibility, but 
it also addresses the expectations we have of the members of the international 
community, and on what basis we have those expectations. Moreover, the model 
provides criteria for the apportioning of praise and blame, as well as some 
concrete suggestions how individual members of the international community 
can meet their share of the collective responsibility. Some of the suggestions 
showed that there are low-cost ways to contribute, a point which will hopefully 
lower the threshold for contributing, and which with some luck will have a 
positive impact on the political will to act. Furthermore, the model identifies the 
members of the collective rather than simply referring to the international 
community, a faceless “actor.” Lastly, the model attempts to bridge the conceptual 
level with the level of practice. After all, responsibility is a practical question in 
the sense that we aim to establish responsibility in a given situation and not in 
any given situation. 
In order to flesh out the “Varying Degrees of Responsibility” model better, the 
next chapter will consider the model further with the help of a thought 






“VARYING DEGREES OF RESPONSIBILITY” 
MODEL AND GENOCIDE 
 
Genocide is the most potent of all crimes against humanity because it is an effort 




If the argumentation has been correct so far, the international community could 
be seen as sharing a responsibility in relation to grave humanitarian crises. This 
responsibility does not belong to any particular member or members of the 
international community, but it is shared among all the members of the 
international community. In order to provide a way to think about this collective 
responsibility, the previous chapter suggested the “Varying Degrees of 
Responsibility” model. In this model, responsibility is graded along a set of 
criteria, so that individual actors’ share of the common responsibility differs from 
one actor to another according to the criteria. It is important to note, however, 
that the individual actor’s share of the common responsibility is due to that 
actor’s membership in the community and its function or position within the 
collective whole. In other words, similar to the Security Council’s right of 
humanitarian intervention, if the Council has such a right,311 the individual 
members of the Council do not have the right. Thus, the individual members of the 
collective do not have a responsibility in relation to grave humanitarian crises, but 
as members of a community, which has the responsibility, the individual actors 
ought to work together as a collective to fulfill the common responsibility. The 
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311 See e.g. chapter 2 above. 
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“Varying Degrees of Responsibility” model is an attempt at theorizing such 
circumstances with the help of expectations of each actor, and on the basis of 
differences in those expectations. 
The “Varying Degrees of Responsibility” model was introduced in the previous 
chapter, and it is the purpose of this chapter to demonstrate its functioning. To 
this end, the first section of this chapter constructs a theoretical case of genocide, 
to which the model is applied in the second section of the chapter. The third and 
final section of the chapter discusses justifications of inaction, which arise in the 
first two sections. 
There are two main reasons for choosing to develop a so-called thought 
experiment rather than using a historical case. First, the purpose is not to criticize. 
A focus on historical cases would easily transform into a criticism of how grave 
humanitarian crises have been dealt with in the past. Surely there have been 
errors and mishaps, which have been pointed out by a number of authors in 
relation to any given grave humanitarian crisis. It is equally clear that the 
international community could have done more in any of the cases. Criticism, 
however, serves no purpose here, but it would be a distraction. To give an 
example, a focus on a historical case would require the accounting and 
interpretation of the events. In attempting to make sense of the various accounts 
of the events, I would necessarily have to engage in criticism and selection. My 
reader, on the other hand, might disagree with the interpretation I provided, and 
thus the higher aim of illustrating the responsibility model would be endangered. 
Moreover, instead of focusing on past cases, a thought experiment demands an 
orientation to the future. After all, the aim is to suggest how future cases could be 
handled. Thus, by providing a generic example, from which one may extrapolate, 
and which draws attention to particular generic details of grave humanitarian 
crises, these issues are hopefully solved or at least bypassed.312 
The second reason for providing a thought experiment is the following: limiting 
oneself to one or a few historical cases restricts which details can be examined. 
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The underlying argument throughout this thesis has been that it is the details 
which determine a case, and by taking one or two cases would necessarily invite 
not only questions about the selection but also about the applicability of the 
results in other cases. In contrast, a thought experiment provides once again a 
background for a way to think about certain kinds of cases, a skill which is more 
generic and applicable across a wider range of cases allowing one to “browse” 
through various scenarios and cases. Naturally, the aim is not to provide a 
completely fictional thought experiment in the sense of being out of touch with 
reality but to construct a “realistic” thought experiment of a case of genocide and 
how it might proceed. 
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A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: GENOCIDE 
In order to illustrate the functioning of the “Varying Degrees of Responsibility” 
model a thought experiment is outlined in this section. This thought experiment 
consists of creating a hypothetical case of genocide. This hypothetical case 
represents chains of events, which might occur in real life. Naturally, this is not to 
argue that what follows provides a blueprint or accurate description of how 
genocide occurs. What is described, however, characterizes one plausible 
progression of genocide and some international responses to it.  
Theoretically speaking, there are numerous possible chains of events creating a 
variety of different scenarios of how a case of genocide might progress. Clearly, it 
is impossible to perceive or imagine all the scenarios, which might be possible. 
Thus, instead of attempting to provide an exhaustive list of various scenarios, here 
the emphasis is placed on the most plausible or likely scenarios and main chains 
of events. 
In the thought experiment, the events unfold in phases for the sake of clarity. The 
first phase consists of the initial stages, such as the discovery of genocide or 
allegations of genocide. The second phase concerns defining the crisis as genocide 
or as something else. In the third phase, it is determined which are the 
appropriate responses to the crisis as defined in phase two. The final, fourth 
phase includes the execution of the decisions made during earlier phases. Clearly, 
there are no guarantees that all the possible chains of events would necessarily go 
through each of these phases. A chain of event might be broken at any stage 
without reaching all phases. Similarly, it is conceivable that a given chain of event 
might either skip some phases or return to an earlier one before a “conclusion.” It 
might even be possible that events in different phases are occurring 
simultaneously. For example, it is possible that actor A is engaged already with 
planning a response to a crisis it has defined, while actor B is still concerned with 
defining the crisis. 
One last remark is in order before describing the four phases of the thought 
experiment. The main focus in the thought experiment is on the United Nations 
Security Council. As discussed in previous chapters, the Security Council has a 
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special position within international politics and the international system, and it 
is also the first port of call in relation to the international community’s 
responsibility in relation to such grave humanitarian crises such as genocide. 
Moreover, the Security Council can influence greatly how a given crisis is defined. 
On the other hand, although the Security Council is emphasized, other actors are 
not excluded in the thought experiment. For example, individual states and 
humanitarian organizations among other members of the international 
community are present in the thought experiment even if they are not always 
explicitly stated. 
To describe the four phases of the thought experiment, allow me to begin with the 
first phase: Initial Stages. During the initial stages of the thought experiment, 
there are “rumors” about a possible genocide occurring somewhere in the world. 
For the purposes here, it is irrelevant where the rumors locate the genocide. Yet, 
for the sake of the argument, let us consider that the rumors place the genocide 
somewhere in the sub-Saharan Africa. Certain parts of this region have been 
tormented by “ethnic” conflict for decades, and almost one and a half decades ago 
genocide took place in this region, while the past years have been rife with claims 
of yet another genocide in the sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, placing the genocide in 
the thought experiment in this region might correspond with reality quite well. 
Other regions, however, are not to be excluded, since the argument is not that 
genocide is something “typical” of Africa. 
The existence of a rumor that genocide was taking place would create both an 
interest and a pressure to investigate the matter. Some actors, such as the 
international media or humanitarian organizations, would have a clear interest in 
investigating the matter further. Here one also thinks of “fact-finding” missions by 
for example states with relations in the crisis area or with presence in the region. 
It might also be that these are the same actors who are making the allegations 
about genocide. On the other hand, the Security Council for example would not 
necessarily have an interest in the same sense as these other actors, but the 
Council would certainly face some political pressure to make inquiries. For one, 
the Council or at least the Secretariat ought to be aware of such matters and 
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events. Second, various pressure groups and humanitarian organizations, 
although not capable of influencing the Council directly in the Security Council 
meetings, would most likely attempt to influence the members of the Security 
Council indirectly, whether in the form of protests, “hallway lobbying,” or 
something in between. 
It is unlikely that there would be any large-scale investigations into the verity of 
the rumor in the beginning. More likely is that only a few actors, perhaps the 
international media, if its attention was not demanded for some verified “hot” 
story, or for example Amnesty International or a similar human rights advocacy 
group, would examine the rumors without spending too much time, effort, or 
money. Clearly, whatever these actors might discover should be communicated to 
the world, yet there is a problem with the kind of information that would be 
communicated. Depending on their situation, some of these early investigators 
might have an incentive to twist their findings, whether for better or worse. On 
the other hand, it is likely that there are several interested parties, and here one 
thinks of neighboring countries or international business, who would not only 
have an interest in finding better information themselves, but also a limited 
responsibility to make inquiries and communicate them. Admittedly, 
international business might not as such bear a responsibility to find out whether 
or not a genocide was about to take place, but for example multinational 
corporations certainly have responsibilities towards their share-holders, who 
most certainly would be interested in knowing where and to what purpose their 
investments were used. Similarly, actors who are present in the region, such as for 
example a World Bank operation, would under the responsibility model share 
some degree of responsibility to cooperate at least in the dissemination of 
information or in providing what information they might have to actors who were 
taking initiative in attempting to discover what was happening. Other actors, in 
other words actors with no presence or traditionally perceived interest in the 
region, would not be expected to share in the responsibility at this stage. 
The results of the preliminary investigations are likely to be one of the following 
two possibilities: one, there is supporting evidence of genocide or at least of a 
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grave humanitarian crisis, in which acts of genocide have occurred; or two, no 
evidence is found supporting the allegations. The latter possibility does not 
denote that the rumor was incorrect and that no grave humanitarian crisis is 
unfolding. It could well be that at this point there was no conclusive evidence 
supporting the allegations, or that actors, in the absence of undeniable evidence, 
would disregard what evidence they found. In any case, if no supporting evidence 
was found, it is most likely that the chain of events from the international interest 
perspective would stop here, at least until a time when new rumors emerged or 
new evidence was discovered. For the sake of continuing with the thought 
experiment, however, it is required to consider that some supporting evidence 
was indeed found by the investigating actors. 
The supporting evidence that actors might discover would by no means be 
necessarily conclusive. Most plausibly, the supporting evidence would indicate 
that further monitoring of the situation was necessary instead of clearly 
indicating that full-scale genocide was underway. One imagines that what 
information was available would be fragments from here and there, which could 
only warrant uncertain and vague conclusions. Alternatively, there might be 
indications of a less wide-spread humanitarian crisis, such as for example a 
distress in one particular corner of a country, while the rest of the country was 
enjoying stability as usual. It might equally well be that the evidence was linked to 
a crisis that had already passed. Although we live in a globalized world with the 
possibility of instant communication, there are large segments of the world, which 
are not part of this hyper-linked world, and where things might happen without 
anyone on the outside knowing about it except perhaps afterwards. For example 
in the case of the international media, events have to meet a threshold before they 
can become news, and afterwards they compete with other news for airtime and 
print space. On the other hand, if a full-scale genocide was taking place anywhere 
in the world, it is unlikely that it could be hidden for long. Thus, at this point in the 
thought experiment, there are indications that a grave humanitarian crisis might 
be in the making but there is no clear proof of its extent or gravity. 
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The analysis of the meaning of the evidence signals that the thought experiment 
has moved already into phase two: Defining the Event. By attempting to 
understand the evidence, one is also attempting to define what they are evidence 
of. Phase two is crucial in the unfolding of events and in determining which chains 
of events might take place. Defining the situation for example as a civil war would 
justify and call for different kinds of responses than if the same situation was 
defined as genocide. Thus, defining a crisis in a particular way may foreclose 
certain possibilities and require a specific manner, in which the crisis ought to be 
addressed, independent of whether such a definition corresponded perfectly with 
“reality.” For example, one definition, such as genocide, might emphasize heavily 
the responsibility of the international community to intervene in the crisis, 
whereas another definition, such as civil unrest, might not require or even prove 
to be an obstacle for a response from the international community as a whole. 
In phase two, the procured information about the situation on the ground might 
support various interpretations of the crisis. One interpretation might label the 
situation as genocide, another claim that genocidal acts had occurred. Yet another 
interpretation might emphasize the unfolding of a humanitarian crisis without 
any reference to genocide or genocidal acts, while a fourth interpretation might 
define the circumstances as the aftershocks of a crisis that had taken place but 
was already waning.313 Furthermore, it is even likely that attempts at definition 
based on such partial and incomplete information would be hasty and perhaps 
even counter-productive. 
For the purposes of the thought experiment and its progression, however, I focus 
on the interpretation that the evidence from the crisis area indicates genocide or 
at least genocidal acts being in progress. The other possible interpretations are 
also interesting, but as the international community’s responsibility is clearest in 
cases of genocide, the thought experiment ought to focus on such cases rather 
than on others. To give a quick impression of the interesting aspects of other 
possible interpretations of the crisis, one could consider for instance the 
possibility that genocidal acts had occurred but that there was no evidence that 
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such acts continued. In such a case, the international community would be 
confronted with obvious questions: What to do about grave violations of human 
life and dignity that have been politically motivated, such as attempts at ethnic 
cleansing, but which for one reason or another were not carried all the way 
through? Should the international community seek to punish the perpetrators and 
follow the spirit of the Genocide Convention? How far back can we go in history in 
the hunt for the perpetrators? Should the international community strive to 
establish an international tribunal? If so, how should it be constructed and to 
what specific purpose?314 More practical questions might also be posed, such as 
whether and what kind of humanitarian assistance was required? All these 
questions are related to a larger framework, which is concerned with the division 
of labor once a decision to take action has been made. 
Coming back to the thought experiment, it continues by focusing on the 
consideration that genocide or genocidal acts were taking place or were imminent 
somewhere in the sub-Saharan Africa. This consideration is supported by the 
evidence from the field. At this point, one should note that despite such evidence, 
the crisis might not be defined as genocide or a grave humanitarian crisis 
including acts of genocide by international actors. Some might draw this 
conclusion, such as human rights groups, but many others, for their own reasons, 
might even work to obscure the “facts” or labor to define the situation in a 
completely different manner. For example, the Security Council might not be able 
to reach a compromise interpretation due to the actual use or perceived use of the 
veto powers of its five permanent members or due to lack of sufficient votes in 
general. 
Since “things” do not define themselves but are defined by others and in relation 
to others, some members of the Security Council, for example, might avoid certain 
kind of terminology, such as genocide, in order to avoid tying their own hands or 
strengthening assumptions about their responsibility to act. For example, in 
avoiding references to genocide or to acts of genocide, actors would attempt to 
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diminish the relevance and applicability of for instance the Genocide Convention 
and of the responsibility to protect. If the crisis was defined as genocide, there 
would most certainly be outcries for the lack of action and demands made on the 
Security Council and the international community as a whole to take action in 
order to alleviate and stop the atrocities. After all, genocide is a crime against 
humanity, which the signatories to the Genocide Convention have condemned, 
and which is recognized universally as forbidden as discussed in chapter three. 
Yet, moral outrage and imperatives apart, political will to act would most likely be 
missing, especially if the region where the crisis was taking place was not wealthy 
in minerals or otherwise of traditional interest, and this lack of political will 
would be reflected in the efforts to deny what for example the international media 
and humanitarian organizations claimed.  
From the perspective of the “Varying Degrees of Responsibility” model, efforts to 
hinder fact-finding, obscuring information, and deliberately attempting to define 
the crisis so that it would not fall under the common responsibility of the 
international community would merit blame and shame. Instead of working to 
undermine the events, one would expect that international actors took measures 
to increase awareness, to learn more about the conditions, and to begin taking the 
necessary measures, whether by applying political pressure or otherwise, in order 
to stabilize the region and to alleviate human suffering.315 To use the Security 
Council again as an example, instead of spending the meetings in discussion about 
whether the crisis was a case of genocide, a discussion with no end most likely, 
one would expect that the time was spent better by learning as much as possible 
about the situation and by recognizing that a crisis was unfolding. By now, in the 
thought experiment it ought to be clear that some kind of crisis was either already 
taking place or was imminent, even if labeling it genocide was controversial. Thus, 
special attention should be directed at the situation on the ground. 
So far the thought experiment has not been sensitive to the particulars of the 
Security Council which has been considered in too simplistic terms. Reality is 
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much different, for example because the Security Council operates according to 
specific rules and procedures. First of all, it does not operate proactively. To 
explain this better, let us consider the procedural rules of the Security Council. 
The President of the Council calls a meeting of the Council at the request of any 
member of the Council, if “a dispute or situation is brought to the attention of the 
Security Council under Article 35 or under Article II (3) of the Charter, or if the 
General Assembly makes recommendation or refers any question to the Security 
Council under Article 11 (2), or if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of 
the Security Council any matter under Article 99.”316 The provisional agenda for 
each meeting is drawn by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of 
the Council. Items that may be on the agenda are restricted to communications 
from states, from other organs of the United Nations, or from the Secretary-
General, and to unfinished items from previous agendas.317 To put it differently, 
the Security Council operates passively by reacting to communications from three 
different sources: member states, other organs of the United Nations, and the 
Secretary-General. For the crisis in the thought experiment to be even considered 
by the Security Council it would have had to have been brought to its attention by 
at least one of these three sources. 
Since the Security Council is quite restricted already in terms of what can be on its 
agenda, it is quite possible that a given crisis would not be placed on its agenda. 
For example, one is hard pressed to find an official Security Council meeting about 
the situation in Chechnya. If the crisis was not communicated to the Security 
Council and placed on its agenda, the thought experiment would proceed along 
different paths excluding the Council until the crisis was brought to the attention 
of the Security Council. Yet, because the aim of the thought experiment is to 
include the Security Council as much as possible, it is assumed at this stage that 
the crisis is communicated to the Security Council and placed on its agenda. It is of 
no real significance from whom the communication comes, but for the sake of an 
example, let us consider that a neighboring state to the crisis, concerned with the 
instability in the region and the incoming refugee flows, asked the Security 
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Council to act. One might ask, who has the responsibility to bring such matters to 
the attention of the Security Council? The “Varying Degrees of Responsibility” 
model provides one answer to this question, and I shall return to it later, because 
otherwise the description of the thought experiment is disrupted. 
Having described how the crisis would be brought to the attention of the Security 
Council, the third phase of the thought experiment consists in Determining the 
Appropriate Response. Having been summoned, the Security Council would 
convene to address the communication it had received in order to determine the 
appropriate response. The courses of action available to the Security Council are 
quite limited. In very simplistic terms, the question is whether or not the Security 
Council issues a resolution. A secondary question is, if the Council decides on a 
resolution, what does that resolution contain?  
Given the nature of international politics and the functioning of the Security 
Council, it is likely that in the event that a resolution is passed during the first 
meeting concerning the crisis in the thought experiment that the resolution calls 
upon the parties to the conflict to cooperate and perhaps to cease hostilities and 
affirms that the Security Council will remain seized on the matter.318 It could be 
that given time and new developments the resolutions would become stronger, 
even calling for arms embargo if not also intervention.  
From the perspective of the thought experiment it is of no substantial relevance 
whether the Security Council passes a resolution calling for intervention after its 
first or tenth meeting regarding the crisis.319 Of interest is whether such a 
resolution is passed. Here, it is important to consider both options, namely that 
despite several meetings, the Security Council does not pass a resolution calling 
for intervention in the crisis, and that the Security Council passes a resolution to 
such end. I shall consider both options beginning with the former. 
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319 Clearly, the more time passes, the more one would expect other actors to make their independent 
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It is quite possible that the Security Council does not pass a resolution calling for 
effective intervention in the crisis despite having met to discuss the matter 
several times, and there might be several reasons behind this outcome. For one, 
the crisis area or the issues involved might be too sensitive to one or several of 
the veto-holding permanent members. It might be possible that the mere 
perception that this was the case would hinder any attempt at passing a 
resolution. After all, the actors calculate and form their perceptions not on a single 
issue but across a range of issues. Moreover, some actors might not wish to risk a 
possible political retribution in a different issue, which might be more important 
to them. Yet, if the crisis at hand was highly sensitive to one or more of the veto-
holding members, it is unlikely that the matter would have ever been placed on 
the Security Council’s agenda, despite it being possible for any member state to 
communicate a matter to the attention of the Council. It is plausible that states, 
whether being informed informally by the veto-holding powers or through their 
own cognition, would not wish to bring up a topic, which would be doomed from 
the start. 
Another probable reason, why the Security Council would not pass a resolution 
calling for intervention, could be the lack of troops, material, and finances. The 
Security Council remains dependent on the goodwill of its and the UN’s members, 
and their contributions. In the event that there were no volunteers, who could be 
authorized to intervene, or that it was evident that no troops would be offered 
despite passing a resolution calling for an intervention, it is a small surprise that 
the Council would not even attempt to pass a resolution. Of course, the Security 
Council could pass a resolution calling for intervention, but normally there would 
already be some idea where the intervening forces would come, even if it was only 
an informal discussion among some of the members of the Council, or thanks to 
the efforts of the Secretary-General. 
The actual reasons why the Security Council could not agree on a resolution 
calling for intervention, or on who to authorize, are not of central importance in 
the thought experiment. It is more important to consider the consequences of a 
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no-resolution situation, in cases where perhaps some of the Security Council 
members had recognized correctly the available evidence as indicating genocide. 
If considering the matter in broader terms, the no-resolution by the Security 
Council would not necessarily mean that there would be no intervention. It is 
possible that a regional actor or a coalition of actors would nevertheless attempt 
an unauthorized intervention. As discussed in chapter two, humanitarian 
interventions which are not authorized by the Security Council are illegal but they 
might qualify as legitimate interventions. Thus, an actor or actors might not rule 
out the possibility of taking action after having been frustrated by the lack of 
action by the Security Council. Naturally, such an illegal intervention would invite 
investigations into its possible legitimacy. In these investigations and 
assessments, one would consider among other things the action taken, by whom, 
on what grounds, the manner it was conducted, and what was the result of the 
action. In justifying the unauthorized action, the intervener(s) might refer to the 
responsibility to protect. If the intervener(s) could demonstrate that action was 
required, the claims to legitimacy would receive a boost. Moreover, it could well 
be that the Security Council would legitimize the unauthorized intervention ex 
post facto but there are no such guarantees. 
Alternatively, in the event that the Security Council did not pass a resolution 
calling for intervention, it is possible that no intervention would take place, 
unauthorized or otherwise. The mere existence of a grave humanitarian crisis 
might not be enough to motivate for example states to fight for humanity in a 
possibly “far-away country,” as history so aptly shows.320 In the event that no 
intervention occurred and genocide indeed took place, one can only imagine the 
ensuing blame game and finger pointing and their counterparts, namely excusing 
and dodging accusations. One needs to consider only the amount of literature that 
the non-intervention in the Rwandan genocide has generated. In general terms, in 
the aftermath of a “failure” to intervene, questions of responsibility, of who should 
have done and what, would be central topics. 
                                                             
320 One thinks of for example Neville Chamberlain’s comments in 1938. 
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In contrast to the chain of event just considered, it is possible that the Security 
Council would pass a resolution authorizing intervention in what at this point 
would be recognized as genocide. By so doing, the thought experiment would 
move into phase four: Implementing Decisions. Yet, even at this point there would 
be no guarantees that intervention would necessarily occur, not to mention that 
there would be any success. The result of the resolution could still be complete 
inaction due to there being no contributions, some form of humanitarian 
assistance, efforts to compose an intervening force without it ever materializing in 
time, or an inadequate force. At this point, however, the responsibility to protect 
has come into play quite strongly, because with its resolution, the Security Council 
would have determined that the international community ought to act. One 
should note, though, that at this point it might not be exactly clear how the 
international community ought to act. 
Leaving aside the possibility that there would be no or insufficient contributions, 
let us consider that a number of states responded to the Security Council’s call, 
and that they were earnest about their contributions. The contributions might 
come either in the form of willingness to be authorized by the Security Council, or 
as readiness to participate in an operation led by the UN. If the former was the 
case, there would normally be a coalition of states or an international 
organization such as NATO which sought authorization. Thus, in its resolution the 
Security Council would indicate such parties and also instruct what measures 
could be taken and to which end. In this case that there was a third party willing 
to be authorized it is quite likely that intervention would actually take place. 
Clearly, the actors seeking authorization would be keen to take action, perhaps for 
their selfish reasons in addition to the humanitarian imperatives, because 
otherwise they simply would not seek authorization. Whether the intervention 
would be successful, sufficient, or even timely from the humanitarian perspective, 
would be different questions. 
On the other hand, if the Security Council was seeking contributions to a UN force, 
again the possibility of there being no, or at least no timely, contributions would 
be present. Since the Council does not have any troops at its disposal, any 
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operation that it wants to execute requires that the Secretary-General visits 
possible donors asking for their support. Naturally, this process of seeking 
support would take a considerable amount of time,321 and the results could vary 
heavily. It is quite possible that UN member states would support Security Council 
action in principle without being willing to contribute to the force. Thus, a broad 
range of conclusions is possible ranging, again, from no intervention through half-
hearted or untimely intervention to a good likelihood of success thanks to 
generous contributions and commitment to the cause. 
If there were insufficient or no contributions, there would clearly be no blue-
helmets on the ground, but it might still be possible that a third party decided to 
pursue the action called for in the Security Council resolution. In other words, a 
possibility exists that the Security Council would determine the existence of 
genocide and pass a resolution calling for humanitarian intervention, but when 
trying to form a task force, the Security Council would realize that there were no 
contributions or an insufficient amount of contributions, and that in realizing this, 
a third party might step in and take on the mandate designed for the UN task force 
until such a task force was ready. This was more or less what happened in 
Rwanda in 1994 when the French Operation Turquoise effectively took over the 
mandate designed for a UN force. 
The issue of contributions to an operation mandated by the Security Council is rife 
with questions about responsibility: Who should contribute, what, and how? The 
“Varying Degrees of Responsibility” model could be of use in answering these 
questions, as will be discussed in the next section.  
Before, however, I would like to draw attention to how the thought experiment is 
left open at this point. Many of the possible chains of events were discussed, but 
many could not be pursued too long. Quite naturally, it could be possible to tell 
stories and imagine many of the likely possibilities, but that would hardly serve a 
purpose here. Instead, the open-endedness of many of the possible chains of 
events, as well as the very end of the thought experiment, shows the uncertainty 
                                                             
321 One should note that also in the event that there were many contributions, their coordination 
would be time-consuming. 
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of events, even when they are only imagined not to mention in “real” life, which is 
ultimately more complex, includes chances or “luck,” and coincidences.322 Hence, 
if even in this thought experiment only very few of the possible paths led to some 
kind of intervention – in fact only two quite precarious paths resulted in 
intervention – the chances of humanitarian intervention in the “real world” must 
be similar to a game of dice, if not a greater gamble. 
                                                             
322 One thinks of for example Clausewitz’s famous fog of war. Carl von Clausewitz, On War 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 
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THE THOUGHT EXPERIMENT AND THE RESPONSIBILITY MODEL 
Having outlined the thought experiment, I now turn to the issue of responsibility 
within the thought experiment with the aim of providing examples of how the 
“Varying Degrees of Responsibility” model operates. During all four phases of the 
thought experiment, issues of responsibility arose.  
In the first phase, responsibility was related to questions of whether and who 
should investigate the genocide rumors.  
In the second phase, responsibility arose on multiple occasions. For example, if 
genocide had taken place, the question would be what the international 
community should do in such situations. Also, if there was a recognized, 
continuing genocide taking place, the international community’s responsibility, 
following the R2P report, to alleviate the suffering would be quite strong, but it is 
not entirely clear how this responsibility should be conceived. It was also 
mentioned in the thought experiment that there is no automatic procedure for the 
Security Council to address grave humanitarian crises, but that the Council 
remains reactive to communications from a limited number of sources. Who 
would have a responsibility for communicating grave humanitarian crises to the 
attention of the Security Council? 
During the third phase of the thought experiment references were made to a 
possible blame-game ensuing non-intervention in the genocide. In such a “game,” 
actors would attempt to shift the responsibility away from their own shoulders by 
using various strategies, most of which would most likely focus on demonstrating 
that they themselves were not responsible. On a higher level, arguments would be 
made concerning action and inaction, who should have done and what, and what 
was even possible to do. 
In the final, fourth phase of the thought experiment the requirement for dividing 
the burden of acting responsibly was the clearest, because this phase concerned 
the execution of the decisions made during the earlier phases. Here, in the event 
that the international community decided to intervene in the genocide, one would 
most certainly want to have some criteria according to which to divide the 
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consequent burden for intervening and most likely also for the post-conflict 
rebuilding of the society or societies where genocide had occurred and which had 
been influenced by refugee flows. 
Thus, questions of responsibility arose on many occasions during the thought 
experiment, as would be expected also in “real life” situations, and as mentioned, 
the purpose of this section is to highlight how the “Varying Degrees of 
Responsibility” model could be of assistance in determining responsibility and 
perhaps also in proposing courses of action for different actors. 
To illustrate the assistance the responsibility model could offer, let us start with 
the initial stages of the thought experiment, namely the genocide rumors and the 
question who should investigate the veracity of the rumors. Clearly, one would 
not expect all members of the international community to take it upon themselves 
to investigate the matter further. Yet, certain kinds of actors, such as human rights 
advocacy groups or the international media, would have not only an interest in 
investigating but more of a responsibility than the rest of the international 
community, at least if applying the “Varying Degrees of Responsibility” model. The 
rest of the international community, however, could not be expected to become 
involved, although if they did, it could only be appraised. 
It is difficult to determine a precise threshold when one would expect more actors 
and more different kinds of actors to become involved. Generally speaking, the 
responsibility model suggests that with more and more complete information 
about the genocide the number of members of the international community, who 
are expected to assist in fulfilling the international community’s collective 
responsibility, should increase. In other words, at the beginning, when only few of 
the members of the international community are aware of the genocide rumors 
and capable of investigating them further, one could only expect these actors to 
act responsibly in light of the possibility of genocide taking place, while later 
when there was more and better evidence supporting the rumors, one would 
expect that for example the situation was communicated to the Security Council 
thus bringing also the Security Council into play.  
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Two questions arise at this point: one, what does responsible behavior mean in 
the early stages of the thought experiment, and two, should sovereign states 
become involved already at this stage? The answer to the former question is quite 
commonsensical; responsible behavior would incorporate efforts to investigate 
the rumors, communicating or sharing one’s information about the situation, or 
supporting or at least not hindering other actors’ efforts at fact-finding. To answer 
the latter question, states in general would not be expected to become involved. It 
could be that some states, such as neighboring states to the crisis area or states 
with particular interests in the region, would become involved from their own 
initiative. Yet, it would be too much to expect that all states as members of the 
international community should be concerned of mere rumors. Thus, passivity 
would not be condemnable at this stage, but later with more evidence of the 
genocide, as is the case in the thought experiment, it would become increasingly 
difficult for states to justify a passive or indifferent stance, especially if they were 
members of the Security Council, central actors in the crisis region, or otherwise 
influential.323 
To consider a different part of the thought experiment, let us consider the 
possibility that genocide had already taken place, or that the systematic killing 
had ceased. In light of the R2P report, its responsibility to rebuild, and the 
Genocide Convention, what would be expected of the international community? 
Should the international community engage in seeking and punishing the 
perpetrators? If so, how should it proceed? Should the international community 
pool resources in order to stabilize the region further and assist in the re-building 
of the devastated society? The answers to these questions are hardly 
straightforward. For one, the expectations on the international community are not 
clear. Surely, there is the possibility of setting up an international tribunal, but it is 
not a requirement. Moreover, the actual structure and functioning of such an 
international tribunal could take many forms, all of which should be considered in 
light of the local conditions. Whether the international community should engage 
in helping the survivors, is an equally tricky question, because it might be that the 
                                                             
323 All this, naturally, does not mean that the actors would not try to justify their passivity, or that 
they had to act. It would simply mean that the justification of inaction would be more difficult. 
Chapter 4: The Responsibility Model and Genocide 
[159] 
 
majority of the survivors in the country were the perpetrators. It is apparent, 
though, that in answering these questions, sovereign states as representatives of 
the international community, and as members of the Security Council in 
particular, would need to agree on the responses. Humanitarian organizations 
could and perhaps should provide assistance. Most likely, the help that these 
organizations can offer would be indispensable, and one would expect them to 
live up to their mission statements. The larger perspective, though, would fall for 
example on the Security Council, on the relevant regional organizations, and on 
the General Assembly and other relevant UN organs. Out of the members of these 
organizations, one would expect that some “champions” of the cause would arise 
to the occasion. For example, if it was decided that an international tribunal 
should be founded, one would expect that so-called “broker states” would step in 
and offer their neutrality and reputation for unbiased decisions for the 
advancement of justice whether in the form of judges, investigatory teams, or 
otherwise. 
One should consider, though, that there are approximately two hundred states 
and perhaps a greater number of regional and humanitarian organizations, which 
could be “relevant” to the crisis in the sense of either operating in the region or 
having a mission statement which includes the kinds of crisis in the thought 
experiment. Surely, one could not expect that all these actors should use their 
resources on a single case. After all, the crisis in the thought experiment would be 
just one case among several crises taking place in all parts of the world. Here, the 
“Varying Degrees of Responsibility” model could be of service in justifying 
focusing on only some of the crises. For example, many politicians would most 
likely be confronted with the question why their nation was not helping in this 
and that crisis, and the response could include references to the assistance the 
nation was already giving in other crises, the shifting of responsibility to act to 
other actors, whose responsibility was stronger based on the responsibility 
model, or the demonstration of what the nation was already doing, even if that did 
not fall within a traditional understanding of development or crisis aid, namely for 
example by rallying support among other contributors or by keeping the crisis 
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still relevant in the discussions among more powerful but perhaps disinterested 
actors. 
Justifying passivity, however, would be more difficult if the genocide had been 
recognized, especially if the Security Council had recognized the crisis as 
genocide. The difficulty would be due to the responsibility of the international 
community to act in such grave humanitarian crises as genocide, because the 
recognition of genocide would also denote the applicability of the responsibility in 
this particular crisis. Thus, one would expect that the members of the 
international community would increase their efforts in fulfilling their collective 
responsibility. The likely reality, though, is that most states would simply ignore 
the situation, unless they were in the Security Council, located or operating in the 
region, or otherwise internationally active and concerned. Looking at cases of 
grave humanitarian crises, one notices how a relatively small number of states, for 
example, have been involved in a given crisis. In light of the “Varying Degrees of 
Responsibility” model, it is only expected that not each and every state would 
participate in each and every effort to alleviate the suffering in grave 
humanitarian crises. One would, however, expect that each state would condemn 
genocide, at the bare minimum, and have justifiable reasons, within the model or 
otherwise, which could count for their passivity. To what extent such 
justifications could be acceptable depends on many factors and is case-dependent. 
The idea behind the responsibility model is, though, that the more shocking the 
humanitarian crisis, the better the justifications of passivity would need to be in 
order to be acceptable.324 
The acceptability of justifications for passivity would be not only case-dependent 
but also actor-dependent. In other words, it would make a difference who made a 
particular justification, because from one actor a particular justification might be 
a plausibly acceptable argument while from another it would not be satisfactory. 
In order to illustrate, let us consider the question of who should bring the 
genocide in the thought experiment to the attention of the Security Council. In 
order not to complicate matters unnecessarily, let us further consider three 
                                                             
324 The next section and chapter examine some of these justifications explicitly. 
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actors: states A, B, and C. The first state, State A, has no knowledge of the 
genocide. State B, on the other hand, has privileged information that genocide is 
taking place, or that at least acts of genocide have been committed. State B, 
however, is not a party to the Genocide Convention, unlike State C which has also 
information about the genocide or about the acts of genocide. Out of these three 
actors, State C has the strongest responsibility to bring the case to the attention of 
the Security Council for the following reasons. The fact that State A has no 
knowledge regarding the genocide or the acts of genocide absolves it to a large 
extent from the responsibility regardless whether or not it is a signatory to the 
Genocide Convention, because it can claim ignorance. Whether the claim of 
ignorance is credible, is another question, but for the sake of the present 
argument, it can be left aside. State B, on the other hand, is not a signatory to the 
Genocide Convention. Although the Convention does not demand that signatory 
parties call upon the Security Council if they have discovered acts of genocide, the 
spirit of the Convention does imply that some action ought to be taken upon such 
discoveries. Thus, due to its knowledge of the situation and by being a signatory 
to the Genocide Convention, of these three actors one would expect that State C 
brings the matter to the attention of the Security Council, either directly or 
indirectly through the Secretary-General. 
In the example just mentioned, the argument is not that State A and State B have 
no responsibility, but that in comparison with State C their responsibility or the 
strength of their responsibility would be less. One could argue, for example, that 
regardless of State A not being a signatory to the Genocide Convention, the fact 
that the outlawing of genocide is an obligation erga omnes imposes a certain level 
of requirement to be aware of acts of genocide, if State A wishes to be an 
integrated part of the international community. Similarly, State B with its actual 
knowledge of the events should have taken measures in the spirit of the obligation 
erga omnes despite not being a party to the Genocide Convention. Without 
discussing the merits of these arguments, for they are surely not wholly 
convincing, the overall point should be clear. The fact that State C would have a 
stronger responsibility does not mean that others, such as State A and State B, 
have no responsibility. Moreover, the strength relates not only to the implied 
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responsibility to commit positive acts but also to the more difficult position to 
justify one’s inaction. 
One example of justifying one’s inaction might arise in the “blame game” that was 
mentioned in the thought experiment. As the name implies, the blame game 
consists in actors shifting blame away from themselves onto others or in 
protecting themselves from possible blame for inaction or insufficient action. 
Clearly, any engagement in such a game incorporates an implicit or explicit 
recognition that there was a responsibility to act or to commit to a certain course 
of action, because otherwise the game would be nonsensical. Admittedly, it might 
be possible that a responsibility is imposed on the actors, much like pro-
humanitarian intervention arguments or the R2P report before its message was 
recognized by the General Assembly. If that were the case, then the actor to whom 
the responsibility was imposed could demonstrate there was no such 
responsibility or that it at least did not apply to this particular actor. This could be 
the chosen strategy of some of the actors, even if they had, or shared in a 
responsibility, when they would justify their inaction. Nevertheless, whether or 
not the responsibility is recognized and accepted, the blame game implies a 
responsibility and the failure to fulfill it. Yet, there is no necessary requirement 
that the responsibility exists and that it is accepted by the actors themselves, 
because the game is about shifting the burden of proof and not about ultimate 
truths. 
The concept of blame game requires further clarification. In colloquial terms, one 
might describe the game as finger-pointing. As mentioned, at the heart of the 
game is the shifting of the burden of proof. To give an example which resonates 
with the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, if the intervention in the thought 
experiment never materialized on time, it is likely that many humanitarian 
organizations, advocacy groups, and academics would engage in arguing what 
should have been done, by whom, and who to blame for the inaction and the 
international community’s failure to live up to its responsibilities. Thus, for 
example the Security Council might be accused for the failure, and the burden of 
proof would be placed on the Council to justify its actions and omissions. 
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Naturally, the Council might not engage in a debate over its competency, but the 
discussion would most certainly proceed with or without the Council whether in 
the academia or outside it. One should note that I do not wish to imply that the 
Security Council should always engage the accusations that are levied on it. 
Rather, that the Council might be in a position to rebut the accusations. After all, 
most of the time the expectations on the Security Council are unrealistic, and 
second, as pointed out in the responsibility model and the earlier discussion about 
responsibility, the international community’s collective responsibility does not 
translate into the sole responsibility of the Council, especially when the Council 
has not been provided with the necessary means to meet the responsibilities and 
expectations levied on it. 
The “Varying Degrees of Responsibility” model can assist in the blame game in 
several ways. First, the model provides criteria for determining who should have 
acted and in what manner. Thus, it is possible to recognize who ought to have the 
burden of proof according to criteria, which are not random or arbitrary. Second, 
because the same criteria apply to the accusers and accused, the model can assist 
the actors with the burden of proof to make their cases concerning their courses 
of action or inaction. Moreover, because the model recognizes the individual 
situation and character of each actor, it allows for a variety of acceptable as well 
as unacceptable individualized answers. Thus, third, the model can assist in 
evaluating the accusations, justifications, or excuses. For example, by considering 
the degree of responsibility a given actor had, it is possible to evaluate an actor’s 
actions in light of that responsibility as well as the justifications or excuses the 
actor made for its actions or omissions. 
To some, it might seem odd to talk about justifications and excuses in relation to 
international politics. From the perspective of the mainstream theoretical 
traditions within the discipline, justification and excuses do not really play a role 
and are therefore unimportant or negligible. Yet, as discussed in chapter one, 
international actors justify their actions and excuse themselves, and it would 
seem odd not to consider this side of international politics. The justifications and 
excuses relate back to the concept of responsibility and also to its original 
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meaning as “I answer.” As discussed in chapter three, a natural reaction to this 
statement could be either “What do you answer for?” or “To whom do you 
answer?” Justifications and excuses answer the first question by clarifying the 
extent of the responsibility, while they similarly answer the second question 
based on their intended audiences. In other words, justifications and excuses are 
made in relation to specific events or actions, and they tell us much about the 
substance of the responsibility in question. Moreover, the justifications and 
excuses are directed at particular audiences, which in turn reveal the location of 
the responsible actor vis-à-vis those who are in a position to question the actor’s 
actions and omissions.  
Justifications and excuses invite questions about their acceptability. The next 
section focuses explicitly on justifications and excuses of inaction with the aim of 
evaluating their plausibility in light of the “Varying Degrees of Responsibility” 
model. 
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JUSTIFICATIONS OF INACTION 
As discussed above, the “Varying Degrees of Responsibility” model can assist in 
many ways, one being the evaluation of justifications of action and inaction. Since 
in grave humanitarian crises, states are usually unwilling to act, the justifications 
of inaction are of special interest. Other international actors, such as humanitarian 
organizations, are usually willing and keen on operating in grave humanitarian 
crises, but the same cannot be said of states. There are, naturally, many reasons 
for this inherent passivity of states. They, after all, operate according to different 
rules than humanitarian organizations, and the functioning of the international 
system limits state action. Yet, if the above chapters are correct in focusing on the 
international community’s collective responsibility in relation to grave 
humanitarian crises, one ought to give special attention to states, the backbone of 
the international community. Thus, in what follows, a state-centric approach is 
taken to the justifications of inaction in relation to grave humanitarian crises, such 
as in the thought experiment, by members of the international community  
First, a small clarification is necessary. When discussing justifications of inaction, I 
shall include both justifications and excuses for passive behavior and for not 
doing what the actor ought to have done. The shorthand “justifications of 
inaction” will refer to these justifications and excuses. I see no merit in 
distinguishing between justifications and excuses at this stage. Naturally, there is 
a difference between justifications and excuses. Justifications are things, such as 
facts or circumstances, which show an action or omission to be reasonable or 
necessary. On the other hand, excuses are explanations of a fault or offense given 
in the hope of being forgiven or understood, and they are thus closer to apologies 
than justifications. In order to avoid confusion as much as possible, I shall use 
justifications to cover both justifications and excuses, although some of the things 
that I refer to might be best described as excuses. Moreover, when discussing 
state behavior, it might be an exaggeration to talk about excuses, although as the 
next chapter will demonstrate, some state-leaders have apologized for their 
states’ commissions and omissions.325 
                                                             
325 This could be an interesting topic for further research, namely to know how common such 
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In general terms, one can easily imagine certain generic justifications of inaction. 
The first generic justification is related to uncertainty about the situation, lack of 
reliable information, incomplete information, and even possible misinformation. 
After all, various actors for reasons of their own might have an interest either in 
exaggerating or downplaying the situation, or in providing incorrect information. 
Also, as always, actors would have to make their decisions under time pressure 
and with incomplete information. Naturally, the situation would not be helped 
with there being possibly contradictory accounts and interpretations of the 
situation. Thus, a generic justification for inaction could be based on the 
incompleteness of knowledge about the situation, or on certain accounts and 
interpretations of the situation, which would justify inaction, as opposed to other 
accounts and interpretations, which would demand action. 
Moreover, some actors might have an interest in defining the situation according 
to their own interests. By trying to define for example the situation in the thought 
experiment as something other than genocide, an actor would engage in a higher 
order justification. In other words, the argument would be that there is in fact no 
requirement to act and thus justify inaction, because the situation does not 
command it. For instance, those members of the international community, who 
were unwilling to act, might engage in this kind of a gambit. Their argument 
would not deny the responsibility of the international community to act for 
example in cases of genocide, but that this particular situation did not constitute a 
case of genocide. This line of argument would naturally receive support from the 
perpetrators or supporters of the perpetrators. In some cases, the denial of the 
state in which genocide or acts of genocide were committed could be sufficient for 
defining the situation as other than genocide for a good period of time. After all, 
the government of a country should know what takes place within its borders, 
and in the event that there was no other contradicting evidence, the government 
would appear credible until new evidence emerged. 
A third kind of generic justification of inaction relates to the discussion whether 
the international community has a right to meddle in the internal affairs of states. 
It is likely that actors, who wish to justify inaction, would argue that the internal 
Chapter 4: The Responsibility Model and Genocide 
[167] 
 
affairs of sovereign states are beyond the international community’s concern, 
especially if there were no clear, undeniable evidence of full-scale genocide. At the 
heart of this justification are traditional perceptions of sovereignty and of a 
billiard-ball model of the international system. Sovereignty is to guarantee non-
interference among sovereigns. The twist introduced by the R2P report, however, 
undermines this traditional interpretation of sovereignty, and advances a claim 
that abusive states are in fact not properly sovereign. Thus, in order for their 
justifications of inaction to be credible, actors such as in the preceding paragraph, 
or actors who are concerned that an intervention would set a dangerous 
precedent at the international level, would have to be able to demonstrate how 
with the new understanding of sovereignty, as endorsed also by the General 
Assembly, the particular situation would fall outside the reasonable concern of 
the international community and its responsibility. 
A fourth generic justification of inaction could be inaction itself! Allow me to 
explain this better. Let us consider the latest stages in the thought experiment, 
where a resolution was passed calling for intervention in the crisis area. If there 
was no state, a coalition of states, or a regional organization to authorize, the 
operation would proceed under UN command, which would mean that the 
Secretary-General would attempt to gather the required contributions from 
member states in order for the operation to materialize. At this point, nothing 
could be easier for those actors who did not support the operation than to remain 
passive and by so doing encourage also others not to contribute to the operation. 
Alternatively, one might resort to doing everything “by the book,” in which case, 
as we all know, everything would take a great deal of time while giving the 
appearance that everything is being done correctly. 
It is quite possible that there could be more generic justifications of inaction apart 
from the four which were just discussed. Instead of attempting an exhaustive list 
of justifications, it is more important to focus on the likely resistance the idea of 
intervention would receive, even in genocide as we have seen during the recent 
years in Darfur, despite there being both good arguments for intervening and a 
recognized responsibility to act. More precisely, it is interesting to examine the 
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kinds of justifications which actors might use in order to evaluate their credibility 
and plausibility, as well as to gain insights to the mode of thinking and logic 
among international actors. 
In broad terms, one could divide the kinds of justifications of inaction into at least 
seven different categories. The first category includes justifications which in their 
essence deny the requirement to act in the first place. As mentioned above, for 
example by arguing that the situation was not genocide, one could make a case 
that the international community’s responsibility did not apply in this particular 
case. Thus, one justifies inaction by rejecting the premises of the requirement to 
act. 
The second category is composed of justifications, which agree that there is a 
responsibility to act, but deny that it falls on any particular actor, namely the actor 
justifying inaction. This argument could be made in several ways. For example, 
one might refer to one’s contributions or other humanitarian efforts, whether 
current or past, and argue that one has done or is doing one’s share already. 
Alternatively, one might engage in an argument denying that the international 
community’s responsibility is a collective responsibility, and that it could not be 
allocated or divided into shares on the individual level. Naturally, it would not be 
the fault of this actor that there is no substantial collective actor known as the 
international community, and simple membership in the community would not 
suffice for demands of action. Other ways to make this argument could include a 
combination of the two examples, or a denial that the collective responsibility 
applies in this particular case. 
Justifications of inaction in the third category are based on claims about the 
futility of action. Again, these justifications do not deny the existence of a 
responsibility to act, but they claim that it would make little difference whether 
one intervened, or perhaps that intervention would be counter-productive. If it in 
fact were true that intervention would be futile or counter-productive, 
committing it would be difficult to justify. Yet, there is no certain knowledge that 
this would be the case. In other words, the justifications in this category rely on 
unknown strings of events about the future. After all, it is not possible to know 
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precisely how one’s actions might influence the outcome of such complex 
situations as grave humanitarian crises. Certain, though, is that inaction would 
hardly alleviate the suffering. On the other hand, the same argument could be 
made by claiming that there are no guarantees that there will not be a return to 
the initial situation before intervention after the intervening forces have left. 
Alternatively, it could be argued that the intervening forces would be unable to 
stay in the country long enough to ensure such guarantees. In other words, this 
argument would resonate with for example Luttwak’s call to “give war a 
chance.”326 Not only would the international community’s resources be wasted, 
according to this argument, but certain conflicts ought to be allowed to proceed 
and reach a solution on their own for the good of the “long run” instead of 
suppressing them only to emerge later with a vengeance. 
The fourth category of justifications of inaction refers to the high risk which 
would be imposed on the interveners. Here, an analogy is made to the continental 
duty to rescue. In other words, although some legal systems require assisting 
strangers in their emergency, the duty does not require putting oneself in danger. 
In relation to inaction in a grave humanitarian crisis, this justification might 
recognize the responsibility and need to act, but it would argue that fulfilling the 
responsibility would demand too much and place the intervening, good-willing 
forces into a high risk situation. In other words, the argument claims that the 
particular situation would be beyond the call of duty. 
If actors use justifications of inaction from the fifth category, they point to the 
costs of action. Whether defined as financial costs, personnel costs, or otherwise, 
the justifications in this category emphasize that the fulfillment of the 
responsibility to act is simply too expensive, or that there would be a too high 
price to be paid in order to guarantee success. An example of this line of argument 
is the so-called Powell Doctrine, which argued during the early days of the 
Bosnian War that in order to stop the fighting 250,000 troops were necessary. At 
the heart of Powell’s thinking was the use of decisive force, which would leave no 
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doubts about the outcome.327 The cost of such a decisive force, which would 
virtually guarantee success, could, however, be too high depending on the 
situation and the goals, at least in the opinion of some actors. Moreover, due to the 
high costs, and especially if there was a high risk to the intervening forces, the 
political will to act would surely be missing in most cases. 
On the other hand, using justifications of inaction from the sixth category would 
attempt to disqualify oneself as a participant in the fulfillment of responsibility. 
Thus, for example one might argue that there was a conflict of interest, which 
would disqualify the particular claimant, namely oneself. Alternatively, one might 
illustrate how it was in the best interest of all if one would not act or if others 
acted instead. In colloquial terms, this category consists of strategies and 
justifications of “buck-passing.” 
Finally, the seventh category of justifications of inaction refers to some higher 
order or whole which would be endangered if a particular type of action was 
committed. For example, one might argue that the functioning of the international 
system is endangered if there is a proliferation of intervention. Here, one 
advances a utilitarian argument, where on the one hand one recognizes the 
responsibility or desirability to act, but on the other hand argues that the “greater 
good” is served by inaction. 
In sum, there can be many different kinds of justifications of inaction. They are 
arguments, which are variously constructed to serve particular purposes, and the 
manners in which they are constructed draw from various logics and warrants in 
order to support the conclusions. As mentioned, some of the justifications aim at 
disqualifying the particular actor or action without denying that there would be a 
responsibility to act, while other justifications disagree with the responsibility 
and aim to demonstrate that there either is no responsibility or that it does not 
apply in the particular case at hand. 
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The discussion has remained at an abstract level. In the following chapter I bring 
the discussion more to the level of practice by examining the justifications of 










RWANDA IN 1994 
AND JUSTIFICATIONS OF NON-INTERVENTION 
 




During the past two decades, two cases of non-intervention in grave humanitarian 
crises stand out. In 1994 Rwanda experienced genocide while the world stood by 
and watched thousands of bodies float down the Kagera River towards Lake 
Victoria.329 Ten years later, Sudan has been accused of genocide in its western 
region, Darfur.330 Despite UN Security Council resolutions calling for international 
action in Darfur,331 the situation could still be described as non-intervention by 
the international community.332 This chapter focuses on the justifications by the 
members of the international community for their inaction in such grave crises as 
Rwanda or Darfur in order to illustrate the abstract discussion of the previous 
chapter with a real-world case. 
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The case chosen for this chapter is Rwanda in 1994. The reason for choosing 
Rwanda is that it represents a shocking passivity on the international 
community’s part. What makes the case even more disturbing is the fact that UN 
troops were on the ground long before the genocide began, and how there exists 
evidence demonstrating that UN officials were aware of an imminent crisis, but 
still when the crisis unfolded, the UN troops withdrew and Rwandan Tutsi and 
Hutu moderates were left to care for themselves. While Darfur represents a 
somewhat similar case of non-intervention, for the purposes of illustrating the 
points made in previous chapters, the Rwandan case provides a more fertile 
ground. In other words, Rwanda provides perhaps the starkest background 
against which to reflect on the responsibility model and justifications of inaction. 
Similar issues would, however, be present also in other cases, such as in the case 
of Darfur. 
The main focus in this chapter is to recognize in the Rwandan case points at which 
the issue of responsibility emerged and the justifications, which relevant actors 
gave for their inaction. Three main actors have been chosen for this purpose, 
namely France, the United States, and the Security Council. As discussed in 
previous chapters, the Security Council is a central actor in grave humanitarian 
crises and in relation to the international community’s responsibility in such 
crises. France and the United States, on the other hand, are permanent members 
of the Security Council, and in addition both possessed the capability to intervene, 
even alone if necessary, and they were in a position to influence also other 
international actors. Moreover, whereas the United States did not have any 
strategic interests in Rwanda, the French at least behaved as if Rwanda was part 
of their zone of influence.  
Thus, the first part of this chapter outlines the case by providing a brief history of 
the events leading up to the genocide and its progression. The second part 
discusses the reactions of central actors to the crisis, namely France, the United 
States, and the United Nations and the Security Council. The third and final section 
examines the French and American justifications of inaction on the basis of the 
discussion in the previous chapter. 
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A HISTORY OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 
One of the most shocking crimes against humanity was leashed in April 1994 in 
Rwanda. For over an approximate period of three months, Rwanda turned into a 
killing field, in which up to a million people perished. The genocide took place in 
broad daylight with low technology weapons, such as machetes, achieving a five 
times greater kill rate than the Nazi extermination program during the Second 
World War. At the heart of the genocide was the Hutu extremists’ plan to solve 
political issues once and for all with the ruling Tutsi minority. In their plans, the 
Hutu leaders calculated that the international community would remain either 
indifferent to the killing, or that the international community’s reaction would in 
any case be too little and too late. 
Overall, the international community did very little to try to save the victims of 
the genocide. Before the start of the slaughter, there were UN forces in Rwanda 
but they lacked troops, equipment, and a necessary mandate to alleviate the 
situation. For the most part of the killing, the Security Council failed to recognize 
the situation as genocide and remained unwilling to authorize intervention until it 
was virtually irrelevant in order to stop it. Although there were some exceptions, 
generally speaking the international community remained passive. The 
international media, however, provided some coverage of the genocide but only 
towards the end of the three months, which the genocide lasted. Humanitarian 
non-governmental organizations, such as Médecins Sans Frontiéres, provided 
some humanitarian relief, but there was little they could do to stop the massacre. 
To understand the circumstances in 1994, one needs to begin a century earlier. 
The first Europeans to set foot in Rwanda were led by a German count, Adolf von 
Götzen, in 1894. Von Götzen was received at the Rwanda court, where he 
informed King Rwabugiri that at the Berlin conference of 1885 Rwanda had been 
awarded to Germany. The Germans, however, were impressed by the social order 
they encountered in Rwanda and decided not to impose direct rule but to rule the 
country through the monarchy and the existing structures. 
To the Europeans, Rwandan society appeared to contain three social groupings: 
the Hutu, the Tutsi, and the Twa. The Twa were the smallest minority 
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incorporating perhaps only one percent of the population. These pygmies lived as 
hunter-gatherers. In contrast, the vast majority were Hutu, who usually cultivated 
the soil and could be described as having Bantu features, while the Tutsi were 
normally taller and thinner, and herded cattle. It seems that the division between 
Hutu and Tutsi was not tribal, ethnic, or class-based in its original form. Both lived 
in the same communities, and shared a language and a culture. Intermarriage may 
not have been customary but it was neither a taboo. The ethnic element in this 
division was introduced only after Belgium replaced Germany in ruling Rwanda. 
After the First World War, German rule in Rwanda was substituted with Belgian 
rule. The change denoted also a departure from the German indirect governance 
to the Belgian direct rule of Rwanda and its society. Among the new measures, 
which the Belgians introduced, were the identity cards, which stated the 
“ethnicity” of the card-holder. At the time, racial theories, and especially theories 
of hierarchy of races on Darwinian grounds, were still popular in Europe, a point 
which was reflected in the Belgian mode of governance, and in the introduction of 
the identity cards. Racial theories served as the background for determining, 
which Rwandans “were” Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. Moreover, based on these racial 
theories, the Belgians concluded that the Tutsi were the natural leaders of the 
society, because their features were closer to European characteristics, and 
therefore, according to the Belgians, the Tutsi were also more developed and 
more suitable to govern the country than the other “races.” This favoritism 
towards the Tutsi was justified by the looming chaos which would allegedly 
result, if the “natural” position of the Tutsi was not embraced.333 Thus, the ground 
was laid for ethnic conflict decades later: the results “of this heavy bombardment 
with highly value-laden stereotypes for some sixty years ended by inflating the 
Tutsi cultural ego and crushing Hutu feelings until they coalesced into an 
aggressively resentful inferiority complex.”334 
The new social system with its racial division and inequalities did not result in 
deadly ethnic conflict until some thirty years later. One violent incident occurred 
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for example in March 1957, when a group of Hutu intellectuals published a 
document titled Notes on the Social Aspect of the Racial Native Problem in Rwanda, 
or the Bahutu Manifesto as it is also known. In the manifesto, the authors drew 
attention to the social inequality between the Hutu and the Tutsi, and to the 
unwarranted Tutsi minority dominance of the Rwandan society. Inadvertently, 
the manifesto did not demand the removal of ethnic identification from the 
identity cards, because it assisted in the statistical analysis on social inequalities. 
Little did the authors know at the time how the ethnic identification in the 
identity cards would make the execution of genocide faster and simpler. Despite 
some clashes after the publication of the manifesto, however, Rwanda remained 
relatively calm. 
At the turn to the 1960s, Belgium was losing her control thanks to the wave of 
decolonization. Because of this, Belgium launched a process in 1959 with the aim 
of establishing self-government in Rwanda. The transition from Belgian rule to 
self-governance was difficult. The early 1960s witnessed an increase in the 
amount of refugees and internally displaced people. In addition, the election 
results reflected more the social inequalities than concern for good governance or 
democracy. Unsurprisingly, the first elections were won by the strong Hutu party 
PARMEHUTU (Parti du Mouvement de l’Émancipation des Bahutus) while Tutsi 
parties suffered defeat. Amid all this, on January 28, 1961 the sovereign 
democratic Republic of Rwanda was declared independent. 
The declaration of independence, however, did not pacify Rwanda. Sporadic 
violence continued throughout the country, and many of the Tutsi were driven to 
exile. Some of these exiles organized themselves in Uganda and carried out raids 
against the now Hutu-controlled Rwanda. For the most part, guerrilla tactics were 
used in order to destabilize the newly elected Hutu government, yet in 1963, the 
exiles were able to launch an offensive, which was barely stopped before reaching 
the capital Kigali. The raids by the exiled Tutsi did little to alleviate the ethnic 
tension within Rwanda or the lives of the Tutsi still residing there. 
The transition to self-governed democracy proved difficult. Soon the young 
republic under Hutu leadership resembled more the old monarchy than a modern 
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democracy. President Kayibanda had learned from the earlier Tutsi leaders, and 
now he used their methods in order to solidify his grip on the country. President 
Kayibanda’s actions even encouraged a United Nations report to declare that the 
racial dominance and dictatorship of one party had been replaced by another.335 
Kayibanda’s party executed “purifications” and checks on ethnic quotas preferring 
the Hutu in employment, education, and virtually everywhere. The Hutu rule, 
however, was subject to a North-South tension, which resulted in Habyarimana 
seizing control of the country in a “bloodless” coup in 1973. 
In its early years, the Habyarimana regime may not have been popular but it was 
successful. The regime brought with it peace, stability, and development to 
Rwanda. The mortality rates were on the decline, whereas hygiene, medical care, 
and education were improving. Administrative control, however, remained among 
the tightest in the non-communist world.336 Much of the improvements were 
achieved with a reliance on foreign aid, which grew steadily throughout the 1970s 
to reach enormous proportions by the late 1980s. In comparison to the other 
parts of Africa, with its low crime rate and orderliness Rwanda appeared as an 
idyllic target for foreign aid. Dependency on foreign aid was naturally detrimental 
in the long term, while at the same time Habyarimana’s order rested on 
dangerous ideological foundations. Despite relative calmness in Rwanda, sporadic 
violence and raids by the Tutsi exiles continued. 
The early 1990s was a trying time for the government of Rwanda. The 
dependency on foreign aid had increased, especially because the domestic 
economy relied heavily on one main export, coffee, whose world price had fallen. 
Moreover, foreign aid, especially by the French, was politically linked to further 
democratization efforts. Thus, Habyarimana quickly moved the government from 
one-party system to a multi-party system, and with the constitutional change, 
Rwandan politics witnessed the birth of various parties among a colorful variety 
of groups and declared goals. For the present discussion, the most significant of 
these new parties was the CDR or Coalition pour la Defense de la République, a 
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radical, racist Hutu party. In addition, the constitutional change signaled also the 
emergence of a colorful press and radio covering all political flavors and touting 
their politically biased messages. The French were satisfied with at least the 
appearance of greater democracy in the country, but in reality Habyarimana’s 
party continued to rule. 
It was during this period of “liberalization” and “democratization” of Rwanda, 
when the exiled Tutsi army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), was lead to 
believe that the Rwandan political system was in such turmoil that a small push 
by an external force could collapse it. Thus, the RPF advanced into Rwanda with 
the aim of toppling the Habyarimana regime, but although successful at first, the 
RPF was soon forced to retreat before the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), 
which received help at least from Belgium, France, and Zaire. The RPF called for a 
protracted, popular long-term struggle against the Habyarimana regime and 
continued its efforts across the border from Uganda. Within Rwanda, though, the 
following years witnessed the acceleration of arrests and violence that sometimes 
could have been described as massacres. 
During the summer of 1992, there was a fragile progress towards peace between 
the RPF and the Rwandan government. A cease-fire was signed in Arusha, 
Tanzania, but the peace negotiations proceeded slowly. The process was not 
helped by the domestic opposition, which was destabilizing the Habyarimana 
regime. On the other side, the RPF remained unconvinced of Habyarimana’s 
sincerity. Despite the international community’s pressure, neither party was 
dedicated to the peace process. During the next twelve months or so, resistance to 
the whole peace process grew within Rwanda and served to strengthen the 
radical circles within the country. Many demonstrations and acts of violence were 
committed by these radical elements. Furthermore, at some point the cease-fire 
broke, and had it not been for the French intervention, the RPF may have been 
capable of achieving its aims without the need to continue the peace process. 
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Finally, a peace agreement known as the Arusha Accords was signed on August 4, 
1993.337 Two months later, in October, the United Nations Assistance Mission to 
Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established in order to monitor the implementation of the 
peace agreement. The UN forces, however, arrived into an explosive situation. The 
period between late 1993 and early 1994 was marked with violence and an 
increase in the number of internally displaced people. Moreover, there were no 
signs of implementing the transitional government as required by the Arusha 
Accords. With its few resources and a Chapter VI mandate, there was little that 
UNAMIR was able to achieve. For example, despite having been informed of a 
weapons cache in a supposedly weapons-free zone, of the training of militias, and 
of the drawing up of lists of Tutsi, the UN forces were not authorized to depart 
from the monitoring tasks and to seize the weapons cache.338 At this point, 
preparations for the coming genocide were clearly underway, but the UN forces 
may not have been fully aware of what was about to happen. 
The genocide aimed at killing all Tutsi and any resistance to the Hutu extremists 
began on April 6, 1994. President Habyarimana was returning with his plane from 
Dar-es-Salaam, where the Rwandan president had been once again pressured to 
implement the overdue Arusha Accords, when the plane was shot down just 
outside the Kigali airport perimeter killing President Habyarimana, President 
Ntaryamira of Burundi, seven senior members of the Rwandan government, and a 
crew of three Frenchmen. Ironically, the plane crashed in the garden of 
Habyarimana’s house.339 Within the hour after the presidential assassination, the 
Interhamve340 had organized roadblocks everywhere in Kigali and began 
searching houses. The Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines broadcasted 
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direct incitements to murder; organized groups began to work their way through 
death lists. The genocide had begun. 
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INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO RWANDA 
Having outlined a history of events leading up to the genocide, I now turn to some 
of the international responses to the events in Rwanda. Thus, I will not engage in 
describing how the genocide proceeded. Instead I discuss the manner, in which 
the international community acted and perceived the situation. Generally 
speaking, one could say that the international community’s response was one of 
indifference. Rwanda was abandoned to its fate except for a small UN contingent, 
the Médecins Sans Frontiérs, the Red Cross, and some other humanitarian 
groups.341 These actors, however, were incapable of making a difference in the 
well-organized massacre of up to a million people. The international actors, who 
could have altered the course of events, were for example the Security Council 
and certain key states, such as France and the United States.  
The importance of focusing on these two states is rather obvious. For one, France 
and the United States are both permanent members of the Security Council, and 
they thus hold significant influence over any Security Council proceeding. 
Moreover, in relation to Rwanda, both France and the United States are unique 
actors due to their intelligence gathering capabilities, general capabilities and 
resources, and in the case of France, due to her close ties with the government of 
Rwanda. Furthermore, these were perhaps also the two states, who voiced clearly 
their objections to any enforcement of the UN forces in Rwanda or to any action 
under Chapter VII powers, points which make these two states of special interest 
in this discussion about the justifications of non-intervention. 
The Security Council, on the other hand, has a unique position in international 
politics and in relation the international community’s responsibility in grave 
humanitarian crises as discussed in previous chapters. For a better discussion 
about the role of the Security Council, see for example chapter three above. 
In examining the international responses to the Rwandan genocide, I will focus on 
France, the United States, and the Security Council, respectively. Afterwards, I will 
discuss the justifications of inaction by the first two actors. 
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France had a special relationship with Rwanda. After all, being part of the 
Francophonie, Rwanda deserved a place in Coopération, the institutionalized way 
to extend French influence over the French-speaking parts of the world. Typical of 
French African politics were favoritism and close ties between the French and 
African heads of state.342 Organizationally speaking, important decisions 
concerning Africa were handled mainly by the French president and the Cellule 
Africaine, or the African Unit, but naturally also other parts of the French 
government were involved, most notably the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of 
Cooperation, of Defense, and of Finance as well as the Secret Service (DGSE). The 
special relationship between France and Rwanda and the multiplicity of the actors 
involved denoted also a complex relationship. For the purposes of the argument 
here, however, a simplified version of the relationship should suffice, because the 
focus is on the French reactions to the genocide rather than on the relationship 
itself. 
One might argue that French interest in Rwanda was mainly cultural. Rwanda had 
few resources of high value, and as an economic partner Rwanda was hardly 
noteworthy. As mentioned above, since her independence, Rwanda had become 
increasingly dependent on foreign aid. Clearly, the French had an interest in 
ensuring that their foreign aid efforts were not wasted in Rwanda, but still more 
important appears to have been ensuring French cultural and linguistic foothold 
in central Africa. The so-called Fashoda-syndrome played a part in French 
determination to guarantee the survival of the French language and cultural 
traditions in the Francophone world.343 There were of course geographic 
advantages in having close ties with Rwanda and keeping it as a base of 
operations. Being relatively calm, Rwanda proved a good location for monitoring 
southern Africa, while the country’s closeness to the Indian Ocean should not be 
overlooked either. Thus, the French perceived their interests to include keeping 
good relations and a presence in Rwanda for cultural, trade, and security reasons. 
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One might even say that France treated Rwanda as if it had been her former 
colony despite it having belonged to Belgium. 
During the 1990s, among other African countries, Rwanda faced an external 
pressure to further democratize its society and domestic politics. Despite a few 
decades of independence, the young republics in Africa, like Rwanda, were 
democratic only superficially. France was one of the sources of external pressure 
to democratize Rwanda, and she used economic incentives to this end. Thus, the 
earlier unconditional economic aid was made conditional upon democratic 
transformation and the introduction of a multi-party system. The Rwandan 
President Habyarimana was quick to recognize the new winds, and made the 
transition, or at least he created the appearance of a more democratic society in 
1990 by liberalizing the constitution to allow the creation of political parties. In 
practice, however, the Habyarimana regime continued to control the country. 
Whether a true transition to deeper democracy or not, the French seemed 
satisfied with Habyarimana’s changes. 
The military relationship between France and Rwanda was quite curious, perhaps 
even questionable, but most certainly not transparent. For example, French 
military forces were officially acting as military advisors in Rwanda, allegedly due 
to the RPF threat, but in practice it seems that French troops intervened heavily in 
the fight against the RPF aiding the FAR under Operation Noroit among others. 
Furthermore, there have been allegations that the French were involved not only 
in the training of the Presidential Guard and the regular armed forces but also in 
the training of the militias, at least indirectly. 
The close ties between French and Rwandan elites and the French presence in 
Rwanda have made France suspect for having been informed about the looming 
genocide. Daniela Kroslak, for example, argues that the French were concerned 
with the ethnic situation in Rwanda already since October 1990, and that some of 
the French officials in Rwanda had included predictions of a possible genocide 
almost four years prior to its beginning in their correspondence with the French 
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headquarters.344 These arguments are supported by the report issued on 
December 19, 1990, where the ambassadors of France, Belgium, and Germany as 
well as the representatives of the European Union in Rwanda imposed a warning 
of the possibility that the “rapid deterioration of the relations between the two 
ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi, runs the imminent risk of terrible 
consequences for Rwanda and the entire region.”345 Clearly, the message in the 
report may not have been referring to a plan to execute genocide, but the report 
or the details it enclosed should not have been ignored either. 
It might be impossible to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the French were 
aware of the plan to commit genocide in Rwanda. Some, however, argue that 
“demonstrably known to the French, the Rwandan authorities began gradually 
drawing up lists. These extermination lists included opponents and Tutsi.”346 
Whether such a demonstration is in fact impeccable, is doubtful. More certain is, 
however, that Paris was in a position to know about the developments in and 
around Kigali, and that France had inside information about the situation in the 
country. For example, by June 1991 the French were informed about Akazu, the 
powerful inner circle composed of Habyarimana’s wife and her associates, all of 
them Hutu extremists.347 Also, it is curious how on April 8, 1994, two days after 
the Rwandan presidential plane had been shot down, the French Operation 
Amaryllis arrived in Kigali in order to evacuate French and other foreign nationals. 
The evacuation expedition left Rwanda on April 14, and the curious thing about it 
is not its length or that it happened, but the fact that no such evacuation had taken 
place previously despite there having been incidents of mass violence and 
massacres. Furthermore, telling of the French special relationship with Rwanda 
and its elites is how during the Operation Amaryllis French troops were able to 
move freely in Kigali unlike UNAMIR troops, who constantly had to negotiate their 
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way around the capital.348 Thus, although it might be impossible to prove anything 
conclusive, the French certainly appeared to have been aware of something 
unusual in April 1994, even if they had not known that genocide was about to 
begin. 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is not necessary to demonstrate that the French 
were completely aware of the situation in Rwanda, a task which might prove 
impossible. It is sufficient to conclude that the French were clearly involved in 
Rwanda and Rwandan politics enough to be considered to have access to inside 
information, which other international actors did not have in comparison. In other 
words, the French were in a position to collect information on the ground and in a 
manner, which for example other members of the Security Council were unable to 
do. Thus, while other members of the Security Council relied heavily on the 
Secretary-General and his briefings on the situation in Rwanda, the French had 
access to the policy-makers and perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda. This 
dimension should be kept in mind for the later discussion about the Security 
Council in relation to the situation in Rwanda. 
Despite their obviously privileged access in Rwanda and therefore privileged 
knowledge about the situation, the “French authorities insisted that the massacres 
were the result of the renewed war.”349 Only on May 15, over five weeks after the 
genocide began, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alain Juppe, called the 
atrocities genocide. It took another month, debates in the Security Council, and 
the pressure of the international media before France announced her plan to 
launch a humanitarian mission to Rwanda on June 15. The very next day, 
Operation Turquoise was underway to Rwanda. One explanation for the rapid 
deployment of French troops is the existence of French rapid reaction forces that 
were set up in August 1993, and which are capable of intervening on a short 
notice almost anywhere in Africa from their bases in France. Moreover, France 
had approximately 8,400 troops already in Africa at the time, of which some 
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already in Rwanda. Furthermore, naturally the decision to intervene had been 
made some time before the announcement was made, thus giving time for 
preparations for the deployment. In sum, the rapid deployment of French troops 
can be explained without much embarrassment to France. More awkward for 
France is the fact that when the French troops arrived, the perpetrators of the 
genocide welcomed them, because they thought France had come to assist them 
against the advancing RPF forces. 
During the five weeks or so before the French operation, France insisted that 
Rwanda was experiencing a renewal of the civil war and an outbreak of the age-
old ethnic hatred, which unleashed the killing of Hutu by the Tutsi and vice versa. 
Given the special position France held in Rwanda, and given her information-
gathering capabilities and access, why was France not better informed, if she 
earnestly perceived the situation in that manner? One explanation could refer to 
the complexity of the French relationship with Rwanda and the complexity of the 
French organizational structure. The fact that we might now discover some 
documents, which would be embarrassing for the French government at the time, 
does not mean that the decision-makers were informed of all the details or of all 
the reports that had been made. Proverbially speaking, it is not unusual in such 
complex organizations as the government of such a large country that the left 
hand does not know what the right hand is doing. Yet, it is likely, if France was 
better informed than what she claimed, that she neither had the inclination nor 
interest to learn more about the actual reality, or that she preferred not to make 
her privileged information public. 
The French had a clear interest in trying to uphold the Arusha Accords and what 
was left of the Habyarimana regime. After all, France had supported Rwanda in 
general against the RPF, which was now advancing into Rwanda, and she had also 
sold and arranged sales of arms to Habyarimana’s regime and continued to do so 
even after the beginning of April, 1994.350 The French had invested in Rwanda, 
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and their involvement in the country had been considerable. France was unwilling 
to abandon her partners so easily.351 The RPF, however, continued their advance, 
and when its victory over the FAR forces seemed more likely unless French troops 
intervened directly, France insisted on the cease-fire policy, the Arusha Accords, 
and that the atrocities were the result of the renewed civil war. From the 
perspective of France, and if neglecting all moral considerations, holding on to the 
Arusha Accords was the only way to save the investments she had made in 
Rwanda. Supporting the Arusha Accords at the time, however, meant supporting 
the genocidal regime in Rwanda, a point which was either neglected, ignored, or 
accepted. 
In the Security Council, France continued to insist on the civil war interpretation 
of events until mid-May. Just like the United States, France was careful not use 
terminology, which mentioned or referred to genocide. A reference to genocide 
committed by the interim government would have made it virtually impossible 
for France to support the Arusha Accords. It would have also encouraged the 
whole international community to take a different stance concerning the situation 
in Rwanda. Thus, being a member of the Security Council, and with known 
connections to Rwanda, French statements carried a special weight in the Council. 
From her actions and statements within the Security Council, it is evident that 
France appears to have been determined to keep the information about the 
situation in Rwanda unclear, if not to confuse it. To give an example, even after the 
UN Human Rights Commissioner Lasso and the French Foreign Minister Juppe 
had called Rwanda a genocide, on June 8 the French Ambassador to the UN Jean-
Bernard Mérimée addressed the Security Council with the following words: 
My delegation recalls that there can be no military solution, and we urge 
the Rwandese parties to heed the voice of reason and tolerance, to 
conclude a cease-fire agreement, and to resume the dialogue that must 
lead to national reconciliation.352 
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If considering the French influence within the Security Council, it is a small 
wonder that the Council continued to describe the conflict as “mindless violence” 
being of “ethnic and tribal in origin” and having been “initiated by unruly 
elements.”353 These descriptions created an image of another “Somalia,” whose 
shadow still loomed large in the minds of the members of the Security Council. 
One could draw the conclusion that France considered that the international 
community had little business in “failed states,” especially if they were part of her 
sphere of influence. Yet, France did not advocate a complete withdrawal of UN 
forces from Rwanda but she had no objections either to the significant reduction 
of UNAMIR as commanded by Resolution 912. 
In mid-May, however, France committed a volte-face recognizing that genocide 
was taking place, or at least the French Foreign Minister Juppe called it genocide. 
Also, France began to call for international intervention in Rwanda. This reversal 
reflected the pressure the French government faced both at home and 
internationally, for example in the Security Council, to alleviate the undeniable 
humanitarian crisis. Now, Ambassador Mérimée argued that “with a humanitarian 
catastrophe of such magnitude the international community could not fail to 
act”354 and requested a Chapter VII mandate for Resolution 918. In the Security 
Council, however, France appears to have been referring to the civil war and its 
effects, and not the genocide, when talking about the humanitarian catastrophe. 
At this point, one heavily doubts French sincerity to act, because despite calling 
for the re-enforcement of UNAMIR in the form of UNAMIR II, France offered no 
troops, equipment, or financial contributions. Nevertheless, a month later, in the 
daily Libération on June 16, Foreign Minister Alain Juppe acknowledged a 
responsibility to intervene in Rwanda,355 and soon thereafter France intervened 
with Operation Turquoise. Even at this point, French sincerity is questionable, 
because her intervention coincided with the imminent victory of the RPF forces as 
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they drew closer to Kigali. Kroslak, for example, has argued that France was 
merely trying to secure her back and to achieve a “moral high ground in light of 
the international passivity that in some respects it had helped engineer.”356 
France and her statements about the situation in Rwanda had surely an effect on 
the international community. Her continued reference to the re-emergence of civil 
war, where admittedly bad things were committed, must have carried some 
authority and convinced at least some members of the international community, 
especially those who had no better knowledge and no interest in knowing any 
better, that this was Africa, where civil war was rife, and that there was in this 
sense nothing exceptional about Rwanda. As the French President Mitterrand 
wondered: “What can France do when local chiefs decide to settle their problems 
with machetes – After all it is their country.”357 Thus, France continued to signal 
that Rwanda ought to be treated as another case of African civil war, which was 
caused by tribal conflict. Quite clearly, a response to the outbreak of civil war, 
where already an internationally brokered peace agreement existed, was to be 
different from a response to an ongoing genocide. In other words, by insisting on 
the civil war interpretation, France attempted to exclude certain courses of action 
and the responsibility of the international community. In this, France was by no 
means the only significant member of the international community, as the 
following discussion on the United States and her reactions to Rwanda reveals. 
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THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
In 1992, the United States was one of the key actors who pressured the RPF and 
the Rwandan government into dialogue, which resulted in the Arusha Accords. 
The United States seems to have placed much hope on the Arusha Accords and the 
peace process, perhaps even too much to have been blinded by it. 
If putting the American position to Rwanda in 1994 in a wider context, one should 
remember that Somalia cast a shadow on any “humanitarian” action the United 
States considered in Africa, or elsewhere. It had been only in October 1993, when 
eighteen US rangers were killed and many others wounded and captured in 
Somalia as a result of an ambitious, “humanitarian” mission gone wrong. Not only 
was Somalia a humiliation to the Americans, because of their quick withdrawal 
from the country in front of television cameras, but it also shaped the way in 
which any future humanitarian missions would be considered. For example, the 
Congress prepared a Peace Powers Act making it difficult for the American 
president to commit troops to any UN missions. The message could not have been 
clearer: “No American should be asked to sacrifice his or her life for a purpose not 
related to the defense, or in the interests of, the United States.”358 Moreover, 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) No. 25 confirmed that President Bill Clinton 
was equally unwilling to commit troops to UN missions lacking American 
interests. At the time, the UN was charged with lavish use of funds and with being 
inefficient, if not even corrupt, and the White House sought to demonstrate to its 
domestic audience that it could be tough on the United Nations. 
To give an example of the timing, Somalia and the deaths of US rangers occurred 
only two days before the Security Council was due to vote on peace-keeping 
mission in Rwanda. Quite naturally, the Americans were less than keen on 
another UN peace-keeping mission in Africa because of their recent experience in 
Somalia.  
The Mogadishu experience, however, was only one reason among many why the 
United States opposed further UN missions. For one, the UN was already 
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overstretched. At the time, there were more peace-keepers than ever in the 
history of UN peace-keeping, and they were also dealing with more missions than 
ever before. This naturally denoted a heavy strain on the UN members for troops, 
materiel, and finances. Second, the United States had large national deficits and 
the government seemed to face an apparently hostile domestic audience to any 
future financial liabilities. Another peace-keeping operation would have required 
the United States to dig deeper in her pockets, something which may have been 
difficult to justify to her domestic audience, especially when American interests 
were not directly involved. Moreover, as the records show on American debt to 
the UN, the United States was hardly willing to pay even her normal UN dues on 
time, and she was already liable for approximately thirty percent of the costs of 
twelve peace-keeping missions.359 
On the other hand, in the fall of 1993, Rwanda appeared to promise an easy peace-
keeping mission that could allow the White House to show to its domestic 
audience how it was putting restraints on UN spending, while at the same time 
bring the UN much needed positive publicity. After all, there was a cease-fire, a 
road map for peace, and all the other signs, which indicated that a traditional 
peace-keeping mission would be enough. Thus, from the American point of view, 
it made sense to agree to the peace-keeping mission in Rwanda despite Somalia, 
just as long as Rwanda was not to become expensive or demand the commitment 
of American troops. Restrictions on spending would not have hurt the mission, if 
it was an easy mission, but they would give the appearance that the American 
administration was tough on the UN. Naturally, if the mission proved successful, 
there would be another democracy in Africa, which could be touted as an 
American foreign policy success. 
On the day before the genocide began, the Security Council met in order to review 
the peace-keeping mission UNAMIR. The general position of the United States was 
that the UN forces should be withdrawn, if a broad-based transitional government 
was not established immediately. It was argued that the UN must be selective in 
its missions, a general feeling shared by the American Congress, which was quite 
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hostile to UN missions at the time.360 Moreover, if the Rwandan parties were 
unwilling to commit to the peace process, the international community could not 
force them. In other words, if there was no peace to keep or a working cease-fire, 
the UN peace-keepers were not where they should have been. 
The position, which the United States took regarding Rwanda, was evidently 
based on the assumption that the outbreak of violence in Rwanda was due to the 
renewal of civil war. Yet, it seems odd that the United States, or at least some of 
the high-ranking members of the administration, was not aware that one of the 
parties to the peace process was not willing to share power as instructed by the 
Arusha Accords. Admittedly, despite having been one of the peace brokers, the 
United States may not have held Rwanda to be on top of her agenda, especially 
with so many other concerns, such as the Balkan situation in Europe. 
Nevertheless, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the Department 
of Defense, James Woods, claims that America knew not only of the unwillingness 
to share power by the CDR, but that there was knowledge about a plan by the 
Hutu extremists.361 If this was the case, one has to question the United States’ 
insistence on the Arusha Accords. 
The United States did not resist, however, when the Security Council extended 
UNAMIR’s mandate until the end of July. Yet, the situation was to be reviewed in 
six weeks time after the extension. The condition for UNAMIR’s extension was the 
establishment of the transitional institutions as described in the Arusha Accords, 
and if they were not established, UNAMIR was to withdraw from Rwanda. From 
the perspective of the planners of the genocide, this was good news. For them, 
there was clearly no reason to even attempt an appearance of continuing with the 
peace process, because in the absence of the transitional institutions the UN 
forces would be withdrawn leaving the perpetrators to execute their plans freely. 
Furthermore, the Security Council signaled with its decision that the international 
community would not be willing to risk casualties in Rwanda. Thus, 
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unsurprisingly, President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down the next day, and 
genocide was well underway by nightfall. 
One day after the genocide commenced, the United States began to close her 
embassy in Kigali. The Americans, like the French, had not taken such measures 
before, despite there having been many occasions of serious unrest in the capital 
of Rwanda. By April 9, all American citizens had been evacuated from Rwanda.362 
The general feeling in America was perhaps well expressed by the Republican 
leader in the Senate, Robert Dole: “I don’t think we have any national interests 
here – I hope we don’t get involved there. I don’t think we will. The Americans are 
out. As far as I’m concerned in Rwanda, that ought to be the end of it.”363 Apart 
from such statements, as some have argued, there seems to have been a strange 
silence in the United States regarding Rwanda.364 
At the international level, the United States associated Rwanda with other failed 
states, in which civil war or ethnic conflict explained the events. Somalia had been 
one such failed state scenario, and America was unwilling to become involved in 
solving other peoples’ conflicts, something which could easily turn into a disaster 
for the United States. Moreover, having decided to cut UN spending, the United 
States was equally unwilling to fund any adventurous efforts at peace-keeping. 
Thus, America began to push for UNAMIR’s withdrawal from Rwanda. The 
American delegation to the Security Council, however, made no demands to 
remove UNAMIR completely. As a consequence, Resolution 912, which was 
passed on April 21, reduced UNAMIR to a symbolic presence and authorized a 
troop of 270 soldiers to remain in Kigali. Naturally, the United States could have 
insisted on a complete withdrawal with her veto, but for reasons of her own, she 
agreed to Resolution 912, despite being openly convinced that peace-keeping was 
untenable in Rwanda. 
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At the domestic level, the end of April witnessed an increase in the details the 
media had about the situation in Rwanda. As a consequence, the American State 
Department was put under pressure by journalists about what was now being 
called genocide in some of the media and by some members of the international 
community. The State Department’s answer, as that of the whole Clinton 
administration, was unequivocal: Rwanda was not genocide. The American 
administration denied the genocide and avoided any reference to the term. 
For some, American behavior was hypocritical. At this point it started to be 
somewhat obvious that the situation in Rwanda was an example of a grave 
humanitarian crisis, even if the reason for it may have been unclear. Comparisons 
were made with the Balkans or with Somalia, and the conclusion was that 
America was inconsistent, if not hypocritical, in her foreign policy. The answer to 
such accusations was that America needed to be selective, as explained on May 5 
by Anthony Lake, a national security advisor, because the United States could not 
solve other nations’ problems or build states for them.365 The Clinton 
administration had introduced criteria for choosing which kind of crises the 
United States was willing to address. These criteria were listed in the Presidential 
Decision Directive No. 25, and Rwanda failed on all the points on the list except 
for one. From this perspective, the situation was regrettable, but there was 
nothing that the United States could or should do. In arguing in this manner, the 
United States did not object to other states taking action; the United States held 
that any future action in Rwanda should be taken by African states or by the 
Organisation of African Unity, the contemporary African Union. The United States 
remained silent, however, when some African states volunteered to contribute 
troops in exchange for them being outfitted with Western equipment.366 
On May 13, the Security Council discussed the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s 
proposal to establish UNAMIR II. The United States objected to the proposal. The 
main reasons behind the American objection were the unclear concept of 
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operations, vague duration of the mission, and general costs of the operation. 
Regardless of American objections, she did not use her veto. On May 17, 
Resolution 918 established UNAMIR II. In practice, however, little had changed. It 
would take months before UNAMIR II would be on the ground in Rwanda. 
During the debate within the Security Council, which eventually led to Resolution 
918, the UN field commander in Rwanda, Roméo Dallaire, received a call from 
Senator Paul Simon. As a consequence of this telephone call, Senators Simon and 
Jeffords addressed a letter to the White House asking for the United States to 
approve the UN plan to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda. On June 9, or 
twenty-seven days later, President Clinton officially replied that he agreed with 
the Senators that there ought to be some action, but that the United States had 
already done a good deal: America had contributed financially, logistically, and in 
other material terms. Moreover, America had supported the arms embargo on 
Rwanda, the negotiated peace settlement, and the UN mission. Furthermore, 
America was committed with a sum of 50 million dollars to assisting the refugees 
on the Rwandan border with Tanzania and Zaire, while senior American 
government officials were in almost daily contact with regional leaders.367 
Evidently, the argument was that America was already doing more than her share. 
At the same time, however, the United States’ regular UN budget arrears were 
between $250 and $530 million,368 while the UN was owed approximately $1,286 
million by all member states combined for the peace-keeping operations.369 The 
United States was one of the largest debtors in this budget. Thus, financially 
speaking, America was clearly not doing her share. On the ground, America was 
also not doing much. An important contribution would have been for example 
ensuring that there was an end to the racist RTLMC broadcasts, which also 
informed the perpetrators where to find survivors in order to finish the job. 
When the time came, the United States supported the French Operation Turquoise. 
From the American perspective, the French operation was somewhat of a 
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blessing. The Security Council had sanctioned the formation of UNAMIR II, which 
in practice was a request for the United States to sponsor at least financially the 
UN operation. Operation Turquoise, on the other hand, was completely a French 
operation, thus incurring no costs on other states, but since it was to begin the 
work reserved for UNAMIR II, it reflected well on the Security Council. In other 
words, it appeared that the Security Council, and thus also the United States, was 
intervening, because it had authorized the French operation. 
Things changed rapidly, however, with images of refugees on American television 
screens. Swiftly, the Clinton administration “found” some $300-400 million for 
aiding the refugees, and it also authorized up to 4,000 military personnel to 
reinforce and secure the hundreds of American civilian and independent relief 
workers on the ground. It is telling, how once the decision was made, it took only 
three days for the American troops to be on the ground, distributing for example 
fresh water in Goma. The relief force, however, differed greatly with its mandate 
from what any intervention force in the genocide would have had; the relief force 
was to secure primarily themselves and under no circumstances to engage in any 
activities resembling peace-keeping or peace-enforcing.  
Thus, the United States changed her stance quite radically during the crisis. She 
was unwilling to engage in efforts at state-building or in intervening in a civil war, 
as Rwanda was described, whether in earnest or for other reasons. When the 
question was about helping refugees on the borders, however, the United States 
showed remarkable charity and determination, although some have criticized the 
efforts, because the perpetrators were able to hide in the refugee camps. 
Nevertheless, one can only speculate the impact a similar show of determination 
could have had on the course of events at the beginning of the genocide. Surely, 
had the international community, or just the United States, acted strongly in the 
beginning, the unsure planners of genocide would have made other calculations, 
and perhaps the deaths of hundreds of thousands could have been avoided, as one 
study has concluded.370 
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THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
The reactions to the Rwandan genocide by the Security Council, and the Council’s 
actions, have been under careful examination by several investigators. For 
example, the Independent Inquiry chaired by the former Swedish Prime Minister 
Ingvar Carlsson was sanctioned by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in March 
1999.371 The Inquiry began its work in June 1999 with a primary objective of 
examining and assessing what had happened, and making recommendations for 
the future on the basis of the events relating to Rwanda in 1994. Despite being 
sanctioned by the UN, the Inquiry produced a report, which is one of the most 
comprehensive and critical reports on Rwanda and the Security Council, despite 
its diplomatic overtones. 
The Security Council’s involvement in Rwanda, at least in relation to the events 
relating to the genocide, began with the Arusha Peace Agreement, which was 
signed by the government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) in 
August 1993 and became known as the Arusha Accords. The peace agreement 
included the introduction of a neutral international force to supervise the 
implementation of the peace process. For the United Nations, this was seen as an 
opportunity. Rwanda promised to be an easy, traditional peace-keeping 
operation, where success might be achieved with minimum effort. Since the 
recent debacle in Somalia, the Security Council was unwilling to forgo such an 
opportunity, when it convened to discuss Resolution 872 establishing the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The shadow of Somalia and 
the Mogadishu experience, however, continued to haunt the Security Council and 
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its influential members, despite Rwanda proving to be a completely different kind 
of a grave humanitarian crisis. 
The Resolution 872 establishing UNAMIR on October 5, 1993 was adopted 
unanimously by the Security Council. Yet, the UN force lacked both the strength 
that had been requested by the joint RPF-Rwandan government delegation and 
the mandate that was suggested by the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. Perhaps 
most notably, UNAMIR’s mandate did not cover assisting in the recovery of arms, 
and instead of the requested force of 4,260 peace-keepers, the total strength of 
UNAMIR was 2,548 military personnel. Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire was 
appointed Force Commander of UNAMIR, and he arrived in Kigali on October 22 
in order to lead the advance party. On November 23, Dallaire sent the UN 
headquarters in New York a draft set of rules of engagement, but apparently he 
never received a response regarding them, a point which was to result in some 
confusion later about the activities in which UNAMIR could engage. 
It seems that the United Nations, or at least parts of the organization, was aware 
of some early signs of genocide or of at least an impending grave humanitarian 
crisis. For example, already in April 1993, the Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Ndiaye, published a report, in which Mr. 
Ndiaye “determined that massacres and a plethora of other serious human rights 
violations were taking place in Rwanda.”372 Yet, despite the report’s indication of 
possible genocide in Rwanda, it seems that Mr. Ndiaye’s warnings were ignored 
by the key actors of the UN system.373 Moreover, the report has not received much 
attention even after the genocide, although for example the so-called January 11 
Cable by Dallaire has been hailed as an early warning of the looming genocide. 
Dallaire sent this cable on January 11, 1994 to the Military Adviser to the 
Secretary-General, Major-General Maurice Baril. In the cable, Dallaire states how 
he has come into contact with a top-level informant, who has provided a number 
of disturbing key information. Three most important pieces of information 
provided by the informant were: one, the strategy to provoke the withdrawal of 
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the Belgian battalion by killing Belgian soldiers serving in UNAMIR; two, the 
Interhamwe had trained 1,700 men, scattered throughout Kigali, with orders to 
register all Tutsi for extermination; and three, Dallaire received information about 
a weapons cache, which the informant was willing to show UNAMIR. With 
hindsight, this cable has been considered as a sure sign of a plan to commit 
genocide. 
Dallaire’s cable, however, did not receive the response he had hoped. Despite 
having been addressed only to Baril, the cable was shared among other senior 
officials, including Under-Secretary-General Kofi Annan, although it seems that 
the cable never reached Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. Kofi Annan’s reaction, 
recorded in a document signed by the Assistant-Secretary-General Riza, was 
addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Booh Booh. In 
this document, Kofi Annan agreed that the information in Dallaire’s cable should 
be handled with caution, but that UNAMIR was to take no action until clear 
guidance was given by the UN headquarters.374 The reply to this communication 
from Kigali described a meeting between Dallaire, Booh Booh’s political advisor, 
and the Rwandan Prime Minister Designate, and how in the meeting Dallaire was 
prepared to pursue the seizing of the weapons cache, or at least to try such an 
operation. Again, Kofi Annan’s reply, signed by Riza, stressed that the operation 
described by Dallaire would go beyond UNAMIR’s mandate, and that no such 
action was sanctioned. Thus, instead of taking action directly, Booh Booh and 
Dallaire were instructed to inform President Habyarimana of the weapons cache, 
so that he could deal with it. When he was told about the weapons cache, 
President Habyarimana assured the UN representatives that the matter would be 
looked into. Yet, it seems that there was no follow-up by UNAMIR or the UN in 
general, whether President Habyarimana in fact ordered the confiscation of the 
weapons.375 
During the early months of 1994, the peace process was delayed. The Arusha 
Accords had been agreed upon, but their implementation was not proceeding as 
                                                             
374 Ibid. 
375 Ibid. 
Chapter 5: Rwanda and Justifications of Non-Intervention 
[201] 
 
planned. The Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali continued to assure President 
Habyarimana of the United Nations’ support to the peace process, but he also 
warned the President that the UN would be obliged to withdraw its presence, if 
there was no progress in the implementation of the Arusha Accords. Evidently, 
this information was used by the masterminds behind the genocide, but from the 
perspective of the United Nations, this was standard procedure. After all, UNAMIR 
was a peace-keeping mission, not a peace-making operation, requiring thus first of 
all a peace to keep and depending heavily on the political road map to peace as 
agreed to at Arusha. It appears that the UN was quite unaware or ignorant of the 
internal political struggles within the Rwanda government and between it and the 
opposition, not to mention the radical elements of the Rwandan elites, who were 
unwilling to share power. Furthermore, relatively speaking Rwanda was still 
faring well in comparison to other hot spots of the world, and thus the UN’s 
primary attention was focused elsewhere. 
In mid-February, however, in a presidential statement, the president of the 
Security Council expressed deep concern about the security situation in 
Rwanda.376 The presidential statement was addressed to the parties to the Arusha 
Accords and encouraged them to stabilize the country and continue with the 
peace process. Despite contrasting information from the field, from for example 
Dallaire or Booh Booh, it appears that the unrest in Rwanda was automatically 
considered to have been caused by the friction between the signatory parties to 
the Arusha Accords. Furthermore, it seems that the Security Council’s only 
response to the delays in the peace process was to reiterate the “threat” of 
withdrawing UN presence from the country, unless progress was made. Such 
statements were hardly threats from the genocide planners’ perspective or 
incentives to commit to the peace process for those who would be on the losing 
side in the process. In fact, the UN and the Security Council undermined their own 
position and played into the hands of those opposing the peace process. 
At the end of March 1994, the Security Council extended UNAMIR’s mandate 
reluctantly yet unanimously. The extension was slightly less than four months 
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with a possible review after six weeks from the extension.377 The Secretary-
General had initially suggested an extension of six months, but this proposal was 
not favored by the key members of the Security Council. The four-month 
extension was already generous by the Security Council, because it seems that at 
that point, the Council was already willing to abandon Rwanda. Yet, it was still 
hoped that with a little more time the peace process would pick up some wind, 
progress could be made, and that the UN efforts had not been wasted but that 
they would result in a success. On the other hand, there appears to have been no 
contingency plans besides withdrawal. From what has been possible to learn 
about the events, it seems that the Security Council did not entertain even the idea 
of the crisis being something other than a slow peace process. 
During the evening of April 6, 1994, the Rwandan President Habyarimana’s plane 
was shot down; this signaled the start of the genocide. An hour after the plane had 
crashed in Kigali, UNAMIR was under full alert.378 Dallaire and Booh Booh held 
high-level meetings with Rwandan government officials during that night, while 
UNAMIR began to receive a number of calls for protection from ministers and 
other politicians. To give an example, the Rwandan Prime Minister sought refuge 
at the United Nations Volunteer compound. The acting designated security officer 
of the compound, Mr. Le Moal, called Riza to inform him that the use of force 
might be necessary in order to protect the Prime Minister. Riza, however, 
confirmed that the rules of engagement did not allow UNAMIR to fire unless it was 
fired upon. As a consequence, within a couple of hours, Rwandan soldiers entered 
the compound and shot the Prime Minister.379 
During the early hours of the morning of the first day of genocide, Belgian peace-
keepers, who had been stationed outside the Prime Minister’s home, were 
confronted by Rwandan soldiers, who eventually disarmed the Belgian soldiers 
and transported them to Camp Kigali, where they were brutally killed. Later, the 
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bodies of the Belgian soldiers were left at the Kigali hospital morgue. Dallaire had 
attempted to save the soldiers, but his efforts were frustrated and at 21.00 o’clock 
of the same evening he was informed of their deaths.380 
The brutal killing of the ten Belgian peace-keepers sparked the withdrawal of the 
Belgian contingent, just like the genocide planners had thought. The Secretary-
General was informed of the Belgian desire to withdraw on April 12, and he 
conveyed the information to the Security Council in a letter on April 13. In the 
letter, the Secretary-General explained that UNAMIR’s position would become 
untenable, if the Belgian contingent was not replaced by another equally well-
trained and well-equipped force. On the same day, the Belgian Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations addressed the Security Council in a letter 
describing the massacres and chaos in Rwanda arguing for the suspension of the 
whole UNAMIR operation. The Belgian government used also other means to 
advocate the withdrawal of the UN forces in Rwanda.381 
With the Belgian announcement to withdraw, the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) outlined two main options how to continue without the 
Belgian contingent. The first option included maintaining UNAMIR in Rwanda 
without the Belgian contingent for three weeks, but this option relied heavily on 
several conditions, which the peace agreement parties were supposed to facilitate. 
The second option was to withdraw UNAMIR immediately from Rwanda except 
for a small, symbolic, political presence. The Force Commander Dallaire expressed 
his support for the first option, while when the Assistant-Secretary-General Riza 
presented both options to the Security Council on April 14, a combination of the 
two options was preferred by the Secretary-General.382 Nigeria had suggested a 
draft resolution the day before. In the draft, UNAMIR would have been 
strengthened, but by April 15, Nigeria had changed her mind and favored option 
number one. The United States opposed prolonging UNAMIR’s presence in 
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Rwanda, but later she agreed with the United Kingdom and Russia that the second 
option was acceptable. 
By April 19, the UN Secretariat had changed its proposal for a course of action in 
relation to UNAMIR. The draft proposal presented to the Security Council included 
not only the earlier options of complete withdrawal or leaving behind only a small 
presence, but also the possibility of strengthening UNAMIR’s forces and mandate. 
Two days later, on April 21, the Security Council, however, decided unanimously 
to reduce UNAMIR to approximately 270 soldiers. In the resolution authorizing 
the troop reduction the Security Council states that it was “appalled at the ensuing 
large-scale violence in Rwanda, which has resulted in the death of thousands of 
innocent civilians.”383 Moreover, Resolution 912 called for a cease-fire, made 
references to the Arusha Accords, and demanded a cessation of hostilities 
between the government forces and the RPF. From the official UN perspective at 
this point, Rwanda experienced the renewal of civil war, not genocide or anything 
even remotely related to genocide. Thus, the UN’s role was to be strictly neutral. 
Three weeks or so into the genocide, at the end of April, the Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali recommended the reversal of the earlier decisions. More 
importantly, Boutros-Ghali suggested abandoning the notion of UN neutrality and 
seeking ways, including forceful measures, to end the massacres against civilians 
in Rwanda.384 Still at this point, using the term “genocide” could not be agreed 
upon by the Security Council, and the following weeks after Boutros-Ghali’s 
suggestion witnessed discussions and exchanges of letters in the Security Council 
concerning the future of Rwanda and what the UN should do in order to alleviate 
the crisis. The main suggestion, which was circulated in the Council, incorporated 
the establishment of a force of 5,500 troops with a revised mandate. Moreover, 
the United States suggested creating protective zones along the Rwandan border. 
On May 13, the Secretary-General made his formal proposal to the Security 
Council. In his proposal, Boutros-Ghali suggested that the Security Council 
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authorize the phased deployment of UNAMIR II, which was to include 5,500 
troops. On May 17, the Security Council adopted Boutros-Ghali’s suggestion with 
Resolution 918, which also imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda.385 
After the Security Council had adopted Resolution 918, the UN Secretariat 
concentrated its efforts on finding the required troop contributions. The 
Secretariat held several meetings on the matter, while Booh Booh traveled to key 
African countries seeking volunteers for UNAMIR II. The Secretary-General 
contacted personally a number of African heads of state. Some African states 
showed interest in contributing troops to UNAMIR, but they expected both 
financial and logistical assistance in return. Despite the Secretariat’s efforts, on 
July 25, over two months after Resolution 918, UNAMIR II had only 550 troops.386 
Evidently, the lack of political will to authorize interventionist measures by the 
Security Council was reflected in the unwillingness to provide the necessary 
troops, material, and finances. 
By the end of May, however, members of the Security Council were undeniably 
aware of the situation in Rwanda due to the Secretary-General’s report dated May 
31. The report provides vivid descriptions of the horrors of genocide, an estimate 
of casualties somewhere between 200,000 and 500,000, and a statement that the 
events constitute genocide. Moreover, the report makes references to 
information, such as the January 11 cable by Dallaire, which earlier may not have 
been made available to all members of the Security Council. The report also 
outlines the deployment of UNAMIR II in three phases, and it ends with a call to 
recognize the failure of the UN and the international community in general in 
preventing the genocide. The Security Council adopted Resolution 925 on June 8 
endorsing the Secretary-General’s report.387 
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As noted above, however, there were few troop contributions made to UNAMIR II. 
Moreover, the earliest possible deployment date would have been the first week 
of July, three months after the genocide had begun. On the other hand, together 
with Senegal, France had approached the President of the Security Council with a 
letter dated June 20 suggesting the creation of a multinational operation under 
Chapter VII “to assure the security and protection of displaced persons and 
civilians at risk in Rwanda.”388 The aim of this multinational operation was to 
contribute to the security and protection of civilians as it was assigned to UNAMIR 
II until the UN force arrived in Rwanda. After two days of consultations, the 
Security Council agreed to accept the French initiative, and on June 22 the Council 
adopted Resolution 929, which authorized the establishment of a temporary 
multinational operation for humanitarian purposes.389 This intervening force was 
lead by France and became known as Operation Turquoise. 
Surprisingly, on July 14, in its presidential statement,390 the Security Council 
expressed alarm of the continued fighting in Rwanda and demanded an 
immediate cease-fire. Even more surprisingly, the Council urged a return to the 
political framework provided by the Arusha Accords, despite the fact that the 
genocide had basically left only the extremists in Kigali. In spite of these calls, the 
RPF continued its advance, and by July 18, it controlled Rwanda except for the 
humanitarian zone controlled by Operation Turquoise. On the following day, Mr. 
Bizimungu was sworn in as the new President of Rwanda: “About one hundred 
days after it began, the horrific genocide in Rwanda ended, leaving deep and bitter 
wounds behind.”391  
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JUSTIFICATIONS OF INACTION & THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 
The international responses to Rwanda changed dramatically during the 
Rwandan genocide in the summer of 1994. Yet, although the initial indifference 
and focus on the renewal of the civil war was transformed into recognizing the 
genocide, it is clear that the international community could have done more, and 
faster, had the political will been strong enough. In this last section of the chapter, 
I examine the French and American justifications of inaction. As was argued 
earlier, in such cases as the Rwandan genocide, the international community 
shares a responsibility to act. The justifications of inaction, on the other hand, 
support the existence of the responsibility, even long before the publication of the 
R2P report. After all, the justifications of inaction attempt to counter the 
arguments that something ought to be done. 
The French and American arguments for not intervening in Rwanda were to an 
extent quite similar, although the Americans made use of more varied arguments, 
while the French emphasized a few key points in their justifications of non-
intervention. One argument, which both states made almost throughout the crisis, 
was the denial of genocide. Both France and the United States denied that the 
crisis was genocide, or that genocide was part of the civil war. This denial took 
many forms. On the one hand, France and the United States used silence as their 
arguments. They simply made no references to genocide, or even refused to 
discuss the matter in those terms. On the other hand, both the French and the 
Americans insisted on the interpretation that the crisis was simply due to the 
renewal of the civil war, and that a cease-fire ought to be established so that the 
Arusha Accords could be implemented. 
The denial of genocide was naturally linked to an argument that because there 
was no genocide, there was also no obligation or responsibility to intervene. 
Evidently, if the French and the American administrations could maintain 
ambiguity about the situation in Rwanda, they could continue to justify their 
inaction by referring to the uncertainty of the situation, and that dialogue was 
either sufficient or the best course of action until better understanding of the 
situation was reached. Naturally, the presence of the Rwandan interim 
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government in the Security Council helped to maintain this perception of the 
situation to the other members of the Security Council, especially to those 
members who had limited independent information about the situation in 
Rwanda. 
The second argument, which both France and the United States used, was that 
Rwanda represented a so-called failed state, where international military 
intervention could achieve little. The situation in Rwanda was compared to the 
recent disaster in Somalia. Allegedly, the lessons to be drawn from Somalia were 
that the international community’s hopes of bringing stability into chaotic 
circumstances were unrealistic, regardless of the humanitarian imperatives. The 
analogy was justified by perceiving the Rwandan conflict as having tribal origins, 
where the people had simply decided to solve their problems with machetes. 
Perhaps the use of low-technology weapons in executing the genocide eased the 
further justification that outside powers had no right to intervene in such a 
situation, and what were they do anyway, when they had already brokered a 
peace agreement, which was not respected? Again, the Rwandan representative in 
the Security Council strengthened this image of tribal hatreds boiling over with 
his references to “spontaneous violence.”392 
In addition to the above justifications, the United States used also other 
arguments to support her position on non-intervention. One of these arguments 
was made in reference to Somalia, and how the American government could not 
justly demand its soldiers to risk their lives in an operation, which was not related 
to American interests, and which would take place in a faraway country for an 
unknown duration. Samuel Huntington captured this kind of reasoning well, when 
he argued that states have no right to risk the lives of their soldiers for possibly 
saving strangers.393 
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Another argument by the United States for not intervening in Rwanda did not 
deny that intervention might be desirable but that the United States could not 
solve all the world’s problems, or build nations or states for other peoples. Thus, if 
others were ready to act, the United States did not object, but she was unwilling to 
become involved. The Americans were correct in arguing that the world’s 
problems do not belong to the United States, yet as the most powerful state in the 
system, it would be naïve to consider that the privileged position of the United 
States incorporated only rights and privileges and not also responsibilities. 
Moreover, when some African states expressed their readiness to contribute 
troops – although poorly equipped – to the UN force, the United States refused to 
provide material or financial support. In other words, the United States was 
unwilling to risk the lives of her soldiers as well as to participate in other ways.  
A third main argument used by the United States underlined the necessity to be 
selective in both the American as well as in the UN commitments. The Clinton 
administration seems to have been determined to draw a line, and that it was only 
an unfortunate coincidence that the line was drawn in 1994, when genocide 
ravished Rwanda. For the most part, the necessity of being selective was due to 
similar reasons as mentioned above about the risks and costs but also due to the 
domestic pressure which the Clinton administration faced at home. 
The domestic pressures, faced by the Clinton administration at the time were 
partially related to the huge American national deficit and international debt. The 
same reasons were behind the fourth justification of inaction by the Americans, 
namely the costs of UN operations and the attempt to cut expenditures. After all, 
the United States was already the single largest contributor to the UN system and 
UN peace-keeping operations, and UN operations were hardly famous for their 
cost-efficiency. Thus, the United States stated her unwillingness to create further 
expenditures for which she would be liable. 
If raising the present discussion on a higher level, the various arguments, which 
the French and the American used to justify non-intervention in Rwanda, could be 
grouped together under four general headings. In other words, the four main 
types of justifications of non-intervention were: 1) Rwanda was not genocide; 2) 
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there was a high risk to intervening troops; 3) the responsibility to act should not 
be translated into the responsibility of a single member or a handful of members 
of the international community; and 4) the costs were simply too high especially 
within the general context and during the particular time period. I shall examine 
the plausibility of each type of justification in light of their contexts while keeping 
the “Varying Degrees of Responsibility” model in the background in this 
evaluation. 
The first type of justification for non-intervention countered claims of genocide. 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, genocide constitutes the clearest example, 
where the international community shares a collective responsibility to act on 
behalf of the victims, and possibly also to punish the perpetrators.394 For the 
responsibility to apply, however, there must be evidence and knowledge of an 
occurring genocide. In the Rwandan circumstances in 1994, the situation was 
chaotic and reliable information was not available during the first weeks of the 
genocide. It was possible to interpret the events as part of the renewed of civil 
war, although perhaps it may have been an extension to describe the events 
especially in Kigali as typical of a civil war. Yet, after a couple of weeks, when the 
genocide was in full swing, it is doubtful that the French and Americans were 
ignorant of what was happening or of the direction which the events had taken. 
The scale of violence in Rwanda was unprecedented, and both governments 
received information and signals from their own, independent sources, from the 
UN mission in Kigali, from the humanitarian organizations, and from the media, all 
of which were pointing towards genocide or at least towards massacres of 
innocent people on a massive scale. Given such signals and information, the 
responsibility model would suggest that both the French and the Americans, as 
examples of privileged actors in relation to the crisis, should have investigated the 
matter further and shared their discoveries with the international community, 
because both governments were involved in the region, in the peace process at 
Arusha, and moreover, both governments possessed intelligence gathering 
capabilities unmatched by other actors in the region. 
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The second kind of justification of non-intervention was based on the argument 
that given the situation in Rwanda, the intervening forces would face a mortal 
risk. It is only correct that governments of states are concerned about the risks 
they impose on their soldiers, especially in situations where it is uncertain what 
could be the effect of the use of force. It was especially the American government, 
which expressed that Rwanda posed a too high risk with little uncertainty of the 
possible gains. Yet, it is strange how at the same time African governments were 
ready and willing to volunteer the troops, but the United States refused to assist in 
their preparations by providing equipment. Certainly, it could be the case that the 
African governments saw an opportunity to upgrade their equipment. 
Nevertheless, they were willing to provide the necessary personnel unlike 
Western governments. Thus, from the perspective of the responsibility model, the 
offer by the African governments should have been followed better and some 
compromise reached, given the severity of the crisis and the likely positive impact 
of an intervention.395 The last remark might be possible only with hindsight, yet it 
should have been obvious that the crisis could only worsen, if the international 
community did nothing. 
The third type of justification of inaction argued that the responsibility to 
intervene was a collective responsibility, and that it could not be interpreted as 
the sole responsibility of the rich and the powerful. As discussed in relation to 
responsibility in general in chapter three, this argument has its merits, and it is 
correct in many ways: collective responsibilities do not translate easily into 
individual responsibilities. Yet, as the responsibility model attempts to show, 
collective responsibility does not mean that it would be necessarily wrong to 
expect the individual members to contribute unevenly towards fulfilling the 
collective responsibility. Moreover, in the Rwandan case, the Americans were 
neither the only ones who were expected to act nor expected to bear the burden 
alone. Instead, the expectation was that for example the United States would have 
supported and contributed something to the UN force UNAMIR, which was 
already in Rwanda, or perhaps to the realizing of the African troop contributions 
willing to strengthen UNAMIR. Alternatively, the United States could have offered 
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her leadership or assisted the UN Secretariat in its efforts to put together UNAMIR 
II. In other words, the responsibility model would have distributed some of the 
expectations on the United States, because of her special and relative 
competencies, which other actors possessed less or not at all. The United States 
was not expected to act alone but to work with the international community in 
order to bring a solution to the crisis in Rwanda. Instead, the United States 
appeared to oppose most suggestions, which were made in relation to the grave 
humanitarian crisis. 
The fourth and final type of justification of inaction focused on material or 
economic costs. From a moral perspective, economic arguments may appear 
banal, when the question is about justifying inaction or standing by to genocide. 
Nevertheless, in the “real” world costs cannot be neglected, and it might be true 
that a given actor was unable to contribute financially. Such arguments, however, 
are less understandable when they are made by rich actors. In the Rwandan case, 
for example the American administration was arguing over some millions of 
dollars, when at the same time the United States’ GDP was approximately $7,000 
billion. To give two other examples, which ought to put the American argument 
into perspective, one needs only to consider the vast sums the United States spent 
during the Cold War, or currently in Iraq, or the prize, which was promised for the 
capture of Saddam Hussein, a single individual. Furthermore, once the genocide 
was over due to RPF victory, the Clinton administration managed to find some 
$300-400 million for the humanitarian mission to help the refugees. One can only 
wonder what those funds might have achieved during the early weeks of the 
genocide. Thus, the plausibility of costs as the justification of inaction seems 
doubtful, because the United States was not obliged to pick up the whole bill, at 
least under the responsibility model, but to contribute towards the costs. 
In sum, the French and American justifications of non-intervention in Rwanda 
fared poorly in light of the “Varying Degrees of Responsibility” model. The 
arguments and justifications as such might have fared better under different 
circumstances, or if they had been made by some other actors. On the other hand, 
had the same actors had at their disposal the responsibility model, they would 
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have been in a better position to justify their inaction, which they obviously 
desired, with the help of better suited arguments. Instead of using the arguments 
they did, such actors as the United States and France could have drawn attention 
to the contributions they were already making with the help of the way of 
thinking and arguing as described by the responsibility model. In other words, as 
the above discussion shows in relation to the Rwandan genocide and the 
justification of non-intervention, which were used in relation to it, the “Varying 
Degrees of Responsibility” model offers a tool for not only “distributing” 
responsibility and determining how to share the burden among the members of 
the collective, but it also offers a tool for evaluating the justifications for not 
fulfilling the responsibility or one’s share. Finally, the fact that France and the 
United States engaged in a debate, in which they justified and excused their 















It should not be surprising that the social world differs greatly from the world of 
nature. Not only are the objects of study fundamentally different but human 
“activity is characterized by an inner psychic dimension that is absent in 
phenomena studied in the natural sciences.”397 Yet, whether due to “physics 
envy”398 or for other reasons, the pursuit of “science,” especially in relation to 
politics, has suffered from the attempt to equate social sciences with the natural 
sciences, most notably in the way “science” is conducted. For a long time, scientific 
inquiry was, and to a large extent still is, restricted to a few methodologies that 
have been deemed “scientific,” while alternative approaches have been 
underappreciated. Moreover, not only is it questionable to mold one’s object of 
study to fit one’s methodologies, but it is a greater offense to disparage the 
complexities involved in the objects of study for the sake of parsimony in both 
natural and social sciences. Regardless of the understandable desire for 
parsimony, it should not be an end in itself, perhaps accomplished at the expense 
of significant details, which “inconveniently” complicate our theories about the 
world. The world is complex, and the whole might sometimes be more than the 
                                                             
396 Αριστοτέλης, Πολιτικά Α, 1253 α. For English, see e.g. Aristotle, Politics, trans. Trevor J. Saunders 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
397 Michael T. Gibbons, "Hermeneutics, Political Inquiry, and Practical Reason: An Evolving Challenge 
to Political Science," American Political Science Review 100, no. 4 (2006): 564. 
398 See e.g. Friedrich Kratochwil, "The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-Realism as the Science of 
Realpolitik without Politics," Review of International Studies 19, no. 1 (1993); Michael McKinley, 
"The Co-Option of the University and the Privileging of Annihilation," International Relations 18, no. 
2 (2004): 167-68. 
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sum of its parts, thus yielding an added value from systemic or structural 
perspectives. 
Simplification, however, has also its uses. Despite the complexity of the world, or 
that social interaction is never self-explanatory but interpreted, it serves no 
purpose to over-complicate matters, especially when short-hands can drive home 
the message. Sometimes, as for example a good defense lawyer will testify, less is 
better. Depending on our purposes, it might be irrelevant to focus on the details, 
especially in cases, which could be described as typical or exemplary. In such 
cases, we need not spend too much time going over the details, but the “simple” 
concepts we use do the work for us. Nevertheless, we should not fool ourselves by 
thinking that the “simple” concepts we use reflect the simplicity of their reference 
points. Thus, despite the fact that “ball” refers to a spherical object, the players of 
American football use a “pigskin,” which is prolate spheroid, or in other words 
oval. Yet, despite the obvious mismatch, the players of American football play with 
a ball, and despite the game being called “football,” feet seldom touch the ball. 
Similarly, “democracy” refers to a particular form of government, but whether a 
particular form of government is democracy, is another question, which only the 
particulars of the given case can “answer.” Here, by answering I am most certainly 
not implying that the things speak for themselves, and that all we need to do is to 
listen carefully. Rather, we are both the questioners and the providers of answers, 
which we give based on our theories about the world and the objects we study. 
The answers we give, or the knowledge we produce in the social sciences may 
differ greatly from the knowledge that can be produced in the natural sciences. 
For instance, in the natural sciences, “laws” might be “discoverable” like the law of 
gravity, but in the political sciences such “laws” as for example the democratic 
peace will remain as descriptions of tendencies rather than as laws in the 
previous sense. For one, because in the political science the objects of inquiry are 
not inanimate but capable of independent thought and decision-making, and 
because they can thus learn, we can never be sure whether we are “truly” correct, 
or for how long our conclusions are valid. There have been, however, attempts to 
rationalize behavior in terms of for example expected utility or by considering 
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what the “rational person” would do in a given situation.399 Nevertheless, for 
example the “rational person” seems more like a political project, which argues 
for a particular kind of behavior or attitude towards problems rather than a good 
model of actual human behavior. Moreover, to derive expectations from such 
models would still remain as educated guesses rather than as precise predictions. 
To give an obvious example, without strong underlying assumptions one is hard-
pressed to justify the rational behavior of tying twenty kilos of explosives to one’s 
person and igniting them in the middle of a crowded place, yet suicide bombings 
have become more frequent in the past couple of decades. Certainly, it is possible 
to find a rationality which would explain such behavior, but it would seem odd to 
claim that such concept of rationality is universally valid. The point is, rather, that 
even if scientific study is imagined to be akin to peeling the layers of an onion,400 
the metaphor deceives us because unlike with an onion which has its last layer, 
we can innovatively find new ways with which to “go on” with our research and 
“discover” new layers or even realize that there is no “onion” but something else. 
Yet again, the “discovery” of new layers should not be an end in itself in 
conducting science. We are interested in being able to say something about the 
social world that we can relate back to it so as to have some practical significance, 
or at least interesting insights, to what we have learned. In many cases, the 
practical application of for example political studies or sociology translates into 
policy recommendations to decision-makers, who need to ground their decisions, 
whether to a domestic or to an international audience. Here, science can be 
helpful, because it not only provides highly convincing arguments in order to 
justify a given decision, but it can also help in choosing among competing options. 
The trouble is, naturally, that “science” has seldom direct, single answers to given 
questions, this being especially true in the social sciences. One thinks of for 
example the standard undergraduate essay answer, in which three different 
                                                             
399 See e.g. Peter Abell, ed., Rational Choice Theory (Aldershot: Elgar, 1991); James S. Coleman and 
Thomas J. Fararo, eds., Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique (Newbury Park: Sage, 1992); 
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1971). 
400 One encounters this metaphor occasionally. See e.g. University of Pennsylvania, "The Importance 
of Understanding Science: An Interview with David Balamuth," 1997). Available at 
<http://www.sas.upenn.edu/sasalum/newsltr/winter97/Balamuth.html>. 
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answers are compared and contrasted. Depending on the student and his or her 
argumentation, any one of the three answers might be the “best” answer 
according to the student in question. One should note here, however, that I do not 
imply relativism, where everything is possible and equally acceptable. Rather, I 
am merely emphasizing that the way we argue has as much to do with the 
evaluation of the conclusions as with the “facts.” 
This thesis has made a number of points and argued in a manner, which is not 
necessarily typical to the field. This last chapter is dedicated to some stock-taking 
and to looking back at the previous chapters in order to draw some conclusions in 
relation to the topic as well as in relation to the way this thesis has been argued. 
Thus, I shall continue the present discussion by drawing from each previous 
chapter as a final conclusion. 
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A POINT OF DEPARTURE 
This thesis began with a simple idea of reversing the main traditional assumption 
in relation to humanitarian intervention, namely that attention to non-
intervention in grave humanitarian crisis is required rather than to the right to 
intervene in such crises. Thus, instead of attempting to build a case proving the 
existence or the desirability of the right of humanitarian intervention, it was 
assumed for heuristic purposes that the right exists. Having done so, the 
examination of the relevant literature took a different perspective than what 
would have been the case otherwise, and it was possible to move beyond the 
usual debate surrounding humanitarian intervention,401 at least from the rights 
perspective. 
One of the most striking features of the humanitarian intervention debate is the 
silence of the opposing side, especially if it is compared to the advocates of 
intervention. After the beginning of the debate in the 1970s, it is difficult to find 
authors who explicitly argue against humanitarian intervention,402 at least in its 
ideal form as helping innocent people in dire straits. In contrast, the number of 
authors advocating for humanitarian intervention is numerous.403 Publishing or 
contributing to the humanitarian intervention debate was popular especially 
during the 1990s, after which interest seems to have waned, and there seems very 
little one can say about the topic, which has not already been mentioned by 
several authors. Yet, the whole issue of humanitarian intervention, not to mention 
the debate surrounding it, is very telling of the shifts that are taking place within 
international politics. For example, the amount of literature on humanitarian 
intervention, of which not all is original, shows the assumptions that are made 
about international politics and also the fears which might allegedly be overcome 
by repetitive assurances that allowing for humanitarian intervention will not 
result in chaos. 
                                                             
401 See e.g. J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and 
Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
402 A rare defense of non-intervention can be found e.g. in Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," 
Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (1999). 
403 See chapter two for a discussion of the humanitarian intervention debate. 
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I would argue that the issues in relation to the humanitarian intervention debate 
can be compared with the fear of opening Pandora’s Box, and that it is the desire 
to counter this fear to such an extent that it becomes the driving force behind the 
repetitive efforts to ground the right of humanitarian intervention either in the 
practice of international politics or in international law. Understandably, 
humanitarian intervention was seen as a violation of sovereignty and the rule of 
non-intervention. Any such violation appears to open the door for the 
unrestricted abuse of the right of humanitarian intervention for selfish purposes 
or as facades of power politics. Allegedly, there are enough excuses already for 
violence without the need to legalize another one.404 
The fear of opening Pandora’s Box by recognizing the right of humanitarian 
intervention is, however, more imagined than “real.” For one, it appears that apart 
from arguing over the definition of “humanitarian intervention” or who the right-
holder is or should be, the debate as it was before the R2P report had little to 
offer.405 Moreover, it is odd that the discussion did not focus on rights despite 
focusing on establishing a right. In other words, the debate sought to allow for the 
right of humanitarian intervention, but the right itself, if established, was 
perceived as uncomplicated and as “given” in the sense that a right is a right. 
Clearly, not all rights are similar and there are many different kinds of rights as 
was discussed in chapter two. In contrast, to an extent in the discussion there 
appeared to be a notion that rights are more or less similar, and that it was 
enough to polish one’s definition without asking how this particular right might 
differ from other kinds of right. Equally confused was the implicit assumption by 
the opponents of the right of humanitarian intervention that allowing for the right 
to a particular actor or actors could somehow lead to a general possession of the 
right by all who so desired. As the discussion in chapter two sought to 
                                                             
404 In this context one might reflect with a classic article: Thomas M. Franck, "Who Killed Article 
2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States," The American Journal of 
International Law 64, no. 4 (1970). See also Walden Bello, "Humanitarian Intervention: Evolution of 
a Dangerous Doctrine," (Focus on the Global South, 2006). Available at 
<http://www.focusweb.org/humanitarian-intervention-evolution-of-a-dangerous-
doctrine.html?Itemid=26>. 
405 The R2P report refers to the following report: International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty, "The Responsibility to Protect," (Ottawa: International Development Research 
Centre, 2001). 
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demonstrate, rights are not as simple as they are usually considered, even when 
examining only one right. As was argued, the one right, namely the right of 
humanitarian intervention, is complex and in fact covers a bundle of rights of 
various kinds. Thus, while focusing on the idea that the right of humanitarian 
intervention is somehow set in stone and we can either accept or reject it, it is 
forgotten that as the creators of rights, we are also able to restrict, modify, and 
determine their use.  
Another aspect of what I have called the fear of opening Pandora’s Box is the 
notion of abuse, namely that the right of humanitarian intervention would be used 
towards selfish interests. In some respects, such ideas border on schizophrenia. It 
is as if on the one hand one recognizes that social things can be modified and 
“used,” but at the same time one denies any control over the possible changes or 
the acceptable uses of the right of humanitarian intervention. Although true that 
authors have no privileged position regarding their “texts” and that there is no 
(meaningful) private language, it seems nevertheless remarkable to think that 
allowing for a right to intervene, by a limited number of actors, under 
extraordinary circumstances, could result in chaos or relativism, where states 
would suddenly send their armies across borders in the pursuit of “power” or 
something similar. This line of thinking is even stranger, because one is left with 
the impression that there are currently none or very few similar concepts, which 
could be used to justify selfish ends. Naturally, this is mistaken, as the concept of 
“self-defense” illustrates: self-defense was the main justification of humanitarian 
interventions during the Cold War according to Wheeler.406 In addition, denying 
the legitimacy or legality of humanitarian interventions would safeguard neither 
against determined humanitarian interveners nor against other attempted abuses 
towards self-interested goals. There is much truth to the proverb: where there is 
will, there is a way; this being true especially regarding political will. One should 
remember, however, that an attempt to justify one’s action with reference to, for 
example, humanitarian imperatives, or by claiming humanitarian intervention, is 
dependent on its inter-subjective success with the acceptance of those 
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justifications in relation to the circumstances by other actors. In other words, as 
seen with the operations of Afghanistan and Iraq, simply claiming to be 
committing a humanitarian intervention does not guarantee that the act is seen as 
such.407 If language is inter-subjective, so is politics, and it is no different whether 
it is domestic or international politics. 
A third part of the fear is the perceived threat that other central aspects of 
international politics and its system or structure are either undermined or 
compromised. Clearly, admitting for the right of humanitarian intervention would 
require us to rethink sovereignty and the rules of non-intervention, and especially 
the acceptable exceptions to these two. Yet, to hold on to concepts as if they could 
be frozen seems naïve. Despite the best efforts to perpetuate the tale of 
Westphalia, and how the current state system has been more or less the same 
since Osnabrück and Münster, sovereignty has a different meaning in the 
contemporary world than what it had for example in the seventeenth century.408 
Similarly, it would be inappropriate to examine the past by using the 
contemporary meanings of concepts. Moreover, not only are the meanings of our 
concepts tied to specific points in time, they can also have different meanings 
depending on the context. To give a few obvious examples, one could consider for 
example the differences in the “sovereignty” of the United States, the Order of 
Malta,409 and “quasi-states,”410 not to mention what it means to be sovereign as 
part of the European Union. Moreover, as the R2P report shows, not only do our 
concepts evolve “semi-independently” in the sense that the change is the net 
effect of numerous factors, but there can be conscious projects to change them.411 
                                                             
407 See e.g. Human Rights Watch and Ken Roth, "War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention," 
(Human Rights Watch, 2004: May 10). Available at <http://hrw.org/wr2k4/3.htm>. 
408 See e.g. Andreas Osiander, "Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth," 
International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001). 
409 The Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of St. John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and Malta, or the 
Sovereign Order of Malta, has been recognized as an independent subject of international law. 
410 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
411 Here one thinks for example reports by international commissions. See e.g. Ramesh Thakur, 
Andrew F. Cooper, and John English, eds., International Commissions and the Power of Ideas (New 
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Hence, to treat for example sovereignty as never-changing would be missing the 
mark. 
In sum, the fear of opening Pandora’s Box rests on certain assumptions about the 
nature of international politics and the social sciences, some of which might be 
warranted but most of which are mistaken. God did not give physics the easy 
problems;412 it is just that what is to be explained and understood in physics, and 
how it can be done, differs from the questions we can pose and from answers we 
can give in the social sciences.413 By simply trying to imitate the natural sciences, 
it is no wonder that social scientists find themselves frustrated, or that the “laws” 
they can generate are close to trivial.414 Similarly, the fears concerning the right of 
humanitarian intervention should not surprise us, if we persist to neglect the fact 
that the world continues to move on without the approval of our theories. Lastly, 
and as I have attempted to show throughout the thesis, allowing, for example, the 
right of humanitarian intervention may raise new questions but they are not 
impossible to answer. 
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The first half of this thesis focused on responsibility. As a first step, the traditional 
assumptions within the humanitarian intervention debate were scrutinized in 
order to excavate the link between the right of humanitarian intervention and its 
possible corresponding responsibility. Clearly, a duty to intervene is not 
implicated by the right, but as I have argued responsibility is implicitly assumed 
in the pro-humanitarian intervention arguments. This is especially true the graver 
a particular humanitarian crisis is and vice versa. This conclusion was 
strengthened with the help of a Hohfeldian typology of rights,415 which indicated 
that the right itself merits a focus on responsibility. The difference is, however, 
that where the pro-humanitarian intervention arguments assume responsibility 
to arise from the existence of the right, the typology of rights clarified that 
responsibilities originate from an act of authorization – in other words from 
passing on the right – or from possessing the right. Thus, it might be a confused 
argument to claim that the right of humanitarian intervention denoted a 
correlating responsibility to intervene, but it would be accurate to state that 
having been invested with the right by for example the international community 
or by the Security Council the possession of the right implies responsibility at 
least in the sense of responsibility to exercise the right and possibly also its 
responsible use. International responsibility, especially international collective 
responsibility, is however an understudied topic in international politics, and it 
would deserve more attention. 
International law recognizes international responsibility, yet within international 
law the meaning of international responsibility is usually reserved for references 
to treaty obligations or similar.416 As the conceptual discussion on responsibility 
showed in chapter three, responsibility differs from obligations and duties, and it 
is a value-laden behavioral description, if not also a prescription. In other words, 
being responsible denotes certain kind of behavior, and to place responsibility for 
                                                             
415 The typology that was used was based on the one outlined in Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, ed. David Campbell and Philip 
Thomas (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001). 
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example on the Security Council regarding grave humanitarian crises is to impose 
certain expectations on the Council and to prescribe how the Council should 
behave or act under given circumstances. This kind of positive behavioral 
prescription with highly normative undertones seems less than familiar to 
international law and also to the study of international politics, at least on a 
higher level. Sure enough, there are many studies or arguments for states to “do 
good” – for example the whole pro-humanitarian arguments are such an attempt – 
but there is a qualitative difference between seeking to enable particular acts and 
arguing that international actors ought to behave responsibly by default. By 
extension, the latter argument refers to a community, of which one can be a 
member if one behaves in a certain fashion. One imagines a social system, which is 
structured in a particular fashion, and in which certain behavioral norms are 
unconsciously perpetuated. Perhaps one might associate such a system to a 
metaphorical “global village” of states, which would not include all states but 
those who follow the particular behavioral norms. These, in turn, determine the 
daily life and interaction among other things.417 Whether this metaphor of a 
“village” is a worthy pursuit of further study remains to be seen. 
The above addresses also the difference between having a right and something 
being right. From a mainstream IR theory perspective, questions whether 
something is right – in the sense of fair, just, or righteous – are usually not asked. 
On the other hand, the whole discussion about the international community’s 
responsibility vis-à-vis grave humanitarian crises and their victims is directed at 
establishing a place for morality and “good” behavior at the international level. It 
is an ambitious project. The earlier project, which tried to settle the right to 
intervene, was undermined from the start, because even if there was such a right, 
no guarantees of its use existed or could exist, at least not without the necessary 
references to an assumed or implied responsibility. Thus, although this newer 
project jumps straight into the question of responsibility, it is nevertheless 
                                                             
417 Martin Shaw’s idea of a “global state” might come to mind in this context, but his “global –
Western state conglomerate” is simply not global enough for the metaphorical global village used 
here. See Martin Shaw, Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). By global village I am referring to how perhaps tribal villages 
may function, and how their internal as well external relationships are maintained. As I said, 
however, this is a mere idea at the moment and perhaps not worth pursuing any further. 
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equally troubled. For one, the project requires that the actors themselves 
recognize their responsibility, and that they share a similar understanding of what 
it means to be a responsible member of the community. Of course, there are no 
guarantees that this would happen, and it might not be in the interests of most 
actors to adopt such a world view. After all, adopting this “global village” world 
view would certainly entail costs without promising many rewards in return. 
Second, the specter of borders and locating political accountability raises its ugly 
head. How is one to draw the boundaries between jurisdictions, whether political, 
legal, or other kinds of jurisdictions? Some might point to global governance 
studies418 and argue that these questions can be answered without global 
government. On the other hand, loyalties, and especially conflicting loyalties, are 
most likely to remain central in social organization. Thus, one doubts whether 
boundaries can be neglected, and it is exactly the division of those boundaries, 
which deserves our attention. 
The boundaries we draw respond to our understanding of who is responsible, for 
what, and to whom. These are the three core questions of responsibility, and they 
have received very different answers in history. It seems that at the international 
level we might be moving towards an understanding where states are becoming 
answerable not only to themselves and their respective citizens but to the 
international community, which in turn is also accountable to “humanity.” Human 
rights may have become the new standard of civilization,419 at least as a 
“measurement” tool, and they have gained ground as accepted concerns for 
foreign states and international organizations.420 It could also very well be that 
states are finding it increasingly difficult to ignore their human rights 
commitments.421 Thus, it seems that we are taking a further step in allocating the 
                                                             
418 See e.g. Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair, eds., Approaches to Global Governance Theory 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999). 
419 See e.g. Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?," International Affairs 74, 
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lack of respect for basic human rights not only to the particular state, within 
whose territory the violations take place, but also to the wider international 
community for allowing such violations to continue.422 
The efforts to make the international community accountable for massive 
violations of basic human dignity and life, such as the R2P report, might seem 
unsuitable from the perspective of international law. International law, which 
could be described in many respects as minimalist, might require quite 
fundamental changes before the content and meaning of the report could be 
accommodated within it. The International Commission and the R2P report, 
however, seem to emphasize a particular reading of international law. The R2P 
report is neither a legal document nor a legal argument, but there are indicators, 
which point to a new reading of existing international law. Moreover, this new 
reading could be perhaps best described as an attitude towards international law 
and the purpose it serves. It is as if the R2P report advocates for a particular kind 
of “neighborhood watch” mentality at the international level with respect to grave 
humanitarian crisis. Whether a reading of international law based on such a 
mentality is possible without challenging the fundamental aspects of current 
international law remains to be seen. 
The extra-legal aspects, such as behavior or a mentality, lie at the heart of the 
topic of this thesis. The law, after all, cannot explain by itself why its subjects 
abide by it or why for example states choose to uphold their treaty commitments. 
Sure enough, some might point to power or interests as the reasons behind law 
abidingness but there are certainly occasions, when subjects of law abide by it 
without there being neither clear interests at stake nor power disparities at play. 
Moreover, the same extra-legal aspects are also part of politics and how politics is 
and ought to be conducted, and whose denial through either negligence or by 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Watch, 2008). Available at 
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trying to find technical solutions is missing the mark. To give an example of a 
theme that has run throughout this thesis: the use of discretion seems to be often 
overlooked both in law and politics, especially when technical solutions are 
suggested. For example, best practices might serve as good guidelines but they 
should certainly not be followed blindly or relied upon without the use of 
discretion.423 It is remarkable to what extent for example the study of 
international politics seems to hold on to ideas that the objects of its study can be 
examined as inanimate objects. Sometimes states have been described as “billiard 
balls”424 or otherwise coherent wholes with an inside/outside,425 or as 
determined by structure(s),426 in the sense that they can be reduced to 
uncomplicated objects neglecting their subjectivity and authorship. Clearly, states 
are better described as complex organizations, but understandably it is often 
necessary to simplify matters. To consider, however, that these simplifications 
would somehow capture or correspond to the things “out there” would be as 
mistaken as basing one’s default understanding of argumentation on a special 
case of arguments,427 as was discussed in chapter one. 
In sum, for international responsibility to be meaningful, not only are we faced 
with new questions about how to conceptualize it, how to “allocate” it in practical 
terms, and how particular connections and relations within a social structure are 
shaped by responsibility, but we are also challenged to reconsider what is the 
purpose of international law and what is the politics in international politics and 
how it is and ought to be conducted.  
                                                             
423 For a curious, “proven” solutions, see e.g. UN-Habitat, "Best Practices: Database in Improving the 
Living Environment,"  (2006 edition). 
424 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1962), 19-24. 
425 In this context one should have a look at R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as 
Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
426 This could be a neo-realist perspective á la Waltz. See Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 
427 See S. E. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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“VARYING DEGREES OF RESPONSIBILITY” AND GENOCIDE 
In the latter half of this thesis the conceptualization of “responsibility” was 
illustrated with the help of a model and a thought experiment. Both the model and 
the thought experiment served to demonstrate the functioning of international 
collective responsibility, at least as it has been understood within this thesis.  
The developed model of collective responsibility could be described as a dynamic 
model of graded responsibility. At first, varying degrees of responsibility may 
seem like an odd concept. After all, we are normally interested in knowing 
whether a particular actor is responsible for something or not; one is not forty 
percent guilty but either guilty or innocent. Yet, in attempting to make sense of a 
universal responsibility – something that could easily translate into nobody’s 
responsibility if everyone is responsible – there is a need to establish some 
criteria for allocating shares of the responsibility. In a similar vein in a criminal 
case, despite a group of people committing an armed robbery, not all members of 
the group receive similar verdicts, if they are caught and tried in a court of law. At 
the international level, then, if the international community is collectively 
responsible for protecting the innocent, and if at the end of the day we are the 
international community through the structures we have created, how are we to 
make sense of this responsibility? This was the question the “Varying Degrees of 
Responsibility” model sought to answer. 
In the model, a set of criteria was suggested, yet no attempt was made to create an 
exhaustive list. The reason behind this is a simple one: the whole notion of 
responsibility implies that matters cannot be predetermined once and for all but 
one must remain sensitive to the particulars of each case and situation. Thus, 
what was presented was a collection of criteria, which allowed one to see the logic 
behind the model without predetermining or limiting its use, and which allowed 
one to apply the logic in other issues as well. Thus, similar to casuistry,428 
principles rather than clear-cut rules or “laws” do the work in the model. 
                                                             
428 See e.g. A. R. Jonsen and S. E. Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning 
(London: University of California Press, 1989). 
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The principles behind the responsibility model acknowledge that there are 
significant differences between the actors in question. Thus, for example, states 
are considered to be “individuals” in the sense that despite being states, they have 
individual characteristics, which differentiate one state from another.429 
Traditionally, great powers have received most attention and they have been 
distinguished as the core of the international system. Admittedly, though, on some 
occasions small states have also received due consideration.430 Yet on the whole it 
seems that lumping together certain kinds of states, whether into groups of great, 
medium, or small powers, or according to wealth based on for example the Gross 
Domestic Product, might entail costly pay-offs in some cases. Although practical as 
short-hands, these labels cannot for example predict the future to any reliable 
extent. More than once in the recent history have the so-called small powers 
resisted a great power to an unpredictable extent.431 Thus, instead of labeling 
actors and then distributing responsibility, the model considers each actor in 
relation to the other actors on a variety of criteria. By so doing, the model also 
addresses expectations. 
The principles in the responsibility model form a particular type of distributive 
justice. Instead of distributing wealth or goods, the normative principles 
distribute a share of expectations towards fulfilling a collective responsibility 
among the members of that collective. Here one should note that responsibility as 
such is not divided among the members. Instead, expectations to fulfill the 
responsibility are divided according to the suggested criteria. These expectations, 
                                                             
429 For an interesting debate about the “personhood” of states, see the forum in “Review of 
International Studies:” Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, "Forum Introduction: Is the State a Person? Why 
Should We Care?," Review of International Studies 30, no. 2 (2004); Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 
"Hegel's House, or ‘People Are States Too’," Review of International Studies 30, no. 2 (2004); Iver B. 
Neumann, "Beware of Organicism: The Narrative Self of the State," Review of International Studies 
30, no. 2 (2004); Alexander Wendt, "The State as Person in International Theory," Review of 
International Studies 30, no. 2 (2004); Colin Wight, "State Agency: Social Action without Human 
Activity?," Review of International Studies 30, no. 2 (2004). See also Peter Lomas, 
"Anthropomorphism, Personification and Ethics: A Reply to Alexander Wendt," Review of 
International Studies 31, no. 2 (2005); Alexander Wendt, "How Not to Argue against State 
Personhood: A Reply to Lomas," Review of International Studies 31, no. 2 (2005). 
430 See for example Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1968); August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland, eds., Small States in International Relations 
(New York: Wiley Interscience Division, 1971). 
431 Here one thinks immediately of the Soviet-Finnish wars, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet-
Afghanistan conflict. 
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in turn, reflect what could be expected of each individual member of the 
collective. Because all members of the collective are different from each other, the 
division is unequal and takes into consideration a number of criteria with the sum 
of the criteria representing a given share of a given member in relation to a 
particular crisis. The thought experiment sought to illustrate this kind of division 
of expectations. 
The division of expectations, on the other hand, structures both the evaluation of 
actors’ actions and the apportioning of praise and blame with regard to those 
actions. A point which was discussed in the previous chapters was the 
acceptability of certain kinds of justifications of inaction given that there was a 
requirement to act. The expectations for action structured and clarified what kind 
of action was called for, thus allowing for evaluating to what extent the 
expectations were met. As a second step, one could then apportion praise and 
blame based on the (dis)parity between the individual expectations and actions. 
Moreover, justifications or excuses for inaction can be evaluated on the same 
basis, a point to which I will return in the next subsection. 
The method used to bring out these aspects was the thought experiment. It was 
argued that constructing a thought experiment would be preferable to choosing 
for example a historical case of genocide. There is little need to repeat here the 
reasons for this choice but suffice it to say that unlike with a historical case, one is 
in a better position to abstract in a thought experiment. Clearly, objections may be 
raised that the thought experiment was designed to show a particular outcome or 
to support a particular argument. Nevertheless, the thought experiment was not 
only designed to highlight certain aspects of such grave humanitarian crises as 
genocide and of international responses to such crises but also to highlight the 
possible uses of the method itself in other cases. 
Thought experiments might belong more to the realm of philosophy and they are 
rarely used in international politics. Hopefully, this thesis has demonstrated that 
thought experiments could be of use also in the study of international politics, not 
the least because many of the problems in international politics have 
philosophical roots. Also, the thought experiment in this thesis shows how one 
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thinks of international politics and its practice, thus challenging one to be more 
reflective. Moreover, in the self-reflection one confronts the assumptions and 
presumptions one makes of the “world” one studies, thus allowing for an 
evaluation of one’s world view, especially in comparison with others. 
Furthermore, the thought experiment of this thesis was not a speculative exercise 
but an attempt to capture processes, which are likely in the contemporary world. 
It is thus also a description of the world, as one sees it. Clearly, this view could and 
most likely will be challenged. Nevertheless, such challenges would surely prove 
fruitful and yield interesting insights to the practice of international politics. After 
all, such a debate would take the discussion focusing on what is international 
politics to another level, namely how we think about what is international politics. 
Lastly, the thought experiment highlighted also the fragile path(s) to 
humanitarian intervention and how politics is about decision-making. Procedural 
rules inform us how decisions can be made, while normative considerations 
determine which decisions ought to be made, but neither procedural rules nor 
normative considerations tell us which decisions will be taken. At any given point, 
there are several possible decisions, which could be taken, despite many 
imaginable possibilities having been excluded by being outside the acceptable 
boundaries. Here, political will plays an important role, especially when 
unpopular decisions are made. If political will is a renewable resource as Al Gore 
has put it,432 the question is how to harness and study it. 
To summarize, the responsibility model and the thought experiment serve many 
purposes in this thesis, and perhaps most interestingly they describe 
international politics. The description is not a theory or an attempt at theory but a 
map of one part of international politics, a map which might describe certain 
things and reveal possible paths without determining them. It might also prove to 
be a map, which could be used as a starting position in attempting to describe 
other parts of international politics. This map is hardly a three-dimensional, 
topographical, satellite image corresponding to what international politics really 
                                                             
432 Al Gore, "Transcript of Al Gore's Speech at the Sierra Summit, September 9, 2005," (Sierra Club, 
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is but rather a sketch highlighting certain aspects, thus allowing one to choose 
different routes or paths and to “explore” new areas. In this exploration and in 
choosing one’s routes – in other words in practicing international politics – it 
seems that “lenses of discretion” could be a prudential choice. 
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RWANDA IN 1994 & JUSTIFICATIONS OF NON-INTERVENTION 
In chapter five, the Rwandan genocide was discussed from the perspective of non-
intervention. Moreover, the main focus was on the justifications of inaction by 
some key members of the international community, namely the Security Council, 
the United States, and France. To summarize the argument, chapter five argued 
that these key members of the international community used various arguments 
to justify their inaction, and that the plausibility or acceptability of those 
justifications depended on the argument in question and by whom it was invoked.  
The mere fact that states and other international actors justified and argued over 
possible courses of action is quite telling of the practice of international politics.433 
Naturally, power disparities, policy linkages, and other factors played a role in 
determining the outcome of those debates, yet the discussions were clearly not 
simply rhetorical for the sake of rhetoric. The positions, which the actors took, 
changed during the crisis, as well as the arguments they invoked to back up their 
positions on the issues. It could well be that the political pressure put on the key 
actors does most of the explaining of this change, and that in this sense the best 
arguments did not win the day.434 Nevertheless, the arguments that were used 
were hardly nonsensical, rhetoric in the sense of lacking content, or being beside 
the point. The actors seem to have engaged in meaningful interaction. This 
interaction was most likely not so much about convincing the other parties with 
the power of their argument as it was about explaining one’s own position in an 
intelligible fashion and about finding support for one’s political projects. 
At the level of arguments, though, the justifications that were used by the actors, 
one noticed a mismatch between what could have been acceptable justifications 
and the justifications which were used. The criteria used in the responsibility 
model served to suggest what kind of arguments could have been acceptable from 
a particular actor, and according to these criteria France and the United States 
could have fared better had they used different kinds of arguments than what 
                                                             
433 One thinks of e.g. Thomas Risse, ""Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics," 
International Organization 54, no. 1 (2000). 
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they did. In other words, seeking to address the expectations, which other actors 
had of France and of the United States, and why they could not be met, or were 
already being met, would have enabled both actors to maintain if not increase 
their credibility at the international and also at the domestic level. 
As discussed in chapter one and following Toulmin,435 arguments are complex. In 
making their cases for non-intervention, France and the United States made use of 
arguments, which were formed of several components. These components 
seemed to support each other, thus creating a coherent argument. The problems 
of credibility, however, were not due to the internal structure of those arguments 
as much as it was due to France and the United States being the advocates of those 
particular arguments. In other words, one might take note that the “validity” of 
arguments is not simply a matter of their internal structure or their 
correspondence with the “world out there” but it has as much to do with who is 
making those arguments and to whom. The French and American arguments may 
have fared better had they been made by some other actor or to another audience, 
but the combination of France and the United States being the actors making 
those specific arguments to an audience highly biased towards a responsibility to 
intervene ensured the lack of credibility of those arguments. 
How is one to determine which arguments are “good” if it is not enough to 
examine their internal structure and their reference points? Let us consider an 
example. In chapter five it was suggested that the American argument about costs 
was unconvincing, because of her large national budget, because she later found 
money to help the refugees, and because she had promised large amounts of 
money in return for capturing a single person, to name only three reasons. 
Certainly, it could have been the case that at the time, when the United States 
made this argument, her national budget was already spent, the money came in 
only later, and that the reward money had been reserved a long time ago and 
perhaps already spent several times for other things. On the other hand, had a 
poor country, such as Bangladesh, made the same argument to the same audience, 
it might have been more convincing. Is this difference due to the potential that the 
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United States ought to have had the necessary financial or material capability? 
This could be a naïve conclusion to draw and we would benefit more by looking at 
the roles we assign to particular actors. 
The fifth chapter examined implicitly the roles we assign to international actors, 
namely specific states, in relation to grave humanitarian crises through the 
expectations we have of those actors. The expectations we have for example of 
France and of the United States in such crises as the Rwandan genocide in 1994 
are indirect descriptions of the roles that are assigned to them, the roles they have 
taken, or the roles that one would anticipate from them. Thus, by examining the 
expectations we learn much about the roles of actors. Moreover, these 
expectations tell us much about ourselves as well. We would do well by asking 
why we have these expectations, on what basis we hold them, and why we assign 
particular roles to particular actors. In the context of chapter five, it is evident that 
for example the centrality of France in relation to Rwanda and the general 
position of France and of the United States within the international system lie 
behind those expectations. Here one should note, however, that although power 
might be important in such role-assigning, it is not the only factor to be 
considered. For example France might be compared to the United Kingdom or 
Germany in being relatively similarly powerful, but neither the United Kingdom 
nor Germany would be assigned a similar expectation to act in Rwanda than 
France. 
The role-assigning could be another point of further research and self-reflexivity. 
The thought experiment and the study of justifications of inaction in relation to 
grave humanitarian crises have underlined the importance of roles, which 
different international actors possess or have been assigned either through 
claiming them, interaction, or by those who study international politics. Thus, one 
might ask what kind of roles do international actors have and what is the 
evolution of such roles, but one might also ask on what basis and to what extent 
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